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Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690) 
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff 
R.O.A. General, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ) 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 
Defendant. 
) MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 960906388 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Defendant R.O.A. General, Inc. by and through its undersigned counsel, moves this court 
for summary judgment against plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, based 
upon the Affidavits and Memorandum in Support filed herewith, as well as the other pleadings on file with 
this court, which show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and defendant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
DATED this _Z? day of August, 1997. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
By. 
Leslie Van Frank 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690) 
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff 
R.O.A. General, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ) 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ) 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ) 
Defendant. ] 
) MEMORANDUM IN 
) SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 960906388 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Defendant R.O.A. General, Inc. by and through its undersigned counsel, submits the 
following Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between plaintiff ("Garco") and defendant ("Reagan") in this case 
arises from a lease ("1975 Lease") that Reagan (or its predecessor) had had for twenty (20) years to 
maintain an outdoor advertising sign on Garco's real property. When the 1975 Lease neared 
expiration, Garco and Reagan attempted to negotiate the terms of a new lease. The negotiations 
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never resulted in a new signed lease agreement, and when the 1975 Lease finally expired, Reagan 
removed its sign from Garco's property and erected a new sign on neighboring property. 
Garco's First and Second Claims for Relief are for damages predicated upon the 
underground foundation that Reagan left in place when it removed the sign from Garco's property. 
Neither the law nor the 1975 Lease, however, support Garco's asserted claims for relief. Reagan's 
use of the land pursuant to the 1975 Lease for an outdoor advertising sign allowed for the 
construction of the sign, including its foundation. The 1975 Lease contains no provision requiring 
Reagan on termination of the lease to remove the sign or its foundation or to restore the land to its 
pre-1975 Lease condition. Removal of the foundation may, in fact, harm one of Garco's buildings 
located on the subject real property. And Garco has been unable to identify any specific damage that 
it has suffered as a result of the foundation remaining in place, admitting that access to the nearby 
building has not been impaired and that the foundation does not disturb parking. Under these 
circumstances, Reagan's omission to remove the foundation from the Garco's property is simply not 
actionable. 
Garco's remaining three causes of action are based on the negotiations in which the 
parties engaged to craft the terms of a new lease, and Reagan's relocation of the sign to the 
neighboring property when the parties were unable to come to an agreement. Garco complains that 
the negotiations "lulled" Garco into inaction, such that Garco is now unable to utilize its property 
to compete with Reagan. Garco's claims ignore the plain language of the 1975 Lease, which contains 
a five-year non-compete agreement upon termination of Reagan's tenancy. Additionally, even if 
there were no non-compete agreement, the testimony of Garco's own agent evidence that Garco 
"lulled" itself into inaction, apparently believing that Reagan would ultimately capitulate to Garco's 
9 
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insistence for almost three years that Reagan enter into an agreement that Reagan had repeatedly 
rejected. Garco's three additional claims are also not actionable and should be dismissed as a matter 
of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Most of the facts set forth in this Statement of Facts are taken from the 5/15/97 
deposition testimony of Joe Kingston (hereafter "J.Kingston deposition"). Reagan disagrees with 
much of what Mr. Kingston has said on behalf of UPC about what happened in the negotiations 
between the parties. However, for purposes of this motion (only), these facts are accepted as 
undisputed. And as the Court will see, even under UPC's version of the facts, UPC's claims must 
be dismissed as a matter of law. 
1. Garco is the owner of real property located at 3994 South 300 West, Murray, 
Utah. On July 8, 1975, Reagan and Garco's predecessor-in-interest contracted to lease space for an 
outdoor advertising sign. (Complaint, par. 5; a true and correct copy of the lease is attached to the 
Affidavit of Dewey Reagan as Exhibit "A"). 
2. The 1975 Lease expired as of July 8, 1995. (Complaint, par. 6). 
3. Garco, through its property manager, Joe Kingston, first met with a Reagan 
agent (Dick Paxman) approximately four years prior to expiration of the 1975 Lease, in May of 1991 
to negotiate a new lease. (J.Kingston deposition, p. 46). 
4. Paxman told Joe Kingston that he would get back to him with an offer within 
a week or so. (J.Kingston deposition, pp. 47-48). 
5. JOG Kingston let four or five months go by with no offer being made by 
Reagan, so he finally called Paxman. In response, Paxman communicated a verbal offer on behalf 
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f Reagan some time in the August through October 1991 time frame. (J.Kingston deposition, p. 
8). 
6. Joe Kingston states that he countered Reagan's offer within a week 
J.Kingston deposition, p. 52), but also admits that he again let several months go by without hearing 
rom Reagan before attempting to reach Reagan again. (J.Kingston deposition, pp. 52-53.) 
7. Joe Kingston finally met with Reagan again through its agent Doug Hall in 
\pril of 1992. (J.Kingston deposition, p. 53). This was almost one year to the date after Garco's 
irst meeting with Reagan, (paragraph 3, supra). 
8. At this April 1992 meeting, Hall told Joe Kingston that he'd like to review the 
income of the sign and that he would get back to Joe Kingston with an offer. (J.Kingston deposition, 
p. 53). 
9. According to Joe Kingston, in that same April 1992 meeting, Hall told Joe 
Kingston that if Reagan and Garco were unable to come to terms, then Reagan would move its sign 
to the north to block Garco from doing business with anybody but Reagan. (J.Kingston deposition, 
p. 156-58). 
10. Over the next several months, Joe Kingston and Hall missed appointments 
with each other (J.Kingston deposition, pp. 54-55, 63), met at least once in June 1992 to discuss 
terms (J.Kingston deposition, pp. 55, 59-63), and finally met again in approximately August of 1992 
(J.Kingston deposition, p. 64). 
11. According to ]OQ Kingston, he and Hall came to an oral agreement in that 
August 1992 meeting (J.Kingston deposition, p. 65), but he wanted Reagan to sign the agreement 
before Garco would (J.Kingston deposition, p. 69). 
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to Reagan, stating that because the parties had Keen UP r--t finalize this agreement" u e , a n< v\ 
lease), Garco was terminating the 1975 Lease. (I-AIIIUM < -* .- Kingston deposition). 
On 1 Joi ' embei 18 1992, R eagan withdrew "any offer, oral or written, that may 
; u \e earlier been made" with respect to a new lease, and indicated 'that the 1975 Lease was still ii. 
effect. (Exhibit 8 to J.Kingston deposition). •• -• •• •-
1-T# Garco 'then turned the matter over to its attorney, Carl Kingston. (JJKingston 
deposition, pp. 82-83) 
• . .\ K^ .uz-tK " * i.irco and 
Reagan had not been able to reach an agreement, Reagan was to remove' the sign within ten days. 
• i:\lnh Km^Lwii deposition), 
«MI\\r protested Garco's attempt to require the sign removal, noting that the 
:
 07S lease was still in full lorce and effect. (Exhibit 11 to J.Kingston deposition). 
I lu'iealU.T, ioi .il least sovoial in nllr., I he discussion1-, I' luri-ii ||) j^ ar'i**1 
regarding a new lease continued, with Garco insisting upon the price and terms that Garco claimed 
the parties had agreed upon in August 1992 and with Reagan attempting to negotiate a lower price. 
• ; ; xt , ) : *'<'i '-it * ' ' .i.. ' * :> lu J.Kingston deposition;. 
4
 \ • ""•* " - almo^: -\M'. yars later, in Feb*uar\ T i°0^, 4he 
ronverbali . 'v: • . -• : . • .:.- . - * : . ' •, -. .i 
interested iii ttle property, but with the parties never coming to terms. (J.Kingston deposition, pps. 
1 A 1 1 , | <-» \ 
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19. During that entire two year period, Garco still insisted that the terms of the 
alleged August 1992 agreement were the only terms that Garco would accept. (J.Kingston 
deposition, p. 142). 
20. Garco and Reagan met again in February 1995, but once again their 
negotiations were unsuccessful. (Exhibits 16 and 17 to J.Kingston deposition). 
21. On February 23, 1995, Garco advised Reagan that it had "elected to pursue 
other options" with respect to Garco's property. (Exhibit 17 to J.Kingston deposition). 
22. As of February 1995, Garco had called several other sign companies, 
intending to have another sign put up by someone other than Reagan. (J.Kingston deposition, pps. 
148-149). 
23. Garco did not follow-up with any of these sign companies in its efforts to 
lease the space to someone other than Reagan until after Reagan removed its sign from Garco's 
property. (J.Kingston deposition, p. 150). 
24. Reagan removed its sign from the Garco property in June of 1995, but left the 
foundation in place, in part because of concerns that Garco had expressed that removal might 
damage the Garco's building near the sign. (Exhibit 19 to J.Kingston deposition; Affidavit of Dewey 
Reagan). 
25. Garco admits that the foundation has not impaired access to the adjacent 
building (J.Kingston deposition, p. 35), and that the foundation, which is flat and almost level to the 
ground, could be utilized for parking. (J.Kingston deposition, pp. 30-31, 113). 
26. In the meantime, on April 20, 1995, some six weeks after Garco told Reagan 
that it would cease further lease negotiations and intended to "pursue other options," Reagan entered 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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into a lease agreement with Garco's neighbor to 'the north, Mollerup Moving and Storage Co. 
("Mollerup") (Affidavit of Dewey Reagan) 
i I \ | in Il ,M, 1 W5. Reagan applied to the Utah Department of Transportation 
for a permit to move the sign located on Garco's property to the Mollerap property (Affidavit of 
I lew ey f! eagan) .
 a. . ..." 
28. Construction .of the new sign on the Mollerup property was completed on June 
1.1995. (Affidavit of Dewey Reagan). 
A i u ; n i v i H N r • . ' . ' 
L R E A G A N ' S REMAINING SIGN F OU NDA I ION CREATES . 
NO CAUSE OF ACTION IN FAVOR OF GARCO. 
Garco claims that Reagan has trespassed on Ga/^o s property and should be liable to 
Garco fc i i in: i l& ^\ ' f \ i! detai nei bj fa te foi u: ic ".-n • \r * a: nroperty. But 
Reagan had no obligation to remove the lobulation at the i \i <••• the J^'*v • ,e ise. ind therefore 
cannot be = .... damages tu uare* . -.. 
In determining v\hethei a tenant has an obligation at the end ol a lea^e to icmove 
stmctures that the tenant has erected during the term of the lease, courts look to the purposes of the 
lease a i id to its tei i ns I x r ii ista i ice, ir i. Di t i H v lei i SincL : w Refu lit u * ( J ) , 227 P 2d 88 ( Ka i I 1951), 
the defendant leased real property Irani \\w plaintiff to utilize as a site to construct tanks, power 
stations, pipeline:;
 LI;K. wiiiv r structures !.>i U.A \n ine tenaiu s operauoi: r\ a iai:K ..:vzt . .:..p iar,« :: 
Id. at 89. In furtherance of those purposes, the tenant had built, maintained, and utilized certain 
buildings and improvements on the property for a number of years before the lease terminated. Id. 
at 90. ( ) n tei i i I ii ia( ioi i o f 11 i,e 1 cast i, 111e tenai It fai 1 ed to remove: 
7 
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. . . several hundred feet of concrete sidewalks, concrete foundations 
for five or six dwelling houses, concrete foundations for four or five 
garages, concrete foundations for pumps and powers; and failed to 
take up and remove several hundred feet of pipe lines; failed to tear 
down and level the banks of earth tanks; failed to remove large 
quantities of broken concrete, stones, bricks, ironpipes and other 
similar refuse; failed to remove and destroy noxious weeds, grasses, 
trees, vines, and shrubs; failed to remove oil that had been permitted 
to flow or be spilled on the soil; failed to fill ditches, sumps, ponds, 
and other holes and depressions on said leased land, and failed to 
remove gravel and chat placed thereon for use in roadways and 
drives. 
Id. at 90. The lessor sued to recover damages resulting from the tenant's failure to remove these 
items it had placed on the property during its tenancy and to restore the premises to their pre-lease 
condition. The appellate court reviewed the lease between the parties, and then, relying on case law 
from Oklahoma. Texas and Kansas, upheld the trial court's demurrer of the complaint: 
Considering the expressed purpose of the lease, plaintiff was 
bound to know that the lessee, in furtherance thereof, would erect 
buildings, tanks, pipelines and all other things necessary for the 
operation of the business at hand. In fact, the right to erect such 
improvements was granted, but nowhere in the contract is there any 
provision requiring lessee, upon termination of the lease, to restore 
the premises to their former condition. As we read this lease contract, 
defendant lessee was under no duty at any time to remove any of its 
property. It was given the right and option to do so if it so desired, 
but nowhere is plaintiff lessor given the right to enforce removal. It 
therefore follows that since plaintiff had no right to enforce removal 
he is in no position to complain of the partial removal, which was 
done under contract right of lessee so to do, in the absence of 
negligence in accomplishing such partial removal. Had the parties 
desired to contract that upon termination of the lease defendant 
would be required to remove all of its property and to restore the 
premises to their former condition, they could have done so. but here 
the only covenant touching removal of the property is the one giving 
lessee the right to remove if it so desires, [emphasis added]. 
Id, at 92. 
8 
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Similarly. ii i Sherman C ' :? i ». I Tnitec i State s of 4meric ^ l * l ^ 
the United States govern merit had leased the plaintiff's land as a military post an. constructe i i 
number of I )u i ld ings a n d < Dthei structures having conci ete foi indations I he lease stated that the 
structures would remain the proper* v »-t the United States, "and may be removed therefrom by the 
Government prior to the termination t-f this lease." Id. at 882~(J.Hamley, concurring). When the 
lcas<* expirnl lln IIIIH1 llniilliliiigs svnr niiKUi'd lliiill llllin IMIMMMPHMII Irll the loimdalmn in pl.n i 
Rejecting the land-owner's claim .for damages, the Ninth Circuit noted that: 
The le;, ^ .* question gave the Government the right to 
remove improvements at the expiration of the lease, but not the duty 
to do so. There is no express covenant requiring the Government to 
^ restore the premises to the same condition as that existing at the 
beginning of the term,.. Under these circumstances, there is no implied 
covenant of the kind, suggested by [the landowner] 
ia. ^J.Hamu '- C'V; • -• . 
In the instant ease, Reagan leased Gare, *s land in 1 075 for the expressed purpose of 
.igiii in the 1975 Lease to construct the sign, including its foundation as a necessary structure for 
erection of the sign fd. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of the 1075 Lease, Reagan had the right to remove 
'••e h^Mi * • • • ase is Reagan, given tl: le di i,t;y to i emo1 e 
the sign at the end of the 197,5 Lease, nor is there reserved any right to Garco (or its predecessor) to 
ii: isist that tl: i,„e lar id to i e s to red to its pre-l.ea.se c o n d i t i o i I at tl le ei id, of the 1.9 7,5 I ,ease. Garco adi. i lits 
that the foundation does not interfere with parking or with access to its building. I he foundation is 
flat to the ground,, contains no holes, and, could, be covered with asphalt. Garco also admits that 
i. emovh tg th< :: I.In mc ia t ion < :oi ild i n idei i i iii ic 1:1 ic foi n, ldatioi i. of Garco's adjacent bi iii iii ig„, Garco simply 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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has no right at this time to insist that Reagan remove the foundation, and Garco's First and Second 
Causes of Action should be dismissed as a matter of law . 
II. GARCO HAS NO CLAIM AGAINST REAGAN 
BASED UPON THE PARTIES* NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW LEASE. 
Garco's remaining three causes of action claim damages under various theories 
against Reagan as a result of the four years of negotiations in which the parties engaged in an attempt 
to agree upon the terms of a new lease. When the negotiations proved unsuccessful, Reagan moved 
its sign to a neighboring property. But Garco insists that Reagan intentionally "lulled" Garco during 
that four-year period, so that Garco would not approach other sign companies. Garco protests the 
fact that because Reagan moved its sign to neighboring property (within 500 feet of the old sign 
location), Garco is now prevented from erecting another sign in competition with Reagan. 
A. The 1975 Lease prohibits Garco from competing with Reagan 
for a period of five years after termination. 
Garco's protestations ignore the plain language of the 1975 Lease. That document 
contains a non-compete provision, which reads as follows: 
Lessor [Garco] agrees at the termination of this lease for five years 
not to lease the demised premises to any outdoor advertiser other than 
Lessee [Reagan]. 
1975 Lease, paragraph 5. Therefore, Garco's claims are barred by the plain language of the 1975 
Lease. 
B. The Statute of Frauds prevents Garco from attempting to 
collect damages for an agreement that Reagan never signed. 
Garco asserts that the non-compete clause in the 1975 Lease is unenforceable. 
(Garco's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim). 
10 
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during the four-year" period that the parties were negotiating for a new lease is grounds for Garco's 
i niiiplaiiii llliiiiiil kc.it'.iii lulled Uaicn info mat lioi) I In tin!1 IIIIIIIII1, lint netured was that 
occasioned by Garco's apparent belief'that Reagan would ultimately capitulate to terms .that Garco 
admits Reagan had repeatedly rejected for more than three years. Garco admits that it began 
liL'^ otialmiin iMlh Kf\ii!ari fin i \\v\\ \wvw in I'^l mini1 111 111 Inin year, punt In rxpiMlum nt III 
1975 Lease. During the entire first year of that negotiation, Garco admits that it had contact with 
Reagan only four or five times (Statement of Facts,, paragraphs 3 7), w ith Garco allowing months 
and months to go by with no attempt by Garco at communication (Statement of Facts, pai s 5 ai id 
H Garco claims mat ii came fo oral agreement with Reagan on (he terms of a nev. lease agreement 
of that pi irported agreement for almost three years. (Statement oi Facts, paragraphs 17 and 19). 
Reagan >:;.. ^-uuiu.'. to prevent Gnrro durinjr that three year period from contacting Reagan's 
coin1 ••!• ' "••.«'. • •• , . ,. c * • - .• • • ; , * * 
admits it refused u J< V\ hen laced v\ ;i. impending expiration <>| the \l*7^ Lease, and unable "• 
ir-\L'.v...iK-'•];.. . ::: . fa new one,'Reagan simp/- in^\ev: its sign ncxi a»\>; , :ui : ,:-.ei: .*v 
unreasonably believing that Reagan eventually would accept terms that it had rejected for years. 
The true nature of Garco \s alleged claim for damages is those Garco W».JM ha --
suffered I lad R eagai i, ii i fact, sigi led ai i agreement ai id tl lei i failed to abide by it I he Stati ite of 
Frauds is designed specifically to prohihit .1 claim lor this t\ pe of damage. Reagan did not sign a 
written lease agreement, and cannot iv nciu name as it it had. i ,J circumvent the Statute of Frauds, 
Garco has created an entirely new cause of action, i.e., "lulling," in which Garco claims negotiations 
11 
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become actionable even though one side knows that the other is not willing to accept certain terms 
and is not willing to sign a written agreement that incorporate those terms. There is no such cause 
of action in common law or in Utah statutes, and this cause of action must be dismissed as a matter 
of law. ; 
III. GARCO HAS NO CLAIM AGAINST REAGAN 
BASED UPON REAGAN MOVING ITS SIGN 
TO THE NEIGHBORING PROPERTY. 
Garco alleges that Reagan's move of the sign to the neighboring property was 
performed with the "improper and predominant purpose to injure Garco." (Complaint, paragraph 
20). Garco also alleges, however, that at least a pari: of Reagan's purpose in moving the sign was 
to advance its own interests in competing with Garco. (Complaint, Fourth Claim for Relief). Once 
again assuming for purposes of argument that the five year non-compete provision of the 1975 Lease 
is unenforcable, Garco still cannot claim damages as a result of Reagan's action in moving the sign, 
for the marketplace encourages competition.. 
Garco's Third Claim for Relief is one for intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations. The tort requires not only that the alleged tortfeasor had an improper purpose, 
but that the improper purpose predominate. Leigh Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d 2931 307 (Utah 
1982). When the actor is at least partially motivated by advancing his own economic interests, there 
is no tort. Id. ">' 
Because it requires that the improper purpose predominate, this alternative 
[i.e., improper purpose rather than improper means] takes the long view of the 
defendant's conduct, allowing objectionable short-run purposes to be eclipsed by 
legitimate long-range economic motivation. Otherwise, much competitive 
commercial activity, such as a businessman's efforts to forestall a competitor in order 
to further his own long-range economic interests, could become tortious. In the^  
rough and tumble of the marketplace, competitors inevitably damage one another in 
12 
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the struggle for personal advantage. The law offers no remedy for those damages — 
even if intentional — because they are an inevitable by-product of competition. 
Id. The Utah Supreme Court went on to note that: 
On this same point, the Restatement (Second) of Torts holds that a competitor's 
interference with a prospective contractual relation is not improper if, among other 
things, "his purpose is at least in part to advance his interest in competing with the 
other. " Id. § 768(d). The authors explain: 
The rule . . . developed to advance the actor's competitive interest and 
the supposed social benefits arising from it. If his conduct is directed, 
at least in part, to that end, the fact that he is also motivated by other 
impulses, as for example, hatred or a desire for revenge is not alone 
sufficient to make his interference improper. . . . Id. § 768, comment 
g. [emphasis added] 
Leigh Furniture v. lsom% 657 P.2d at 307, footnote 9. Reagan obviously wanted a sign in the area 
of Garco's property. It attempted for years to negotiate with Garco to back off of lease terms that 
Reagan was unwilling to accept. Garco believed that it had the right to contact other sign companies, 
as evidenced by its February 1995 communication to Reagan that it had "elected to pursue other 
options." Surely Garco knew that Reagan had a corresponding right to contact other landowners. 
These negotiations do not constitute unfair competition, but were clearly simply unsuccessful 
lessor/lessee negotiations. And any injury that Garco suffered in the "rough and tumble of the 
marketplace" when Reagan finally walked away from the negotiations is not actionable. 
Similarly, Reagan is not liable under the Unfair Practices Act (Garco's Fourth Claim 
for Relief). The purpose of that Act is to foster and encourage competition. U.C.A. §13-5-7. In a 
market in which Garco was insisting on unacceptable lease terms, the market took care of Reagan's 
need for sign space. Reagan was able to obtain more favorable terms with Garco's neighbor, and 
13 
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{ 
simply moved its sign.1 What the Unfair Practices Act prohibits is price discrimination, §13-5-3, 
and sales at less than cost, §13-5-7. Garco has not alleged that Reagan engaged in price 
discrimination or sold anything at less than cost. Garco is only unhappy because Reagan refused to 
accept Garco's lease terms and moved next door. 
The problem of which Garco has complained regarding its inability to erect its own 
advertising sign in competition with Reagan is one of Garco's own making. By continually insisting 
on lease terms that Reagan refused to accept, and by waiting until after Reagan had made 
arrangements to build a new sign on the neighboring property to contact Reagan's competitors, 
Garco may have bruised its nose in the rough and tumble of the marketplace. But Reagan's 
legitimate economic motivations are not prohibited by law. Garco's Third, Fourth and Fifth Causes 
of Action should be dismissed as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Reagan respectfully respects the Court for an Order 
dismissing Garco's Complaint, in full. 
DATED this % day of Jkrfy, 1997. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Leslie Van Frank 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Counterclaim Plaintiff 
1
 While it is not necessary for the Court's decision, the fact is that the neighboring property 
owner dictated the placement of Reagan's sign when it was moved. The sign ended up within 
500 feet of Reagan's original sign location on Garco's property as a result of the neighboring 
property owner's needs and requirements. (Affidavit of Jim Mollerup). 
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
mailed, U.S. First class, postage prepaid, on this ^ day of August, 1997, to the following: 
F. Mark Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
624 North 300 West, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
.F:\LESLIE\JULY97\ROAUPC.MEM 
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&Gt£oor Advertising, Inc. 
1775 North 900 West 
Salt Like City, Utah 84116 
Pagel 
This agreement made and entered into by the undersigned lessor, (the ''Lessor") and 
by Reagan Outdoor Advertising, (the *LesseeM). Both lessor and lessee acknowledge the 
receipt and suiriciency of good and valuable consideration and agree as follows: 
The lessor does hereby gran; and convey to the lessee and its assigns and successor*, the 
exclusive right to use the following described property for the purpose of erecting and 
maintaining thereon outdoor advertising structures including such necessary devices, 
structures, connections, supports and appurtenances as may be desired by lessee for a 
term of ten years commencing on or before . JLE . day of. ^Tcnu£ _is3i-
at option of lessee, upon the following described land, together with ingress and egrett 
lo and upon the same, located in the county of t> A^-"T L~Ak_ k- ___ 
State of Utah and more particularly described as follows: 3 n frCp S p
 / S tate ot Utah and more panic 
L«»**« B U ) ' p l t c* oa or «u*ci» u> Uu» tasxrum+xxi. *u»*«qu*nx to u * c u U o n , m. m*i+* «n4 bound* dMcrlptioo. erf th* l o c a t i o n . ' 
annually, payable 
< ^ f (f monthly) quauuly; i>iiiu'&nuuAiir); however! prior to construction and obKUflJnf-p*raait» 
by lessee tho rental shall be Five Dollars. 
This lease shall continue on the same terms and conditions for a like successive period; 
thereafter, this lease shall continue in full force on the same terms and conditions for a 
like successive period or periods, mtlow tetter delivers to lessee notice a( termination within 
ninety days of the end of said term. Y^— r*~YvT 
It is further expressly agreed that lessee may terminate this lease by giving written 
notice and paying a penalty of one year s rent at any time within thirty days prior to the 
end of any twelve month period subsequent to the commencement date of this lcaseJ tseJfW 
Value <fi vyiied imdici, if die skid sp<u.e becomes obstructed so as 10 leyen the advertising « 
lny of lesseej> signs_execf4-on said uimiLcs. or if traffic is diverted oi ieduced-ror-ii--tKe 
use of-airfTucoMgns is prevented or restrictcdJ^y^a^vT-criflor any reason a building permit 
fdr erection or moditic^tian^-fenrsed inis lease may, at tne option of lessee, be terminawd 
or, the rent reducttiTcTrive Dollars while said condition cxists-aad in such event ltttor thaJl 
refund prorata any piep^dd xenial fui die unripiicd leiiii.t Lessor agrees that no such 
obstruction insofar as the same is within lessors control will be permitted or allowed. 
Lessor authorized lessee to trim and cut whatever trees, bushes, brush, as it deems necessary 
for unobstructed view of its advertising display. 
All advertising signs placed upon the described premises are to remain the property of 
lessee and may be removed by lessee at any t i m e l y letter u prevented by law, or govern-
nr-nf in niHilHryornVr<<j>£_fljhrT rarjrfjtcynnn itirmr'i rnnrrnl; frnm Hlnmirntinir it? xign^ 
the less^rnXy reduce ihs^frrrcsTprb^dcd herein by one-half with suchjrdnr^H rental tcr 
rrmain in effect so long as such coudiuuii mminues lu zxi£T 
Lessor warrants the title of said leasehold for the term herein mentioned. In the event 
this lease is not renewed or cancelled, lessor agrees that he will not for a period of five yean 
subsequent to the date of termination, release said premises to any other advertiser other 
than lessee for advertising purposes, yf-n thr rrrnt Irnnr-ihall oVifjpLfiuriftfl llir j f inn " 
lamina _ 
.. Reagan-
^ 
is expressly understood that neither the lessor nor lessee is bound by any stipul*- '^r 
tions, representations, or agree menu not printed or written in thi* lease. Q)< 
This agreement shall inure to the benefit of and thjdl be binding upon the heirs, per-
sonal representatives, successorx, and atrigm< of the parties hereto. 
Executed this . .day of . 19-
LESSEE: REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING 
-SK£ 
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Carl E. Kingston 
ATTORNEY AT WW 
3212 SOUTH STATE STREET 
P.O. BOX 15809 
SALT UVKE CITY, UTAH 84115 
TELEPHONE (801)486.1458 
FAX (801) 487-3971 
February 23, 1995 
Daniel A. Reagan 
1775 North 900 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Dear Mr. Reagan: 
I received your letter dated February 15, 1995 and passed it on to 
U.P.C. and also to Elden Kingston. We were disappointed in your letter, 
although not greatly surprised. We hoped that we would have some 
kind of an offer that we could deal with, but instead, you want to go 
back to "before square one." Since we have no desire to start all over 
with negotiations that have already been unproductive for over two 
years, my clients have elected to pursue other options with regard to 
both the 3986 South 1-15 property and the 3745 South State property. 
Accordingly, please accept this letter as official notification that 
your State Street sign constitutes a trespass and must be removed 
immediately. In addition, the sign must also be removed from the 3986 
South 1-15 property before July 8, 1995. We expressly reserve and any all 
claims for damages we may have against Reagan National Advertising, 
Inc., arising from trespass or otherwise. 
Very truly yours, 
Carl E. Kingston 
CEK/kj 
EXHIBIT 
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Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690) 
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff 
R.O.A. General, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a ] 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ) 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ] 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ; 
Defendant. ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
) DEWEY REAGAN 
) Civil No. 960906388 
) Judge William B. Bohling 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DEWEY REAGAN, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I am the general manager of R.O.A. General, Inc., d/b/a Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising, the defendant herein. This affidavit is based upon my personal knowledge and/or my 
review of company files and records. 
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2. On July 8. 1975, Reagan and Garco's predecessor-in-interest contracted to lease 
space on the real property that is the subject of this lawsuit ("Garco Property") for an outdoor 
advertising sign. A true and correct copy of the Lease is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
3. Reagan removed its sign from the Garco property in June of 1995, but left the 
foundation in place, in part because of concerns that Garco had expressed that removal might 
damage the Garco's building near the sign. 
4. On April 20, 1995, Reagan entered into a lease agreement with Garco's neighbor to 
the north, Mollerup Moving and Storage Co. ("Mollerup"). 
5. On April 24, 1995, Reagan applied to the Utah Department of Transportation for a 
permit to move the sign located on Garco's property to the Mollerup property. , ,
 r 
6.
 % Construction of the new sign on the Mollerup property was completed on bgegck, djL^ I 
1995. 
- 7 ^ DATED this / day of August, 1997. 
DEWEY Rfi^GAN* 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / T ^ d a y of August, 1997. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Michelle R. Soraer* 
525 E**t 100 Soutn #500 
MtUktftty.Utth S4102 
My Commii«»on Expwtt 
Aprt 2«,1©C8 
STATE OF UTAH 
(Seal) 
Notary Public 
Residing a t f ^ ' J ^ t ) , \{h\\ 
TYITKWm.r.KI-ACJAN.AlTl 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, 
U.S. First Class, postage prepaid, on this 8th day of August, 1997, to the following: 
F. Mark Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
624 North 300 West, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Di^ r 
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ic? Z '2 * REAL OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, IN 
SIGN LOCATION LEASE 
/ /fad AGR£RU1LNT made this ..„J££&i*t < ^ . l ^ l ~ , 1 9 . / ^ b e t v ^ e a ^ L ^ / U ^ V t ^ ^ 
^ ^ V ^ i m ^ V g - i hereinafter called the Leeinr. tad 
hereinafter c i lW the Lessee, 
ANOUTOOOI R ADVERTOiN<J/«fa, * Utah corporation, 
I. That, for tho consideration hereinafter mcntionftd, the Lessor doe* hereby grant to the Lessee, and (U assigns and 
successon, die exchuive riiftc to use the fottowiaf described property for the purpo*« of erecting piinflDd, printed, or Alumi-
natad edrertuinr. signS) including necessary structure*, cUvicet end connectioni, u>wit; on the ground, on buikl^ *ft, erecty ' 
or to be erected, at on rooii of any *uch buildinp, upon the fallowing described land, located ia the county oh 
Stace of Uuh, and more. particularly described u foilowi, to-wit: 
> v^/rV*T*~<a*#**«r^ LOCATION; 
.. JJ e a rtl< 
.rfj^L^^ 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION: 
•ad dull continue on the same terra* for an Initial period of coo yean from the date of rikcemiat of Mt/&gx structure (or 
advertising purpose* oa the herein deecribed prtaUet; notwithstanding the foregoing, it U further understood aiid agreed that 
If tho first structure U not placed within twelve month* from execution of thie agreement, that the clot anniversary 4wf shell 
be the- commencement date of the lease and renL + 
3. Leasee ihalJ pay to the Leesor renuJ ia the amount of %...(gwLCyv*x year payable on a (Monthly)Quarterly; 
Sifceeei) haiii. Prior to construcuon and during *ich daw as DO s^vertiiing copicj are being dispiiiyW- «riithe deavis+J 
promisee by tr**x, the rent thai] be at the rau U ken percent uf the annual renuL 
iM.ua, Aiuuicipu or omc^ puonc aumonty mau rruorce ari/ fUWi or rcruiAuOni oxTUrc* 
ig the Jocatiua, comcrucrion, maintenance or operation of eigne, to AS to dimlniah the 
urpow, or in CJUC the view of the prcmisee shall become obstructed the Lcseo* may tcr-
c thirty days written notice. 
^ 4. Lease* grant* to the Lessee privilege And option to continue thU lee>s for a like period on the earn* and ennrti-
tlocu herein iot out; said renew*] #hall be dtenuvl ro have been exercued for «u •ddiUooal period by the '•^tinging in the 
poteession of laid premise* and the payment of rent Leseor agrees at the termination of this tease for five rpartaot to lce«« , , 
the d*mUed premiees to any outdoor advertiser other than Leeeoe* ^ 4^6^^C^r^^^c-£^^fC^^/^p^j^.<h^^^^^^ 
X In the case the Federal. State, Municipal or other public SxSS\^mi\fmhrc^ l^ruEioTrt |ulat»ni or^jc t*^* \ 
which chjtil have the effect of rtftxicdag the iocxtiuo, com true don. maintenance or operation of igm. to ai to dimlniah the V 
value of Mid premue* for Advertiikg- puri 
minate thii lea** upoa iftvinc the Leoot 4 
. & it i« understood that m-tfce event of the termination of this leas* under any of the provuioo herein"*«t oat, any 
peniai which haa bees peid in advance by the Leuee »hali be ropeid by the Leuov. 
'• 7, The L/auee U and shall remain the owner of ail «U°* *ad improvemenu placod by LAUCA OO aaid property tnd 
h*j the ri«hc to removn or change the same At any rime. 
8. The Leuor reprcsend that he M the osmt^tatUM'msiaii of the premise* above deicribed and h u the authority 
to execute thie leaic 
9. In the event the Lessor ihould defauit in any of the covenants and *rra«mcnti concaiacd hcreiu. Leuor nfrcci 
to pay all coats and cxp«nsee that may arise from eaforcinj; this acrtement either by tuit or otherwise, including resuonabie 
attorney feet. 
10. Lc**or a^ rexu thAC he, his tenants, Menu, employw*, or other pertonj acting in his bahaif, chail oot place or auu'n* 
tain any object on die premise* at oa any neirhoorinf premiMi which would in any way obstruct the view of Lessee's ikn 
structurei. If such an obsuruction occurs the Leasee has the option of reouiruur trui Lcuor to t%movc taid obstruction, or t 
JLeasee may itself remove th« oUtructioq charxinf the cost of laid removal to the Lessor, or the Lessee may reduce the ttaul 
herein peid to the sum oi Five Dollars per rev #o ' * ' '' 
11. Leseof lUefl iKer&c tf cause to be. 
'the 
siiuch oUtrucdoo condnuM, 
^ ^ ^ r . ---, --,--„
 > j r . ^ ^ r m l t / O be «tcted any jign which[ wul extend ebove the parapet 
wail of Leseor'i b u i l d i a t ^ ^ ^ ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ s ? ^ ^ 
12. This Lcaie thaJl'cocudnite'the sole *eT*cmcat of the partie* relating to the Iea*e of the abore described premi*»4. V 
Neither party will be bound by any lutementi, warrantie*, or promhci, oral or written, unJea «uch diuoicatt, wammtie4 or V 
promise* are set forth ipccificaily in thii Loa*c A 
IS. Thi< a/rreecment ihaJI inure to the Unc/lt of^nd be blndlruj upon their htin, pcrtonai reprevuiudvei ruccc^or* Hs V-
and auitni of the parties hereto. / ' ' ' . / \ 
IN WITNESy WH£REpF, to have set their haadi the day iuid year Tint tbova wriatn. 
> 
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FiLtODiS'fKiCTCCL..i' 
Third Judicial District 
F. Mark Hansen, #5078 
624 North 300 West, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 533-2700 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a ; 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ) 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ) 
Defendant. } 
1 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMAR 
| • \ ' 
> Civil No. 960906388 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Plaintiff U.P.C., Inc. d/b/a Garco Industrial Park (Garco) respectfully submits this 
memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Because summary judgment denies the benefit of a trial, any doubt concerning the facts, including 
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, must be resolved in favor of the party 
opposing the motion. Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co.. 780 P.2d 827 (Utah App. 1989). 
If there is any genuine issue of material fact, the motion must be denied. Ruffmengo v. Miller, 579 
P.2d 342 (Utah 1978). Construing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in favor of Garco, 
there are numerous genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment in this case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Summary judgment may not be granted if there exists even a single disputed material fact. 
Garco responds to Defendant's Statement of Facts, and disputes a number of those facts, as follows: 
FACT NO. 1. Undisputed. 
FACT NO. 2. DISPUTED. Paragraph 6 of the Complaint does not allege the 1975 lease 
expired as of July 8, 1995; it alleges, "The lease expired no later than July 8, 1995." The lease 
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expired as early as July 8, 1985, a full decade earlier than Reagan claims, or became void as to 
Garco by March 2, 1990. [Facts 29-31] 
FACT NO. 3. DISPUTED IN PART. [Fact 31] 
FACT NO. 4. Undisputed. Paxman also told Kingston that Reagan agreed and was willing 
to pay market rate for a lease. [Kingston depo. p. 47] 
FACT NO. 5. Undisputed. When Paxman failed to get back to Kingston as he had agreed, 
Kingston complained about the delay and said Reagan was stalling. Paxman agreed Reagan had 
taken a long time, and acting within his authority as Reagan's agent, agreed when the parties set 
a new rate, it would be retroactive to June 1, 1991. [Kingston depo. p. 48-49] Paxman then 
offered $350.00 per month, far below the promised market rate. [Kingston depo. p. 49-51] 
FACT NOS. 6. Undisputed that Kingston again made the next contact. Paxman then said he 
would put Kingston in touch with Bill Reagan or Doug Hall. When Reagan again failed to follow 
through, Kingston made the next contact. [Kingston depo. p. 52-53] 
FACT NOS. 7, 8. Undisputed that Kingston and Hall met around April of 1992. Kingston told 
Hall the parties did not have a valid lease, and that Garco was asking $800.00 per month. Hall 
scheduled then later changed an appointment. [Kingston depo p. 53-54] 
FACT NOS. 9, 10. Undisputed. 
FACT NO. 11. By the conclusion of the August 1992 meeting the parties had an agreement: 
Q. And you felt you needed Reagan's signature on there before it was a 
complete deal, correct? 
A. I felt like we had a deal, and we had agreed to it and that we just 
needed it executed. [Kingston depo. p. 69 lines 11-14] 
Q. And so I understand it, you have indicated that you came to a 
complete agreement with respect to Exhibit 4? 
A. Right. [Kingston depo. p. 72 lines 4-7] 
Q. Why were you thinking it needed to be finalized with a signature? 
A. We had an agreement; just the formality of the signature on it. 
[Kingston depo. p. 75 lines 18-21] 
FACT NO. 12. DISPUTED. Between August and October of 1992 Kingston spoke with Hall 
by telephone several times. The substance of those conversations was that the parties had reached 
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( 
an agreement and that they needed to get the lease signed. [Kingston depo. p. 72-73] Kingston's 
October 29, 1992 letter did not state Garco was terminating the 1975 lease. The letter says, "As 
I notified Dick Paxman in May of 1991, and you shortly there after, your old lease had expired. ... 
We met and agreed on the following amounts: ... Because we have been unable to finalize this 
agreement, you are hereby notified that any lease between you and Garco Industrial Park is hereby 
terminated." Kingston was referring to the August 1992 agreement or a tenancy at will. 
FACT NO. 13. DISPUTED in part. Reagan's letter [Kingston depo Ex. 8] speaks for itself. 
Reagan made no mention of a 1975 lease, but only referred to "the current lease." The only 
"current lease" was either the parties' August 1992 oral agreement or a tenancy at will. 
FACT NO. 14. Undisputed. 
FACT NO. 15. The contents of the referenced letter are undisputed, and speak for themselves. 
FACT NO. 16. DISPUTED. The letter refers not to the 1975 lease, but to the August 1992 
agreement or to Reagan's tenancy at will. 
FACT NO. 17. Undisputed. Kingston further testified: 
Q. So you were continuing your negotiations with Doug [Hall] from 
November of '92 through at least January of '93, correct? 
A. I felt like our negotiations were over and he was continuing to pursue 
the property. 
Q. I'm sorry. Explain that. 
A. H continued to tell us he was interested in the property. 
Q. But you felt the negotiations were every -
A. Yes, that we had resolved all of the issues that -
Q. You felt the negotiations were over as of August? 
A. Right. [Kingston Depo. p. 87 lines 9-22] 
FACT NO. 18. DISPUTED in part. Reagan seeks to imply there were further negotiations. 
There were not. Garco's position was consistent: Reagan was to comply with the lease terms the 
parties had agreed to in August of 1992, or remove its sign. [Kingston depo. p. 141-144] 
FACT NO. 19. Undisputed. 
FACT NO. 20. DISPUTED that the February 1995 meeting constituted "negotiations." 
FACT NO. 21. Undisputed. 
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FACT NO. 22. DISPUTED in part. Kingston did not contact Young Electric Sign Company 
(YESCO) until after Reagan removed its sign. [Kingston depo p. 150] 
FACT NO. 23. Undisputed. 
FACT NO. 24. DISPUTED in part. See Facts 40, 42, 44, 46, 47] 
FACT NO. 25. DISPUTED in part. Kingston testified that he hadn't heard complaints from 
the tenants about the foundation. He further testified the foundation does interfere with reasphalting 
the area, and with any digging for water lines or other below-surface construction in the area. 
[Kingston depo. p. 117-118, 172-73] 
FACT NO. 26. Undisputed. Garco is informed Reagan's lease with Mollerup was part of a 
settlement of a major dispute, the terms of which are purportedly subject to a confidentiality 
agreement demanded by Reagan as part of the settlement. [Kingston Aff t f 6] 
FACT NOS. 27, 28. DISPUTED. Reagan did not move the Garco Sign to the Mollerup property. 
By Reagan's own admission, the new sign on the Mollerup premises was completed about three 
weeks before Reagan removed its sign from Garco. [Facts 28, 45, 47] 
Garco submits the following additional facts as material to this motion: 
Fact No. 29. On February 22, 1990 U.P.C., Inc. purchased the Garco property in good 
faith and for a valuable consideration, and on March 2, 1990 recorded its warranty deed. 
[[Kingston Aff ' t f l , Ex. 1] 
Fact No. 30. Reagan's purported lease was not in the file Garco received from its grantor. 
[Kingston depo p. 37-41] 
Fact No. 31. In May of 1991 Kingston met with Paxman, Reagan's agent. Kingston 
informed Paxman Garco and Reagan did not have a valid lease, and that Reagan needed to sign a 
lease at market rate or move its sign. Paxman, acting within the scope of his authority as Reagan's 
agent, admitted and agreed the lease Reagan now seeks to rely on was not valid. [Kingston depo. 
P. 47, 61] Given Paxman's statement, by Reagan's own admission the lease expired as early as July Digitiz d by the Howard W. Hu ter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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f 
8, 1985, a full decade earlier than Reagan now claims. Assuming Garco had inquiry notice, it 
satisfied any resulting duty of inquiry. 
Fact No. 32. During the April-May 1992 time frame, Kingston scheduled two appointments 
with Hall, but was stood up. Hall finally came to Kingston's office in about June of 1992. During 
that meeting, Hall offered a price of $7,200.00 per year, retroactive to June 1, 1991, and agreed 
to delete from Reagan's standard form lease provisions giving Reagan a right of first refusal option 
on the property, and to delete the non-compete clause. [Kingston depo p. 54-60] 
Fact No. 33. In about August of 1992 Kingston and Hall met again. Hall had authority as 
Reagan's agent to contract for a sign location lease and acted within the scope of that authority. The 
parties agreed to a ten year lease at $7,800.00 per year the first five years, effective June 1, 1991, 
and $8,400.00 per year the second five years. The parties also agreed, among other things, to 
delete from Reagan's standard lease agreement the noncompete clause and the purchase option; and 
modified the automatic renewal provision. Hall reduced the agreement to writing by modifying 
Reagan's standard form agreement in his own handwriting. Hall said he wanted to have the written 
agreement cleaned up, made better looking and more presentable before he added his signature, and 
Kingston wanted Hall to sign the agreement first so Reagan couldn't make other changes after 
Kingston signed. Therefore, although the parties had contracted for a lease, they agreed to reserve 
signing the document until it was cleaned up. [Kingston depo p. 64-72, 106-107, Ex. 4] 
Fact No. 34. Reagan did not record its 1975 lease until December 14, 1992, four months 
after the parties had contracted for a new lease, over a year after Reagan admitted it had no lease 
on the property, and over two years after Garco recorded its deed. [Kingston Aff't 1 2, Ex. 2] 
Fact No. 35. Although the document Reagan recorded was purportedly signed July 8, 1975, 
it was notarized by a seal that expired February 15, 1995. Because notary seals are renewed every 
four years, the recorded document did not even exist until some time after February 15, 1991, a full 
year after Garco bought the property. [Kingston Aff 11 3, Ex. 2] In addition, while paragraph 1 
of the lease has written, "see attached tax notice for description hereby incorporated by reference, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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exhibit "A", the page Reagan recorded as exhibit "A" is not a tax notice. The facial inconsistencies 
on Reagan's purported lease raises serious questions about the preparation and the credibility of 
Reagan's evidence, not to mention the legality of the acts of the notaries involved. Dewey Reagan's 
affidavit, whose sworn false identification of the lease as of only one page of the four page recorded 
document also raises questions as to his credibility. These credibility questions are fact issues 
precluding summary judgment. 
Fact No. 36. Laws regulating outdoor advertising signs prohibit the placement of such signs 
in the area of Garco closer than 500 feet apart. The Utah Outdoor Advertising Act provides: 
§27-12-136.4(1) Outdoor advertising that is capable of being read or 
comprehended from any place on the main-traveled way of an interstate or primary 
system may not be erected or maintained, except: (d) signs located in a commercial 
or industrial zone .... 
§27-12-136.5(2)(a): Any sign allowed to be erected by reason of the exceptions set 
forth in Subsection 27-12-136-4(1) or in H-l zones shall not be closer than 500 feet 
to an existing off-premise sign adjacent to an interstate highway .... 
Fact No. 37. At all pertinent times Reagan owned and still owns a sign located about 510 
feet south of Garco's southern boundary line and about 600 feet south of the former Garco sign 
location. Before Reagan put up its Mollerup sign, Reagan also owned a sign located about 550 feet 
north of the former Garco sign location and 640 feet north of Garco's southern boundary. The 
northern boundary of the Mollerup premises is slightly over 500 feet from Garco's southern 
property line. This makes it possible to erect two signs over 500 feet apart, one at Mollerup's 
northern boundary and the other at Garco's southern boundary. [Kingston Aff't K 4, Ex. 3] 
Fact No. 38. Paragraph 7 of the 1975 lease provides, 'The Lessee is and shall remain the 
owner of all signs and improvements placed by Lessee on said property and has the right to remove 
or change the same at any time." [Dewey Reagan Aff't Ex. A] 
Fact No. 39. By letter dated February 10, 1993 Reagan informed Garco that Reagan still 
insisted the entire sign structure was owned by Reagan: 
The sign structure and faces are the property of Reagan Outdoor and may not be 
removed by anyone without our permission. Neither you nor your client has that 
permission. 
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Treble civil damages and other penalties are available to Reagan under the provisions 
of section 27-12-136.9 of the Utah Code should your clients, their agents or assigns, 
attempt the removal of, or cause damage to, the sign. [Kingston depo. Ex. 11] 
Fact No. 40. In October of 1992 Hall told Kingston if Garco wouldn't agree to modify the 
parties' August 1992 agreement, Reagan would remove its sign from Garco's premises, and erect 
another sign north of Garco within 500 feet of Garco's south property line, because Reagan didn't 
want Garco doing business with anyone but Reagan. Kingston insisted Reagan honor the agreement 
it had already made, and execute the agreement the parties had reduced to writing. At each 
succeeding communication, Reagan expressed its interest in keeping the Garco location, but 
continued to delay execution of the agreement. In June of 1995, following Reagan's clear 
repudiation of its agreement, Garco finally succeeded in having Reagan remove its sign, but Reagan 
still refused to remove the sign foundation. [Facts 9, 17-21, 47] 
Fact No. 41. About three weeks before Reagan removed its sign from the Garco premises, 
before Reagan informed Garco it would remove its sign, and without giving any advance indication, 
Reagan erected yet another sign about 480 feet from Garco's south boundary line and about 390 feet 
from Reagan's still-existing Garco sign, in blatant violation of the 500 foot limit set by the Utah 
Outdoor Advertising Act. Kingston asked Dewey Reagan why Reagan had thus moved its sign. 
Reagan told Kingston it had done so for the specific purpose to prevent Garco from doing business 
with anyone but Reagan. [Kingston Aff 11[5, Ex. 3; Kingston depo p. 155-158,177] 
Fact No. 42. The sign foundation was an integral part of Reagan's sign structure. It was 
always Garco's intent, and until Reagan actually removed the sign, Reagan's expressed intent, to 
remove the sign foundation as part and parcel of the sign removal. By letter dated June 12, 1995 
Reagan admitted it was obligated to remove the sign foundation as part of the sign structure, and 
represented it would do so as part of its sign removal [Kingston depo. p. 169, Ex. 21]: 
Unless I hear from you within the next 5 working days, I will assume that you want 
us to remove the sign structure and we will begin to do so. In addition, in order to 
remove the foundation we will need to tie up your parking lot for 3 to 4 days. 
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Fact No, 43. Even with the top of its sign structures removed, Reagan's sign foundations 
have monetary value to Reagan in excess of their removal cost, and can be economically used in the 
building of other signs. [Ex. 1, attached — Testimony of Reagan in injunction hearing, see 
attached transcript p. 55 lines 6-22, R.O.A. General, Inc. v. Lynn D. Kitchen et aL. Civil No. 
940905728PR (Utah 3d Dist. Ct.).] 
Fact No. 44. Garco was not concerned that removing the sign foundation would injure the 
building foundation. There is no indication Reagan risked damage to the building foundation when 
Reagan first excavated to build the foundation and erect the sign. Garco's only care was that 
Reagan use due care when removing the sign foundation to prevent damage to the building. Reagan 
could remove the foundation safely and easily, simply by having qualified people do the work. 
[Kingston depo p. 161-162, 169] 
Fact No. 45. Reagan finally removed its sign no sooner than June 19,1995. Reagan admits 
its Garco sign was still up and being used by Reagan until June 19, 1995, nearly three weeks after 
Tune 1, 1995, when Reagan completed erection of another sign 390 feet to the north of the Garco 
sign in clear violation of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act. [Facts 28, 47] 
Fact No. 46. Counsel for Garco reminded Reagan of its obligation not to damage the 
foundation, and warned Reagan it could leave the foundation only if it abandoned both the 
foundation and the sign poles to Garco: 
He [Joe Kingston] did mention that he was concerned that unless you provide 
additional support for the building near the sign, the building foundation will be 
undermined when the sign foundation is removed. I believe that you will agree that 
any removal activity you pursue must be done is such a way that the Garco property 
is not damaged. One suggestion that Joe made was that Garco may agree to allow 
you to just remove the top part of the structure and leave the foundation and poles 
in place. This way, you would avoid the expense and time of removing the 
foundation and Garco may be able to use the structure for its own sign, should it 
chose [sic] to do so at a later time. [Kingston depo. Ex. 19] 
?act No. 47. Despite Reagan's June 12, 1995 letter agreeing to remove the foundation, 
)ewey Reagan clandestinely told his crew to just cut the sign off and leave the foundation. Before 
leagan began removing its sign from the Garco property, Kingston met with Hall, Dewey Reagan Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and the crew chief. Kingston specifically told them they had to remove the foundation, and to take 
it out so as not to damage the foundation of the nearby building. When he learned that Reagan was 
planning to cut its sign off at the ground, Kingston drove to the sight and spoke to the crew chief, 
telling him that Reagan had take its foundation as well. The crew chief left to call Dewey, then 
returned and again started taking the sign out but leaving the foundation. Kingston immediately 
called Dewey and told him, "In no conversation have I ever given you permission to do it any other 
way. It's not acceptable. It needs to be taken out." Dewey replied Reagan was going to just cut 
off the sign anyway, which Reagan did. [Kingston depo. p. 159-164, Ex. 18, 19] 
Fact No, 48. After Reagan removed its Garco sign, by letter dated August 9, 1995 Reagan 
informed Garco's attorney: 
In regards to another matter, that being the possibility of locating an outdoor 
advertising structure somewhere upon this location at a point to be determined in the 
future, I would greatly appreciate you facilitating a meeting between myself and Joe 
[Kingston], as we seem to have a hard time connecting. I look forward to facilitating 
a mutually beneficial business relationship in the near future and await word from 
Joe. 
[Kingston depo. Ex. 21] The only way Reagan and Garco could have "a mutually beneficial 
business relationship in the near future" would be for Reagan to erect a sign at Garco's southern 
boundary and move its Mollerup sign 25 feet north to Mollerup's northern boundary so as not to 
violate the 500 foot spacing limit. Reagan's overture to Garco is a frank admission Reagan's 
placement of the Mollerup sign was within Reagan's exclusive control, and demonstrated Reagan's 
choice for placement of the Mollerup sign was for the sole purpose of forcing Garco to deal with 
Reagan or no one. 
Fact No. 49. After meeting with Kingston to seek a new lease on Reagan's own terms, by 
letter dated September 11, 1995 Reagan again admitted Reagan's placement of the Mollerup sign 
was within Reagan's exclusive control, that Reagan's choice for placement of the Mollerup sign was 
for the sole purpose of preventing Garco from dealing with anyone but Reagan, and that Reagan 
refused to remove its sign to coerce Garco into an unfavorable lease: 
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In regards to the possibility of our parties entering into a new lease agreement which, 
as I stated above was the only topic that Joe and I discussed, I will contact them in 
the very near future with a proposal the subject of which will be easing the South 
West corner of your property in order to erect a new outdoor advertising structure. 
Should our parties be able to agree on a new ground lease, I would be willing to 
discuss possible further action at the old site. It is my hope that we can consummate 
a lease agreement in that spot and thus facilitate a new business relationship between 
our two parties. [Kingston depo Ex. 23] 
Fact No. 50. With respect to Reagan's placement of a sign on the Mollerup premises, 
Mollerup told Reagan where the sign had to be located as far as east-west placement (that is, 
respecting its distance from the freeway), but it was Reagan, not Mollerup, who chose the sign's 
north-south placement. Reagan told Mollerup that Reagan needed the sign to be about 20 feet or 
so south of Mollerup's northern Boundary. Mollemp informed Reagan the sign would be more in 
the way there, but Reagan insisted, so Mollerup acquiesced in Reagan's chosen location. The sign 
could have been placed at Mollerup's the northern boundary rather than the location Reagan chose, 
and such a placement would actually have been preferable to Mollerup, as it would interfere less 
with Mollerup's ability to use the area. [Kingston Aff t ^ 6, Ex. 3] 
Fact No. 51. It is readily apparent from an inspection of the Mollerup property that 
Reagan's sign could easily have been placed at Mollerup's northern boundary; that Reagan's 
placement of the sign some 25 feet south of the boundary was more inconvenient to Mollerup than 
placing the sign at the boundary would have been; and that the difference between the two locations 
on the Mollerup premises would have no effect on Reagan's ability to sell advertising space on the 
sign. [Kingston Aff t H 7, Ex. 3] 
Fact No. 52. On July 29, 1996, Garco served Reagan with a Notice of Unlawful Detainer 
pursuant to U.C.A. et seq. [Complaint ^16; Amended Answer \1\ Kingston depo Ex. 27] 
Fact No. 53. Reagan still has not removed its sign foundation, and refuses to do so. 
[Complaint 1f9; Amended Answer f4,5; Reagan's pending motion generally] 
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ARGUMENT 
I. REAGAN'S PURPORTED DEED IS VOID AGAINST GARCO. 
Assuming for the sake of argument Reagan's sign lease was valid with respect to Garco's 
grantor, it is nevertheless not enforceable against Garco. Utah Code Ann. §57-3-3 provides: 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith 
and for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
On February 22, 1990 Garco purchased the property in good faith and for a valuable 
consideration, and on March 2,1990 recorded its warranty deed. Reagan's purported lease was not 
in the file Garco received from its grantor. Reagan did not record its lease until December 14, 
1992, over two years after Garco recorded its deed and over a year after Reagan admitted to Garco 
it had no valid lease on the property. 
The document Reagan recorded was purportedly signed on July 8, 1975, but notarized by 
a seal that expired February 15, 1995. Because notary seals are renewed every four years, the 
document did not exist even until after February 15, 1991, a full year after Garco bought the 
property. Since Garco had no record notice, and had no actual notice of a document that on its face 
did not exist at the time of purchase, Reagan's purported lease is void as against Garco. 
II. REAGAN IS LIABLE FOR TRESPASS AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER. 
A. REAGAN IS LIABLE FOR TRESPASS. 
Garco's First Claim for Relief is for trespass. Restatement (Second) of Torts concisely 
summarizes the black letter law. Section 158 states, "One is subject to liability to another for 
trespass, irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the 
other, if he intentionally ... (c) fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to 
remove." Section 160 states: 
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A trespass may be committed by the continued presence on the land of a 
structure ... the actor or his predecessor in legal interest has placed on the land (a) 
with the consent of the person then in possession of the land, if the actor fails to 
remove it after the consent has been effectively terminated .... (Comment g) "Even 
though the actor ... has not agreed to remove the structure ... from the land upon the 
termination of the license pursuant to which it was placed there, ... the termination 
of the license creates a situation in which the rule stated in this Section applies." 
Section 170 states, "A consent given by a possessor of land to the actor's presence on the land 
during a specified period of time does not create a privilege to enter or remain on the land at any 
other time." Reagan waived any claim to privilege or license as an affirmative defense by failing 
to plead it either in its Answer or Amended Answer. U.R.C.P. Rule 8, 12(h). 
The evidence and reasonable inferences support a finding of trespass. The principle that 
improvements become the landlord's property does not apply in the face of contrary lease 
provisions. If the lease authorizes a tenant to construct and remove improvements, the tenant 
retains title even to seemingly permanent improvements. 49 Am Jur2d. Landlord and Tenant §899 
and note 26. Absent an agreement to the contrary, a tenant's improvements to real property 
becomes the property of the landlord when the lease terminates. Gourlev v. O'Donnelh 626 P.2d 
367, 371 (Or. App. 1981). But Reagan's lease with Garco's grantor included just such an 
"agreement to the contrary." Paragraph 7 of that document provides in no uncertain terms, "The 
Lessee [Reagan] is and shall remain the owner of all signs and improvements placed by Lessee on 
said property..." Reagan has even threatened to sue Garco should Garco seek to interfere with 
Reagan's ownership interest in the Garco sign structure. 
While Reagan still owns its sign structure including its foundation, any rights Reagan may 
have had against Garco's grantor are not binding on Garco, since the 1975 lease is void as against 
Garco. Point I, infra. The 1975 lease terminated no later than March 2, 1990. Reagan has no 
right to remain in possession of any part of the Garco premises. Yet Reagan still "is and shall 
remain" the owner of its sign foundation , which still has value to Reagan if not to Garco. By 
keeping its property on Garco's premises after all consent to the property's continued presence has 
terminated, Reagan is in continuing trespass and unlawful detainer of Garco's premises. 
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Restatement (Second), Property §12.2 provides: 
(1) Except to the extent the parties to a lease validly agree otherwise, the tenant 
is entitled to make changes in the physical condition of the leased property which are 
reasonably necessary in order for the tenant to use the leased property in a manner 
that is reasonable under all the circumstances. 
(2) In situations not described in subsection 1, except to the extent the parties to 
a lease validly agree otherwise, there is a breach of the tenant's obligation if he 
makes changes in the physical condition of the leased property and the leased 
property ... is not restored promptly after a request from the landlord to do so .... 
(3) Except to the extent the parties to a lease validly agree otherwise, there is a 
breach of the tenant's obligation if he makes permissible changes in the leased 
property and does not, when requested by the landlord, restore, where restoration 
is possible, the lease property to its former condition .... 
Moreover, 
The owner of an easement is said to have all rights incident or necessary to its proper 
enjoyment, but nothing more. And, if he exceeds his rights either in the manner or 
extent of its use, he becomes a trespasser to the extent of the unauthorized use. 
25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements §72. Even the 1975 lease gave Reagan the right to use the Garco 
premises only "for the purpose of erecting ... advertising signs, including necessary structures, 
devices and connections." Reagan was given no right to erect structures on the premises in 
perpetuity, or any underground structures except as necessary to support advertising signs during 
the lease. Even during the lease Reagan could not cut off its sign and leave the foundation in the 
ground, since such a use of the premises would not be reasonably necessary for Reagan to use the 
premises in a manner reasonable under the circumstances. Restatement (Second), Property 
§12.2(1). When the lease expired Reagan could, but only with the landowner's consent, let the 
landowner keep the entire sign structure. Once having undertaken to remove the structure, Reagan 
had to remove the entire structure. To construe the 1975 lease otherwise would be to extend to 
Reagan a right to use the premises in perpetuity, for a purpose not granted by the lease. Reagan's 
argument that the 1975 lease does not spell out an express duty for Reagan to remove its property 
from the premises is specious. Nowhere in that document is Reagan given a right to continue in 
possession of the premises upon termination of the lease, and it would be unreasonable, construing 
that document as a whole, with all inferences construed against Reagan, to imply such a right. 
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Reagan seems to imply Garco cannot maintain an action for trespass on the theory Garco's 
damages are nominal. Such an argument fails for four reasons. First, actual damages are not a 
necessary element of trespass. The essence of a trespass to real property is an injury to the right 
of possession. The law therefore infers some damage from every trespass. Since the mere act of 
trespass alone, without more, interferes with the right of possession, a trespass is actionable without 
the need to prove harm to any legally protected interest. 75 Am Jur 2d Trespass §§25, 34, 117. 
A prevailing plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages even in the absence of any proof of injury, and 
even where he is benefitted by the trespass. Id. §141. 
Second, even if damages are nominal an owner of property subject to a continuing trespass 
such as Reagan's is entitled to injunctive relief. Id section 113. 
Third, the assessment of damages is left to the trier of fact, Id. §120, precluding summary 
judgment on that fact issue. 
Fourth, Garco has suffered actual damages. Where the trespass results from termination of 
a landowner's consent to the presence of a structure originally placed on the land with consent, 
damages include the rental value of the space occupied by the structure during trespass. A 
defendant is liable for the property's rental value even though the landowner was not hindered in 
any way in his use of the property. 75 Am Jur 2d Trespass §135. The landowner may also recover 
the cost to remove the structure. Id §137. If, as here, the trespass is direct, even nominal damages 
will support a punitive damage award, which again is an issue for the trier of fact precluding 
summary judgment. Id §§149, 152; Powers v. Taylor. 379 P.2d 380, 382 (Utah 1963). 
Reagan relies solely on two hoary, irrelevant cases from other jurisdictions. Duvanel v. 
Sinclair Refining Co.. 227 P.2d 88 (Kan. 1951) and M. H. Sherman Co. v. United States. 258 
F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1958) contain no holdings or dicta addressing even indirectly an action sounding 
in trespass. In both cases, unlike Reagan, the lessee did not retain ownership of the improvements. 
Duvanel involved a contract action based on an alleged implied covenant of good faith in an oil and 
gas lease. It stood only for the proposition, not at issue here, that an express agreement excludes 
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an implied one of a contradictory nature. Id, at 92. And in Sherman the parties purposefully 
negotiated out of a lease a provision that the lessee would restore the premises, and substituted a 
provision expressly relieving the lessee of any restoration responsibility. 
Duvanel is questionable authority even as to the proposition for which it stands. In Bonds 
v. Sanchez-O'Brien Oil & Gas Co., 715 P.2d 444 (Ark. 1986) the Court addressed whether a lease 
includes an implied duty by the lessee to restore the land upon termination of the lease. The Court 
noted the trend is to reverse older cases not recognizing a duty. One participant in the trend was 
Kansas, the very state from which Duvanel originated, which enacted a statute impliedly overruling 
Duvanel, requiring an operator to remove all structures from the land and restore the surface to its 
pre-lease condition. Bonds at 445. The Court went on to state, "We are persuaded that the current 
trend toward placing the burden of restoration on the lessee is the better view. ... To hold 
otherwise would allow the lessee to continue to occupy the surface, without change, after the lease 
has ended. ... Accordingly, we hold that the duty to restore the surface, as nearly as practicable, 
to the same condition as it was before the drilling is implied in the lease agreement." Jd, at 446. 
Thus, even under a contract cause of action argued by Reagan but not alleged by Garco, Reagan 
would be responsible for removing its entire structure at the end of the lease. 
B. REAGAN IS LIABLE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-36-3(1) provides: 
A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer: 
(a) when he continues in possession ... of the property or any part of it, after the 
expiration of the specified term or period for which it is let to him, which specified 
term or period ... shall be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified 
term or period; 
(b) when having leased real property for an indefinite time with monthly or other 
periodic rent reserved: ... (ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in 
possession of the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five days 
Reagan's conduct fits squarely within the statutory definition of unlawful detainer. Even 
under Reagan's theory of the case, the 1975 lease expired July 8, 1996. Under Garco's theory the 
1975 lease was void as against Garco, and Reagan was a tenant at will. Reagan remains the owner 
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of the foundation it left behind and by which it continues in possession of the premises after the 
expiration of the specified term. Any one of Garco's letters of October 29, 1992, February 2, 
1993, February 23, 1995, June 19, 1995 June 26, 1995, September 14, 1995, October 5, 1995 and 
July 29, 1996 [Kingston depo Ex. 3, 10, 17, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27] would have triggered the unlawful 
detainer statute. 
Garco's damages for unlawful detainer are substantial. Reagan is liable at a minimum for 
three times the rental value of the property. Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10(3). In Forrester v. Cook. 
292 P. 206, 214 (Utah 1930), the Utah Supreme Court held the measure of treble damages for 
unlawful detainer includes the rental value of the property beginning from the unlawful detainer: 
The question may arise as to what is included within the term "damages."... 
The plaintiff is entitled to recover such damages as are the natural and proximate 
consequences of the unlawful detainer. Clearly the loss of the value of the use and 
occupation of the premises, or the rental value thereof, during the period when the 
premises were unlawfully withheld from plaintiff, is a damage suffered by her. 
While damages may not be restricted to the rental value and may include more, yet 
the rental value during the unlawful withholding of possession is the minimum of 
damages. [Citations omitted] ... After the tenancy has been terminated by the 
notice required by the statute, the person in unlawful possession is not owing rent 
under the contract, but must respond in damages pursuant to the law. Rental value 
or reasonable value of the use and occupancy of the premises becomes an element 
of damages for retaining possession. This is not rent, it is damages. 
Accord Monroe, Inc. v. Sidwell. 770 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Utah App. 1989). Since the rental value 
in 1992 was at least $8,400.00 per year, the disputed facts entitle Garco to a trial on its entitlement 
to over $25,000.00 per year from November of 1992 for Reagan's unlawful detainer. 
III. REAGAN IS LIABLE FOR INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE, 
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
Utah recognizes the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic relations. A 
plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing jor 
potential economic relations; (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means; (3) causing 
injury to the plaintiff. Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982). 
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affirmative defense, Leigh, supra at 304, which Reagan did not plead and therefore waived. Utah 
R. Civ. Proc. 12(h). 
The first and third elements of the tort are readily shown. Reagan, with full knowledge of 
the restriction in U.C.A. §27-12-136.5 against the erection of signs within 500 feet of each other, 
erected a new sign within 500 feet of Garco's southern boundary, and so intentionally barred Garco 
in perpetuity from contracting not just with Reagan's competitors but with Reagan as well, and loses 
forever the sign rental value of its entire property. 
The evidence and reasonable inferences support a finding Reagan employed improper means 
and had a predominant improper purpose: 
The alternative requirement of improper means is satisfied where the means 
used to interfere with a party's economic relations are contrary to law, such as 
violations of statutes, regulations, ore recognized common-law rules. Such acts are 
illegal or tortious in themselves and hence are clearly "improper" means of 
interference ... "Commonly included among improper means are violence, threats 
or other intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, 
defamation, or disparaging falsehood." 
Leigh at 311 (citations omitted). The Utah Outdoor Advertising Act precluded Garco from 
contracting for another sign until Reagan removed its sign. Although its lease had expired, Reagan 
not only refused to remove its sign, but threatened Garco with legal action should Garco remove 
the sign. Reagan at first remained as a tenant by feigning an interest in a new lease. When that 
failed, Reagan stayed in trespass, and in unlawful detainer in violation of U.C.A. §78-36-3(1). 
Reagan thus unlawfully kept Garco from getting a sign permit while Reagan was securing a permit 
for the Mollerup sign. After obtaining its permit, Reagan violated U.C.A. §27-12-136.5 by 
erecting a sign less than 400 feet from its still-existing Garco sign. Reagan's violation of statutes, 
misrepresentations to Garco, and violation of the recognized common-law rules governing trespass, 
all constitute improper means supporting a claim under Leigh for intentional interference. 
Garco does not allege a claim for "lulling." However, Reagan continued lead Garco on 
while at the same time secretly contracted with Mollerup. Reagan's choice for the Mollerup sign 
location just within the 500 foot limit shows Reagan's interest in the Garco property was a 
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misrepresentation by which Reagan intended to, and did, lull Garco into inaction, sufficient to 
support both improper means and improper purpose. 
In October of 1992, Reagan told Garco if the parties did not reach agreement, Reagan would 
remove its sign and erect another sign within 500 feet, because Reagan didn't want Garco doing 
business with anyone but Reagan - in effect, Garco could lease to Reagan on Reagan's own terms, 
or could not lease, period. That in itself is an improper purpose as well as an unfair trade practice. 
When Reagan contracted with Mollerup, Reagan could have erected its sign at Mollerup's northern 
boundary. Garco could then contract for a lease at Garco's southern boundary, either with Reagan 
or one of Reagan's competitors, or could erect its own sign. Reagan chose a location on Mollerup's 
premises just within the 500 foot limit. That location was not more convenient for Mollerup and 
did not save Reagan money on its lease with Mollerup. It did not enhance the rentabiiity of 
Reagan's advertising space. Reagan made it legally impossible even for Reagan to contract with 
Garco for another sign which Reagan could also have profited from, and so was not for a "long-
range purpose of achieving some personal economic gain." After Reagan erected its Mollerup sign, 
it again told Garco, as it had nearly 3 years earlier, that it chose the location for the specific purpose 
no prevent Garco from doing business with anyone other than Reagan. 
Leigh does not require that Garco negate Reagan's claim it was partially motivated by its 
own economic interests. Reagan quotes the dicta in footnote 9. But the Court consciously rejected 
the Restatement approach to the tort. IcL at 304. All that is required is that the improper purpose 
predominate. It is noteworthy that the Court found Leigh Furniture liable for having an improper 
purpose even though partly motivated by its own economic interest. 
Reagan's claim that a noncompete clause in the 1975 lease is a bar to Garco's intentional 
interference claim is without merit. First, that agreement is void as to Garco. Point I, infra. 
Second, the lease expired more than five years before Reagan removed its sign, so the noncompete 
clause by its own terms was no longer in effect. Third, Reagan's act interferes with Garco's right 
well beyond the five years of the noncompete clause. It prevents Garco from leasing its premises 
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to another outdoor advertiser not just for five years, but in perpetuity. It diminishes the value of 
Garco's property in perpetuity by over $8,400.00 per year in 1992 dollars. 
Finally, the provision upon which Reagan relies is void. Paragraph 4 of the 1975 lease 
states, "Lessor agrees at the termination of this lease for five years not to lease the demised 
premises to any outdoor advertiser other than Lessee." Utah law is clear and well settled: _a 
covenant not to compete which is primarily designed to limit competition is simply not enforceable: 
Covenants not to compete are enforceable if carefully drawn to protect only 
the legitimate interests of the employer. ... Covenants not to compete which are 
primarily designed to limit competition or restrain the right to engage in a common 
calling are not enforceable. 
Robbins v. Finlav. 645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1982). 
This case does not deal with an ex-employee who possesses unusual expertise he acquired 
through employment, or who had access to trade secrets, customer lists or other confidential 
information, or who had a special role in generating good will for Reagan. Reagan's noncompete 
clause does not preserve a trade secret, good will or an extraordinary investment in an employee's 
training. The clause does nothing but attempt to restrict Garco's right to rent a common billboard 
site. It applies not just to the small footprint of the property where Reagan erected its sign, but to 
Garco's entire premises including both the freeway and the 300 West frontage, which Reagan never 
used. There is nothing particularly unique about Garco's premises that make them more valuable 
as a billboard site than similar property all along the freeway corridor. Reagan's noncompete clause 
is void for illegality. It is designed solely to limit and restrain trade and competition, and to 
monopolize the outdoor advertising business. It is a contract in restraint of trade or commerce, void 
as in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 and Utah Code Ann. §76-10-914(1). 
It is an attempt to monopolize, and void as in violation of 15 U.S.C. §2 and Utah Code Ann. §76-
10-914(2). It is an unfair method of competition in commerce or trade, and void as in violation of 
the Utah Unfair Practices Act, U.C.A. §§13-5-1 et seq. 
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Utah Code Ann. §78-18-l(l)(a) provides that punitive damages may be awarded if "the acts 
or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent 
conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, 
the rights of others." Utah allows punitive damages in cases of trespass. Powers v. Taylor, 379 
P.2d 380, 382 (Utah 1963). They may be awarded in addition to only nominal damages if, as here, 
the trespasser was given notice its activities constituted trespass and nonetheless continued the 
trespass. Aztec, Ltd., Inc. v. Creekside Investment Co., 602 P.2d 64, 68 adaho 1979). Proof of 
Reagan's intentional interference tort would also entitle Garco to an award of punitive damages. 
This entire issue is one of fact which may not be resolved by summary judgment. 
IV. IF NECESSARY, THE COURT SHOULD STAY REAGAN'S 
MOTION PENDING DISCOVERY. 
Generally, summary judgment should not be granted if discovery is incomplete, since 
information obtained through discovery may establish the existence of fact issues sufficient to defeat 
the motion. Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1987). 
On March 25, 1997 Garco served Reagan with Plaintiffs Second Set of Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents. [Ex. 2, attached] At Reagan's request, Garco agreed that 
Reagan could respond after taking the deposition of Joseph Kingston. [Ex. 3, attached] Although 
Mr. Kingston's deposition was taken May 15, 1997, Garco is still waiting patiently for Reagan's 
responses. Garco also has sought to coordinate dates for taking the depositions of Reagan's 
witnesses including among others Dick Paxman, Doug Hall, Dewey Reagan, William Reagan. {Ex. 
4, attached] Finally, Reagan has obtained an affidavit from James Mollerup containing at least one 
statement that may be inconsistent with statements he has previously made to Joseph Kingston, 
making it necessary for Reagan to depose Mr. Mollerup as well. 
Garco has fully responded to all of Reagan's discovery. In return Reagan has spent its time, 
not responding to Garco's discovery, but preparing this motion, which in itself is nothing more than 
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an improper use of Rule 56 for additional discovery by Reagan. In light of Garco's substantial 
outstanding discovery requests, most of which Garco initiated even before Reagan deposed Mr. 
Kingston, Garco is entitled to complete its discovery, and offer evidence obtained as a result, before 
the Court rules on the pending motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Reagan's motion for summary judgment is without merit. As shown above, there are 
numerous genuine issues of material fact raised by Reagan's motion that preclude summary 
judgment, including but not limited to: when the 1975 lease expired; whether it is void as against 
Garco; the effect of the August 1992 agreement on Garco's tort claims and damages; the scope and 
extent of Reagan's duty to remove its entire sign structure from Garco's premises; the circumstances 
surrounding the erection of Reagan's sign on the Mollerup property; and the means, intent and 
purpose employed by Reagan in placing its Mollerup sign when and where it did, the enforceability 
of the noncompete clause, and Garco's entitlement to punitive damages. The applicable laws of 
trespass, unlawful detainer and prima facie tort support judgment for Garco, not Reagan. For these 
and the other reasons stated above, the Court should deny Reagan's motion. 
DATED this < ^ ( day of August, 1997. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify on August ^~~[ , 1997 a true and correct copy of the above was served by first-
class mail to: 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Leslie Van Frank 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
2351p.015 
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TH£ COURT: I C . 
•veil:?:. I ihir.ic. 
MR. 20LL: I was -ust vcr.ceri.ng if we 
couil ndke in cpeninq cciefly --
Pecnior. for 
MKK i II 1UUC 1'agt 
• ! we're evicted ' 
\ 2 Tlic same people. Your Honor, now arc 
\ 3 sayine thai ihe -- the same people thai promised us ; •, 
j 4 thai tfiey wouldn't do seif-nelp are the same ones / , / ( { / •' 
| 5 that loki the City a variety of mlsfepres^hTa^5rfs^'"r.^^^'"u 
« 6 such as they would change the sign face only, that 
; 7 they'd submit plans that were tn compliance with what 
! s they were putting on the property. And we are going 
! i) to show todav that they didn't do that. 
110 And they've made out affidavits to the 
h i City where they swore that they had seen the footings 
! 12 be placed in place in that location. We are going to 
! 13 show today, Your Honor, that also is not true, ft is 
u the same people we are going to show, Your Honor, 
15 that waited for us to be out of town. After we were 
16 out of town they took into their own hands -- even 
17 though they had unlawful detainer rights, procedures 
us and privileges they should have honored, to trespass 
19 upon the land of RMAC. 
20 What we are going to show that we didn't 
21 know before, Your Honor, is that they actually cut 
22 the locks off the gate. They told RMAC that they 
23 worked for Reagan Outdoor Advertising when they made 
24 entry in and cut down our sign, took oft the existing 
25 ads. They then put on their own sign on top of our 
his, 
THE COURT: At the same time? 
MR. ZOLL: No, I would make mine after 
of course. 
MR. MITCHELL. He can talk and I'll 
Page 2 
i 
smg. 
THE COURT: You may proceed, 
7 Mr. Mitchell. 
8 MR. MITCHELL: My understanding is that 
9 we have an hour for this hearing, Your Honor? 
10 THE COURT: 55 minutes, an hour. 
11 MR. MITCHELL: 55 minutes. I am willing 
12 to forego opening statements if Counsel is. If not 
13 then I will make an opening statement. 
14 MR. ZOLL: I'd like to make a brief 
15 opening. I think it would help us, Your Honor. 
16 MR. MITCHELL: Judge -
17 THE COURT: Very brief. I have read all 
18 your materials. 
19 MR. MITCHELL: Very quickly, the issue 
20 that we are asking the Court to decide today is 
21 whether during the pendency of this lawsuit Reagan 
22 Outdoor Advertising is going to be allowed to tear 
23 down the sign on the Kitchen property. The Court 
24 previously entered a TRO requiring that we give 
25 Reagan access to the sign for the purpose or placing 
foundation on top of our four-foot pole that they 
left diere. 
They even went so far, Your Honor, as 
then to go Sack to the City when we decided to go 
next door and do a variety of misrepresentations to 
them not the least of which is they even called 
Mr. Reagan's son a Jewish prick. They will do 
anything it takes to get to the level they need to, 
and we will demonstrate it. 
In mitigation of this case, Judge, our 
client said: "It is free enterprize. I can go next 
door and lease the premises next door." They had the 
13 right to do that, too. They didn't go next door and 
14 lease the premises. We did. 
15 W^ then exercised all the bundle of 
16 rights that we have under 407 replacement and moved 
17 our permits next door. Now, they want to say that 
18 they - that we should stay. They want to say that 
19 this TRO should force us to stay on the leasehold 
20 that they claim they've evicted us from. Now, this 
21 reminds me of a book and page right of out of 
22 Ripley's Believe It or Not, Your Honor, where they'd 
23 suggest that they want us gone in the first instance, 
24 now they have decided they want us to stay. And 
25 they'd like this Court, Judge - I think is what they 
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1 its advertising on Utah Sign's sign. We've done so. 
2 Now Reagan is proposing to not use the sign but 
3 destroy it. We think that's outside the Court's 
4 order. 
5 We are asking the Court to do one of 
6 three things: Number one, we are asking the Court to 
7 make it clear that it's previous order did not 
8 authorize Reagan to tear down the sign and Reagan is 
9 not authorized to do so under this Court's previous 
10 order; or, number two, we are asking that the Court 
11 issue a preliminary injunction which prevents 
12 Mr. Reagan from tearing down the sign during the 
13 pendency of the action in order to maintain the 
14 status quo. Thank you. 
15 MR. ZOLL: Good morning, Your Honor. 
16 Just briefly, we are goine to show that this TRO was 
17 not merited here today, that the very party that's 
18 requesting this TRO asking for a special equitable 
19 relief is the same party that jumped the lease in 
20 this particular case, got a new one that was signed 
21 without so much as a phone call coming to our 
22 clients. We are going to show Your Honor that they 
23 sent out a termination notice. They've sued us on 
24 their counterclaim for unlawful detainer. They don't 
25 want us there iq rhp hnrtnm line. Thev sav that 
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1 are really asking is to go beyond the confines of 
2 this case, the premises that are here, and go next 
3 door into free enterprise and be able to try to take 
4 the leasehold that we have from the Doctormans and 
5 prevent us from doing it. 
6 We are going to show that we were tenants 
7 even under the very best case scenario on September 5 
8 - September the 28th when we got our 407 
9 relocations. We got Mr. Coffin here who is from the 
10 State who is going to explain that you have to have 
11 both permits, both the City and the State permit, to 
12 have the bundle of rights that it takes to have a 
13 sign. 
14 We are going to show that the Kitchen 
15 cannot possibly retain a space on that because they 
16 don't have 407 permits. You have to buy them or 
17 terminate them. Only Reagan has those, and we 
18 switched them. We are going to also demonstrate that 
19 the City has revoked their permit and for good cause, 
20 and that the City and the State have both granted us 
21 the right to be on the Doctorman place next door 
22 which is unrelated to this lawsuit. 
23 Your Honor, we believe as we look through 
24 this that the elements of TRO are clearly not met. 
25 And what we',d like Your Honor to focus on during the 
Page 
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jrL'Uiniz annul :s the ;;\;:KU:i;on.' 
~MR ZOI..!..: wc have four ice: and 
foundation. 
ill!: COURT. Mr Reagan, docs thai 
foundation have any vaiuc other than hooking -o 
Mr Rogers' ankle and throwing if."' 
MR REAGAN Ves. iherels about 20 feet 
of steel pipe there Trie proneny was substantially 
filled alter the sign was built. And we want to use 
that steel pipe and that foundation to rebuild the 
other sign. And that's -- it is -- pan of it is 
integrated with it. and the engineering is 
consistent. 
We don't want to destroy their sign. We 
will leave their sign on the property. They can put 
it back up if they want to or take it down. We just 
want to get our pipe, remove our foundation. And 
they are not suing us for not taking the foundation 
out of the ground That may be the next claim they 
make against us. And let our sign be where it is. 
MR. MITCHELL: Your Honor, so there's no 
misunderstanding: The sien that's up there on the 
Kitchen property is Utah Sign's sign on the 
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foundation that was placed there by Reagan. An issue 
which this Court will ultimately resolve in this case 
is: By virtue of Reagan's refusal to remove that at 
the termination of the lease, if the lease was 
terminated, is that still Reaean's foundation or 
not? You just don't get to leave your personal 
property there forever. 
And let me tell you, Judge, that 
foundation has about as much value to Reagan other 
than maybe a little bit of the pole that sticks out 
of the ground; nothing at all. It is a net deficit. 
It takes thousands of dollars to go in there and 
remove — 
MR. ZOLL: Not correct. There is no 
evidence to support that. That's speculation. He 
didn't get on die stand as to -
MR. MITCHELL: Nor did Mr. Zoll, nor 
Mr. Reagan -
THE COURT: R.O.A. is restrained from 
removing the sign base from the property until 
further order of the Court. 
Lynn Kitchen and Utah Sign are ordered to 
post a 10,000 corporate bond under the Tit For Tat 
Rule. 
MR. MITCHELL: Thank you, Your Honor. I 
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am well familiar with the Tit For Tat Rule. 
MR. ZOLL: That is a cash bond, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Cash or corporate. Of equal 
dignity to the Reagan bond. 
MR. MITCHELL: when you say the 
foundation, you are also including the Utah Sign that 
is on that foundation? 
THE COURT: Well, the whole sign, sure. 
MR. MITCHELL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. ZOLL: That needs to be removed -
THE COURT Listen. Don't interrupt the 
Court. 
MR. ZOLL: I am sorry, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Condition number two is that 
there is no signage to go on the face of that sign 
until further order of the Court. 
MR. MITCHELL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. ZOLL: I take it the order should be 
drafted. Should Mr. Mitchell draft the order? 
MR. MITCHELL: I will prepare the order. 
MR. ZOLL: Approved as to form. 
THE COURT: He prevailed so he should. 
MR. MITCHELL: No signage other than 
5 : " T a c e 5 T 
j i you meant".* 
i - THE COURT, rhey are going to use the 
j .» Doctorman. They have got signage on it. 
| 'i MR. MITCHELL: I am trying to anticipate 
; .5 if the City says you can't use the Doctorman sign. 
• ft THE COURT Their testimony is that they" 
! 7 arc going to wait until the issues are adjudicated 
! s The State said they are going to wait. 
j 9 MR. MITCHELL: I will prepare the order, 
i 10 Your Honor. 
i i! (Discussion off the record.) 
12 THE COURT. Then I'll await until the 
13 under ly ing issues are certified ready for trial 
u before I do anything more. 
15 MR. MITCHELL: Thank you. j 
16 MR. ZOLL. Is it for a finding purpose -- I 
17 one last question: Do we have a finding on the bond 
13 issue? I think the bond statute says double the 
19 amount of the possible damages. 
20 THE COURT $10,000 corporate or cash 
21 bond. That's what you filed. 
22 MR. MITCHELL: we will do it, Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: I applied the Tit for Tat 
24 Rule. 
25 MR. ZOLL: I do know that Rule. 
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1 THE COURT: The hearing is adjourned. 
2 (Hearing Adjourned.) 
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F. Mark Hansen, #5078 
624 North 300 West, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 533-2700 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS 
Civil No. 960906388 
Judge William B. Bohling 
INTERROGATORIES 
Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff requests that Defendant 
answer the following interrogatories, under oath, within 30 days of service of these interrogatories. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: With respect to paragraph 2 and the Fourteenth Defense of 
your Amended Answer, and paragraphs 5 and 6 of your Counterclaim, please state the following: 
a. State the date you contend the sign foundation was installed, and the date you contend the 
building was erected. 
b. State the facts upon which you rely to support your contention removal of the sign 
foundation would compromise the integrity of the building foundation. 
c. Identify each person whom you believe has or may have information regarding the subject 
matter of this interrogatory, and briefly describe the information you believe each such 
individual has or may have. 
d. Identify all leases and other documents of which you are aware, which contain or may 
contain information relating to the subject matter of this Interrogatory. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: With respect to paragraphs 3 and 4 of your Amended Answer, 
please state the following: Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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a. State the date you originally erected a sign on the adjacent property, and describe the exact 
original location of the sign, using a map or diagram if necessary to make your description 
sufficiently clear for Plaintiff to identify the original sign location on the premises. 
b. State the date(s) during which you relocated the sign. 
c. State the reason you located the sign. 
d. State the cost to you of relocating the sign. 
e. State the names, places of employment, addresses and phone numbers of the individuals 
who performed the work of relocating the sign. 
f. State the names, places of employment, addresses and phone numbers of the individuals 
who owned the premises or who represented the owners of the premises upon which the 
sign was relocated, with whom you dealt with respect to relocating the sign. 
g. State the facts upon which you rely to support your contention that "any attempt by plaintiff 
to erect another advertising sign on the property" (as opposed to leasing the premises as 
stated in paragraph 4 of the lease) constitutes a breach of contract. 
h. Identify each person whom you believe has or may have information regarding the subject 
matter of this interrogatory, and briefly describe the information you believe each such 
individual has or may have. 
i. Identify all documents of which you are aware, which contain or may contain information 
relating to the subject matter of this Interrogatory. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: With respect to the Fourth Defense of your Amended Answer, 
please state the following: 
a. Identify all persons you contend acted on behalf of Plaintiff. 
b. For each communication relating to the allegations of the Fourth Defense, state the date of 
the communication, identify the parties to the communication, describe in reasonable detail 
what was said by each party to the communication, and identify all documents discussed or 
prepared in connection with or as a result of the communication. 
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c. State the facts upon which you rely to support your contention the allegations of the Fourth 
Defense constitute an affirmative defense to: 
(i) Plaintiff s First Claim for Relief, 
(ii) Plaintiffs Second Claim for Relief, 
(hi) Plaintiff s Third Claim for Relief, 
(iv) Plaintiff s Fourth Claim for Relief. 
d. Identify each person whom you believe has or may have information regarding the subject 
matter of this interrogatory, and briefly describe the information you believe each such 
individual has or may have. 
e. Identify all documents of which you are aware, which contain or may contain information 
relating to the subject matter of this Interrogatory. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: With respect to the Fifth Defense of your Amended Answer, 
please state the following: 
a. State the facts upon which you rely to support your defense of laches. 
b. State the facts upon which you rely to support your defense of estoppel. 
c. State the facts upon which you rely to support your defense of waiver. 
d. Identify each person whom you believe has or may have information regarding the subject 
matter of this interrogatory, and briefly describe the information you believe each such 
individual has or may have. 
e. Identify all leases and other documents of which you are aware, which contain or may 
contain information relating to the subject matter of this Interrogatory. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 18: With respect to the Sixth Defense of your Amended Answer 
and paragraph 9 of your Counterclaim, please state the following: 
a. State the facts upon which you rely to support your contention plaintiff "has erected a new 
outdoor advertising on the premises," including when the advertising was erected, the 
location of the advertising on the premises, the name of the advertiser, the content/subject 
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matter advertised, the individuals who erected the outdoor advertising, and all other facts 
upon which you rely to support a claim the advertising was erected by plaintiff. 
b. State the facts upon which you rely to support your contention plaintiff has "entered into a 
lease agreement with an outdoor advertiser other than ROA." 
c. Identify each person whom you believe has or may have information regarding the subject 
matter of this interrogatory, and briefly describe the information you believe each such 
individual has or may have. 
d. Identify all leases and other documents of which you are aware, which contain or may 
contain information relating to the subject matter of this Interrogatory. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 19: With respect to the Seventh Defense of the Amended Answer, 
please state the following: 
a. State with particularity each and every fact upon which you rely to support your contention 
of fraud, including but not limited to the following: 
(i) The date each and every representation you contend was made. 
(ii) The name of the individual making each and every representation, and the name of 
each and every individual to whom each and every representation was made. 
(iii) An exact description of the content of each and every representation. 
(iv) The facts supporting your claim each and every representation was false. 
(v) The facts supporting your claim plaintiff knew the representation(s) was/were false. 
(vi) The facts supporting your claim the representation(s) was/were of presently existing 
material facts. 
(vii) The facts supporting your claim plaintiff intended you to rely on the representations. 
(viii) The facts supporting your claim you relied on the representation(s). 
(ix) The facts supporting your claim your reliance was reasonable. 
(x) The facts supporting your claim you were injured as a result of your reliance on the 
representation(s). 
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b. State the facts upon which you rely to support your contention the above -described fraud 
constitutes a valid defense to: 
(i) Plaintiffs First Claim for Relief, 
(ii) Plaintiffs Second Claim for Relief, 
(iii) Plaintiff s Third Claim For Relief, 
(iv) Plaintiffs Fourth Claim for Relief. 
c. Identify the statute of frauds you contend applies, and state the facts upon which you rely 
to support your contention the statute of frauds constitutes a valid defense to: 
(i) Plaintiff s First Claim for Relief, 
(ii) Plaintiff s Second Claim for Relief, 
(iii) Plaintiff s Third Claim For Relief, 
(iv) Plaintiffs Fourth Claim for Relief. 
d. Identify each person whom you believe has or may have information regarding the subject 
matter of this interrogatory, and briefly describe the information you believe each such 
individual has or may have. 
e. Identify all documents of which you are aware, which contain or may contain information 
relating to the subject matter of this Interrogatory. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 20: With respect to the Eighth Defense of your Amended Answer, 
please state the following: 
a. Describe the risk you contend plaintiff assumed, and state the facts upon which you rely to 
support your contention plaintiff assumed the risk. 
b. State the facts supporting your contention assumption of risk constitutes a valid defense to: 
(i) Plaintiffs First Claim for Relief. 
(ii) Plaintiffs Second Claim for Relief. 
(iii) Plaintiffs Third Claim For Relief. 
(iv) Plaintiffs Fourth Claim for Relief. 
c. Describe the consideration you contend you bargained for but did not receive. 
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d. State the facts upon which you rely to support your contention failure of consideration 
constitutes a valid defense to: 
(i) Plaintiff's First Claim for Relief, 
(ii) Plaintiff s Second Claim for Relief, 
(iii) Plaintiffs Third Claim For Relief, 
(iv) Plaintiff s Fourth Claim for Relief. 
e. Identify each person whom you believe has or may have information regarding the subject 
matter of this interrogatory, and briefly describe the information you believe each such 
individual has or may have. 
f. Identify all documents of which you are aware, which contain or may contain information 
relating to the subject matter of this Interrogatory. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: With respect to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Defenses of your 
Amended Answer and paragraph 11 of your Counterclaim, please state the following: 
a. State the facts, and identify the statutes, ordinances, regulations and other legal authority 
upon which you rely to support your contention that "any effort by plaintiff to erect an 
outdoor advertising sign is a legal impossibility." 
b. State the facts, and identify the statutes, ordinances, regulations and other legal authority 
upon which you rely to support your contentions that "plaintiff has erected an outdoor 
advertising sign," and that plaintiff did so "without first obtaining proper governmental 
permits," and that "appropriate governmental permits for the outdoor advertising sign that 
Garco has allowed to be erected on the subject property have never been issued." 
c. Identify each person whom you believe has or may have information regarding the subject 
matter of this interrogatory, and briefly describe the information you believe each such 
individual has or may have. 
d. Identify all documents of which you are aware, which contain or may contain information 
relating to the subject matter of this Interrogatory. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 22: With respect to paragraph 15 of your Counterclaim, please 
state the following: 
a. Describe each and every way in which you contend you suffered damages. 
b. Describe how you contend your damages may be calculated, estimated or otherwise 
ascertained. 
c. State the amount of your damages using the best information presently available to you. 
d. Show your calculations or other method by which you arrived at your damage amount. 
e. Identify each person whom you believe has or may have information regarding the subject 
matter of this interrogatory, and briefly describe the information you believe each such 
individual has or may have. 
f. Identify all documents of which you are aware, which contain or may contain information 
relating to the subject matter of this Interrogatory. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 23: State the name, address and phone number of each and every 
person or entity, other than yourself, who is a party to the agreements referred to in Request for 
Production of Documents No. 5 below, and each and every individual who negotiated with you with 
respect to those agreements. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 24: State the name, address and phone number of each and every 
person or entity who owns or owned property on which you previously had erected an outdoor 
advertising sign, from which since January 1, 1990 you removed the above-ground portion of your 
sign but left the underground portion in place. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 25: For each and every individual identified in your responses to 
the above interrogatories, or requested to be identified in the above Interrogatories, state the full 
name of the individual, the individual's employer, and all valid addresses of the individual for 
effective service of subpoenas or other process under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 26: Please supplement your responses to Plaintiffs First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. 
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REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff requests that Defendant 
make the following documents available for inspection and copying, at a time and place to be 
agreed on by counsel, within 30 days after service of these requests. 
REQUEST NO. 4: All documents identified in your responses to the above 
Interrogatories, or requested to be identified in the Interrogatories, and all documents you know 
or believe may describe, refer to or evidence the subject matter of the Interrogatories. 
REQUEST NO. 5: All agreements, unredacted, for the lease or rental of real property 
for the erection of outdoor advertising signs now in place for reading from the following locations: 
(a) The 1-15 freeway corridor in Salt Lake County from 9000 South to the Davis County 
border. 
(b) The 1-80 freeway corridor in Salt Lake County from 2700 East to 4500 West. 
(c) The 1-15 freeway corridor in Davis County. 
(d) The 1-15 freeway corridor in the Ogden metropolitan area. 
(e) The 1-15 freeway corridor in the Provo/Orern metropolitan area. 
(f) All on-ramps and off-ramps along the above freeway corridors. 
(g) All major thoroughfares between the Salt Lake City International Airport and downtown 
Salt Lake City. 
(h) Bangeter Highway. 
(i) Redwood Road in Salt Lake County. 
REQUEST NO. 6: All leases, correspondence and other documents relating to the 
placement and removal of the outdoor advertising signs referred to in Interrogatory No. 24 above. 
DATED t h i s ^ < ^ _ day of March, 1997. 
7' 
lvAttorney for Plaintiff FPlHni 
-r^v^^-t^/ 
235 lp.011 
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COHNE 
RAPPAPORT 
& SEGAL 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
525 EAST FIRST SOUTH. 5th FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84102 
(801)532-2666 
(801) 355-1813 FAX 
(801) 364-3002 FAX 
Mailing Address 
POST OFFICE BOX 11008 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 
84147-0008 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Roger G. Segal 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini 
David S. Dolowitz 
Vernon L. Hopkinson 
John T. Morgan 
Keith W. Meade 
Ray M. Beck 
A.O. Headman, Jr 
Julie A. Bryan 
Erik Strindberg 
Clifford C. Ross 
Jeffrey R. Oritt 
Daniel J. Torkelson 
Leslie Van Frank 
Kevin J. Fife 
Ralph E. Chamnesi 
Brian F. Roberts 
May 13, 1997 
VIA FACSIMILE 533-2736 
AND FIRST CLASS MAIL 
F. Mark Hansen 
624 North 300 West, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Re: UPC v. ROA 
Dear Mark: 
In response to your May 12, 1997 letter, I remind you of our agreement that ROA 
need not respond to your discovery requests until after the depositions of Joe and Carl Kingston 
had been completed. Enclosed is a copy of my April 21, 1997 letter to you, faxed and mailed 
to you, which letter confirms our agreement. 
As I am currently in the process of preparing for the Kingston depositions, I will 
need to address the remaining issues in your letter sometime next week. 
Very truly yours, 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Leslie Van Frank 
LVF:ls 
cc: Dewey Reagan 
Tom Branch, Esq. (via facsimile 268-8859) 
L"-\,L ll O 
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W OFFICES OF 
MARK HANSEN, P.C. 
[ NORTH 300 WEST, SUITE 200 
_T LAKE CITY, UTAH 84103 
EPHONE: (801) 533-2700 
C: (801) 533-2736 
ADMITTED TO PRACTICE IN UTAH. 
ARIZONA. COLORADO AND NEVADA. 
NEVADA OFFICE: 
5675 S. VALLEY VIEW, #200 
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89118 
TELEPHONE: (702) 798-0125 
May 12, 1997 
VIA FACSIMILE ONLY 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. 
525 East First Floor, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Fax no. 801-355-1813 
Tom D. Branch 
Zoll & Branch 
5300 South 360 West, Suite 360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Fax no. 801-268-8859 
RE: 
Gentlemen: 
U.P.C., Inc. dba Garco Industrial Park v. R.O.A. General, Inc. 
dba Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Civil No. 960906388 
Plaintiffs Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents was 
served by mail on March 25, 1997. Reagan's Answer was due April 28, 1997 and has not yet 
been served. Reagan has not requested a time extension, objected to the discovery or sought a 
protective order. I would appreciate you letting me know what Reagan intends to do. If I do not 
receive a satisfactory response by this Thursday afternoon, I will reluctantly be forced to conclude 
Reagan will not voluntarily comply with its discovery obligation, and will proceed accordingly. 
Garco also needs information of Reagan's remaining sign structure, including its 
composition, horizontal dimensions and depth, so it can obtain a cost estimate for its removal and 
disposal. I would also like to know what Reagan would like done with its property should Garco 
arrange for its removal from the premises rather than wait for Reagan to end its ongoing trespass. 
Please let me know if Reagan will provide this information informally, or if I must obtain it 
through formal discovery. I remind you that Reagan continues to incur treble damages for 
unlawful detainer until the sign removal is completed. 
Finally, I would like to know what dates are acceptable between May 28, 1997 and June 
27, 1997 to take the depositions of the following individuals: 
Dewey Reagan 
William Reagan 
Doug Hall 
Dick Paxman 
Vern Frazier 
Ray Green 
Chris Kinser 
Since Reagan refused in its first discovery responses to give any address for sevice but its 
own, and told Garco to serve these individuals at Reagan's offices, 1 need to know when when 
Reagan will confirm their availability at its offices for personal service of their subpoenas. If 
Reagan cannot do so, it should supplement its discovery responses immediately to provide their 
residential addresses so I can have them served. I look forward to your prompt reply. 
Sincerely, 
..FT-Mark Hansen 7 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
U.P.C., INC., d/b/a GARCO 
INDUSTRIAL PARK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., d/b/a 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 960906388 
Deposition of: 
JOSEPH KINGSTON 
Judge William B. Bohling 
COPY 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on Thursday, the 
15th day of May, 1997, commencing at the hour of 
9:40 a.m., the deposition of JOSEPH KINGSTON, produced 
as a witness at the instance and request of the 
Defendant in the above-entitled action before the 
above-named Court, was taken before Jill Dunford, a 
Certified Shorthand Reporter, Utah License No. 244, 
and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, at the 
offices of Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, 525 East First 
South, 5th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
REPORTING SERVICES, LLC 
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Page 41 
A No. 
Q Do you recall seeing the third page of 
xhibit 2 -
A No. 
Q - i n Garco's files? 
A No, I don't. 
Q So to your recollection, there is no third 
age to Exhibit 2 -
A Right. 
Q - i n the lease that is in Garco's files with 
spect to this sign? 
A Right, yes. 
Q You have never seen Page 3 of Exhibit 2 
rfore today? 
A I have never seen this lease. 
Q So today is the first time you have seen 
lis lease? 
A Correct. 
Q Does Garco maintain only one lease in its 
les with respect to the Reagan sign? 
A Yes. 
Q And the one lease is the one that you 
escribed that does not have any of this handwriting 
tat you have marked on Exhibit 2? 
A Correct. 
Page 42 
1 Q Do you know where that copy of the lease 
2 came from? 
3 A It came from the previous owner, I was told. 
4 Q Who told you that? 
5 A Elaine Crosley, when she handed me the 
6 leases to go through. 
7 Q In your capacity as the property manager of 
8 the Garco Industrial Park, do you collect rent? 
9 A No, I don't. 
10 Q Who within the organization collects the 
11 rent? 
12 A Elaine Crosley. 
13 Q And who within Garco pays the taxes, any 
14 taxes? 
15 A I believe Elaine Crosley. 
16 Q What is it that you do in your capacity as 
17 property manager? 
18 A I hire the maintenance and see that the shop 
19 space is ready for new tenants. 
20 Q Are you responsible at all for taking care 
21 of any of tne expenses of the Garco Industrial Park? 
22 A No. 
23 Q Do vou have any knowledge of the expenses of 
24 Garco Industrial Park? 
25 A No. I mean-I guess you need to clarify 
Page 43 
mt. 
Q Okay, that's fair. 
Have you ever looked at the books and 
xords of Garco in order to determine what expenses 
larco incurs with respect to the industrial park? 
A Occasionally, but generally not, not in 
etail. 
Q So that would be Elaine's duties? 
A Right. 
Q Does anybody else within the organization 
ave that duty? 
A No. 
(Exhibit No. 3 was marked for identification.) 
Q I'm handing you what has been marked as 
xhibit 3 to your deposition and ask if you recognize 
tat document? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Is that your signature on Page 2 of this 
xhibit 3? 
A Yes. 
Q And this is a letter that you prepared on or 
X)ut October 29, 1992 and sent to Doug Hall? 
A Yes. 
Q I notice in Paragraph 1 of your letter, you 
idicate that you talked to Dick Paxman in May o f 91? 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q Who is Dick Paxman? 
3 A He is the representative that Reagan Sign 
4 sent out when I first called. 
5 Q When did you first call Reagan Signs? 
6 A Approximately May of '91. 
7 Q And why did you call? 
8 A I called to inform them that we didn't have 
9 a valid lease with them, and they would either need 
10 to-they would either need to sign a valid lease or 
11 move the sign. 
12 Q And why did you believe that there was not a 
13 valid lease on the property? 
14 A The lease that I had in my file was not 
15 valid, hadn't been signed. There were several other 
16 points. 
17 Q What were the other points? 
18 A It had expired. The monetary amount was not 
19 sufficient. There were other things that I discussed 
20 with him but— 
21 Q Tell me about those things. 
22 (Witness reviewed document.) 
23 A The main thing was the lease had expired and 
24 the automatic renewal was not legal, in my opinion. 
25 Q Why not? _ 
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1 A Because they hadn't paid enough money 
2 to-for market rate on the sign. 
3 Q Now, did you seek legal counsel with respect 
4 to that opinion? 
5 A Yes, I did. 
6 Q With whom did you speak? 
7 A I spoke with Carl. 
8 Q Carl Peterson? 
9 A Kingston. 
10 Q Fm sorry. When did you first speak with 
ll Carl Kingston about this particular issue? 
12 A It was before I called Reagan which was just 
13 before May. 
H Q Of 1991? 
15 A Of '91. 
16 Q Now, how much was Reagan paying to Garco as 
17 of 1991 for rental of the space? 
18 A They were paying $80 a month. 
19 Q And did they pay $80 per month from May of 
20 1991 through the time they took the sign down? 
21 A I believe they did. I couldn't say for 
22 sure. 
23 Q Who in the organization could say that for 
24 sure? 
25 A Elaine. She collects the-
Page 47 
1 A Okay. 
1 2 Q You met with Dick Paxman in May of *91? 
3 A Right 
I 4 Q Who did you meet with? Who else was there? 
5 A Just Dick and myself. 
6 Q And where did you meet? 
7 A At my office. 
1 8 Q So you called Dick and had him come down to 
9 your office? 
10 A I called Reagan, told them that we didn't 
111 have the lease, and they sent Dido 
112 Q And what was said by you and what was said 
13 by Dick, if you recall? 
14 A I told Dick that I-that we didn't have a 
[15 valid lease, and that they either needed to sign the 
16 lease, market rate, or move the sign. 
17 And Dick laughed and said, "Yeah, $80 isn't 
18 very much. We would be glad to pay a lot more than 
19 that I agree the lease with the automatic renewal is 
20 possibly not valid if it goes to court" And he told 
21 me that he would get an offer together and—he told me 
22 that the location was important to them, to Reagan, 
23 that they wanted to—and was willing to pay market 
24 rate and that he would get back with me with an offer. 
25 Q So what was the next thing that happened [ 
S3 ^ - " 
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1 Q You never had any discussions with Elaine 
2 that the $80 per month payment hadn't been made? 
3 A The-no, I hadn't 
4 Q Now, do you and Elaine have discussions when 
5 rent is not paid? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q So if the rent had not been paid, it would 
8 have been likely that you would have had conversations 
9 with Elaine about that? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q And so given that you didn't have such 
12 conversations, it's more likely than not that the rent 
13 was paid? 
14 A The $80, yes. 
15 Q When did you meet with Dick Paxman? You 
16 have indicated in Exhibit 3-actually I apologize. 
17 Exhibit 3 indicates in the first paragraph 
18 that you had apparently met with Doug Hall. Or are 
19 you making reference to Dick Paxman when you say, "We 
20 met and agreed upon the following amounts"? 
21 A Doug Hall and I agreed on those amounts. 
22 Dick Paxman I met with in May of '91 for the first 
23 time. 
24 Q Let's go through chronologically. That may 
25 help. _ _ _ ] 
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1 after that meeting? 
2 A He told me that-in that first meeting that 
3 he would get back to me within a week or so. J 
4 Four or five months had gone past and he 
5 hadn't gotten back with me. So I called him and told 
6 him that we needed to either get the sign taken down 
7 or sign the lease. And so he made an appointment and 
8 came and met with me and brought an offer. 
9 Q That would have been mid-1991, the summer of 
10 1991? 
11 A That would have been probably August, J 
12 September, October time frame. 
13 Q Of 1991? 
14 A Of'91. 
15 Q So that was a telephone conversation, 
16 correct? 
17 A It was in person. 
18 Q Did he bring you a lease in that particular 
19 meeting? 
20 A He brought me an offer, just a verbal offer. 
21 Q What was the verbal offer? 
22 A I recall it being around $350. 
23 Q And that was something Dick Paxman 
24 communicated to you? 
25 A Yes. He didn't have a lease-or he brought 
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ise, but it wasn't filled out 
I He brought a blank lease form in basically 
same format as Exhibit 2, it just didn't have any 
[writing on it? 
i I believe it was a different size. It was 
ller, but it was, I assume, similar. 
I Did you say he made a verbal offer of $350 
month? 
i Yes. 
i What happened next? 
i I also discussed with him the fact that he 
taken four to six months to get back to me. I 
him that I felt like they were stalling. That if 
r were willing to pay the higher rate, that they 
led to get it done and resolved. 
J What did he say in response to that? 
I He says, "I realize it's taken a long time." 
jays, "We will—when we set a rate, we will pay you 
n the day we first met" And I says, "When was 
t?" And we both agreed that if they started on 
e 1st of 1991, that that would be approximately 
n we first met 
J And then what happened? 
t I told him that I would think it oyer and 
i get back to him. 
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1 Q And that'8 everything in that meeting? 
2 A Everything that I recall at this time. 
3 Q What happened next? 
4 A I did some market research to see what they 
5 were charging, what Reagan was charging for 
6 advertising on their sign. And I determined that they 
7 should be paying higher. 
8 Q How did you do your market research? What 
9 did you actually do? 
10 A I called Reagan Sign, told them that I was 
11 interested in advertising along the freeway, and asked 
12 what they would charge me. 
13 Q To put an advertisement up for you on an 
14 existing sign? 
15 A Right 
16 Q What did they tell you? 
17 A They told me that it would cost anywhere 
18 from $1,200 a month to-if I bought a long time 
19 frame-to about $2,500 a month, depending on the type 
20 of advertising and how long the contract was and how 
21 many locations I had. 
22 Q What else did you do in terms of your market 
23 research? 
24 A I called some of the other sign companies. 
25 Q What questions did you ask of them? 
Page 51 
i The rates that they charged. 
3 Now, what you were asking both Reagan and 
*e other sign companies was the rate that they 
ild charge for you to actually place advertisement, 
rect? 
\ Correct. 
3 Did you do any market research into what 
>e payments Reagan or any of the other sign 
apanies were doing or were making to owners of the] 
perty they had signs on? 
\ I contacted some of the owners, and it 
led quite a bit. 
Q What owners did you contact? 
\ I don't recall exactly. One of them was the 
n to the south of ours. 
Q What would have been the lease price quoted 
pou down there? 
A I don't recall what he said on that. 
Q Do you recall what any of them told you? 
A In the inquiries, I found they ranged from 
)0-or around $350 to about $700. 
Q Per month? 
A Right. 
Q But you don't recall who you spoke to? 
A I spoke to Dick Paxman, asked him some of 
the rates on the freeway. 
Q And you spoke to the guy to the south of 
you? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Page 52 
The guy to the south. 
Who else? 
I don't recall. 
So is that everything you did with respect 
to your market research? 
A Yes. 
Q How long did that take you? 
A A couple of hours. 
Q And when did you do that in relation to the 
September-October meeting with Paxman? 
A It was right after, within a week after. 
Q And then what happened? 
A I called Dick Paxman and told him that we 
would like to get $800 a month for the sign. 
Q What did he tell you? 
A He told me that he wasn't authorized to do 
that, but that he would put me in touch with Bill 
Reagan or Doug Hall, and that they possibly would work 
with us on that 
Q And then what happened? 
A I didn't hear from them for several months, 
and so I called, and the secretary gave me Doug Hall. 
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1 Q Then what happened? 
2 A We set up an appointment in his office. I 
3 went— 
4 Q This would have been in approximately-let's 
5 put a time frame on that. 
6 A This was probably April. 
7 Q O f 92? 
8 A Of'92, approximately. 
9 Q I'm sorry, I didn't u.-san to interrupt you. 
10 Go ahead. 
11 A I met with Dick at his office. 
12 Q You met with Dick or with Doug? 
13 A Excuse me, with Doug. I met with Doug at 
14 the Reagan Sign building and he introduced himself. I 
15 explained to him that we didn't have a valid lease, 
16 and that I had been talking to Dick Paxman and he-he 
17 was friendly and took me on a tour of the facilities. 
18 Q He's never done that for me. 
19 MR. HANSEN: Joe didn't send him a bill 
20 afterwards. 
21 THE WTTNESS: Then he told me that he would 
22 review the income on that sign. At that time I told 
23 him we were asking $800 a month. He told me he would 
24 review the income and get back to me. And I told him 
25 that I would like to set an appointment. And so he 
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1 scheduled an appointment within about two or three 
2 weeks. I don't recall exactly. 
3 Q (BY MS. VAN FRANK) Then what happened? 
4 A He called and changed that appointment And 
5 it actually-the actual appointment took place several 
6 months later, probably about three or four months 
7 later. 
8 Q So the next thing that happened was you 
9 actually had another appointment with Doug at the 
10 Reagan office? 
11 A At my office. I had-we had several 
12 appointments at the Reagan office, and he stood me up, 
13 I guess, a couple of times. 
14 Q So Doug had called and changed the 
15 appointment. And then you— 
16 A I came and waited, and he wasn't there. 
17 Q And so what did you do after you came and 
18 waited and he wasn't there? 
19 A I called back and scheduled an appointment 
20 And he said he would meet at my office the next time. 
21 Q So then he came and met at your office the 
22 next time? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q So there was only one appointment that he 
25 stood you up at? 
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1 A Two. 
2 Q When did that one take place? 
3 A They were April, May time frame. 
4 Q So you were up there twice and got stood up? 
5 A Right. 
6 Q The next appointment was at your office? 
7 A Richt. 
8 Q Tell me about that one. 
9 A He came aud-
io Q I'm sorry, let's put a time frame on it. 
11 That would have been what month? 
12 A I remember it being over a year. I would 
13 say it was probably June. 
14 Q June of '92? 
15 A Ninety-two. 
16 Q And Doug came to your office? 
17 A Right. He came to my office and he brought 
18 a lease filled out with the amount in. 
19 Q What was the amount? 
20 A I don't recall exactly. I would say it was 
21 probably-it was around probably $500 a month or 
22 thereabouts. 
23 MS. VAN FRANK: I don't think I want to mark 
24 these just yet. Off the record just briefly. 
25 (Off-the-record discussion,) 
were marked for idenUfkatKXL) 
1 MS. VAN FRANK: What was my last question? 
2 (The record was read by the court reporter.) 
3 MS. VAN FRANK: Let's take a brief break. 
4 
5 
6 
7 Q (BY MS. VAN FRANK) I'm handing you what has 
8 been marked as Exhibits 4, 5, and 6 to your 
9 deposition. 
10 MR. KINGSTON: This one is 4? 
11 MS. VAN FRANK: Yes. That's 5 and this one 
12 is 6. 
13 Q (BY MS. VAN FRANK) Have you had an 
14 opportunity to look at those three exhibits? 
15 A Uh-huh. 
16 Q Is any one of th ose three exhibits the lease 
17 that Doug would have brought with him to your office 
18 in approximately June of *92? 
19 A I believe the June of '92 was this one here 
20 (indicating.) 
21 Q That's Exhibit 5 you are pointing to? 
22 A I believe it to be that I don't recall 
23 exactly, but I-that's ™ hat I would say. 
24 Q Is there something in here that leads you to 
25 that conclusion? 
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A The lease that I felt like we had finalized 
i was this, was No. 4 (indicating.) And this was a 
evious version (indicating.) 
Q Exhibit 5 was a previous version? 
A Right. 
Q And what is it about Exhibit 5 that 
stinguishes it from Exhibit 6 that leads you to 
lieve diat Exhibit 5 came first before Exhibit 6? 
A It's a lower offer. 
Q Exhibit 5 offers $7,200 per month and 
chibit 6 offers $700 per month? 
A Seventy-eight hundred dollars a year, yes. 
Q Where are you seeing the $7,800 per year? 
A Annual. 
Q But you are looking at Exhibit 4? 
A Yes. 
Q What is it about Exhibit 5 that 
stinguishes it from Exhibit 6 that makes you think 
at Exhibit 5 came earlier than 6? 
A It has all of the points that we talked 
)OUt. 
Q You are comparing 4 and 5 again. Fm asking 
m to compare 5 and 6. 
Q Fm sorry. 
A Okay. 
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1 Q Is there something about Exhibit 5 that 
2 leads you to believe it came earlier in time than 
3 Exhibit 6? 
4 A I'm not sure what time frame Exhibit 6 is. 
5 In fact, I don't really recall Exhibit 6. 
6 Q So you are thinking that Doug may have 
7 brought Exhibit 5 to you in June of *92, correct? 
8 A Approximately then, yes. 
9 Q So Doug brought in a blank form lease to you 
10 that had some things filled out. Would it have 
11 had-look in Exhibit 5-the $6,600 filled in with it 
12 crossed off? Or would it have had the $6,600 with it? 
13 A It probably started with the $6,600 in, and 
14 in our negotiations then we crossed that off and wrote 
15 the $7,200 in. 
16 Q Do you know whose handwriting the $7,200 is? 
17 A I believe it's Doug's. 
18 Q Is your handwriting anywhere on Exhibit 5? 
19 A Not that I can see, 
20 Q Do you recall if the cross-outs on all this 
21 typewriting in the form were there at the time that 
22 Doug brought it to you? 
23 (Witness reviewed document.) 
24 A I don't recall it being there at the time 
25 that we first sat down. But during the process, then 
Page 59 
was crossed out 
Q So during the process of this meeting that 
ok place in approximately June of '92, the two of 
>u together marked up this document? 
A Right 
Q Tell me a little bit about the discussions, 
hat was said and what Doug said and what you said in 
is June of '92 meeting. 
A We talked about it taking so long to get 
•—to have a meeting, and again that they were 
t^ting the cheaper rent for all that time. 
We talked about the discussion I had with 
ick Paxman to go back to June 1st of '91 for the 
ayments. And we agreed to that And he wrote—Doug 
Tote in the dates that the lease would start June 1st 
F'91. 
I mentioned that I felt like it was worth 
bout $800 a month, and he started with $6,600 and 
len he came up to the $7,200, which is $600 a month. 
We talked about the provisions of the lease 
lat I felt like if we were going to get an option on 
le property, that they needed to pay for that So we 
rossed that off and agreed that we would give them 
otice if we sold the property, but that they didn't 
ave an option to buy the property. 
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1 We talked about the-after the lease 
2 expires, that the five years after, we couldn't have 
3 any other advertising company. I told him that they 
4 would have to pay for that in order for that to be 
5 in. That's a point that he left in this first 
6 version, but it was crossed out in Exhibit 4. 
7 Q He left it in Exhibit 5, but it was crossed 
8 out in Exhibit 4? 
9 A Right But he was aware that I wouldn't 
10 sign a lease under—with those provisions. 
11 Q So at least as of June of *92, Reagan was 
12 unwilling to cross off the noncompete agreement? 
13 A He had agreed to it, but it wasn't crossed 
14 off. 
15 Q He agreed to it in the June of '92 meeting? 
16 A Yes. I made it clear that we wouldn't even 
17 consider a lease that had that in i t 
18 Q Why is it that it didn't get crossed off the 
19 form in June of '92 meeting? 
20 A I don't recall. I don't know if these marks 
21 here were marks of~they were items we were discussing 
22 or~I don't recall what those would be. 
23 Q What marks are you talking about? 
24 A There is an initial or something on the side 
25 (indicating.) 
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1 Q Down next to the last paragraph, second to 
2 the last paragraph, that says, "Lessor warrants the 
3 title of said leasehold'-is that the paragraph you 
4 are talking about? 
5 (Witness reviewed document.) 
6 A It's right next to the—where it says five 
7 years, on the last paragraph, with some type of a mark 
8 here. 
9 Q Okay, I sec. 
10 A There is also another one up here at the top 
11 (indicating.) 
12 Q Where? 
13 A Right here (indicating.) 
14 Q Where it's crossed off, "Rent to increase to 
15 $600 a month on June 1, 1996," is that the mark you 
16 are talking about? 
17 A Right 
18 Q But you don't know what those two marks are? 
19 A I don't know what they are. I am assuming 
20 that they were points that we were discussing. 
21 Q What other points did you discuss in that 
22 meeting? 
23 A We discussed that there wouldn't be an 
24 automatic renewal beyond a year at a time and that he 
25 was asking for longer term. He told me he could give 
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1 me a better deal if I went longer term. On this 
2 Exhibit 5, we were discussing just a five-year term. 
3 Q But Doug was wanting a longer term than five 
4 years? 
5 A He wanted a longer term. In fact, he was 
6 asking for it I guess here again too. 
7 Q Where? 
8 A Where he is asking—he has in here that the 
9 rent will increase to $600 on June 1st, '96. So he is 
10 asking for two five-year terms, it looks like. 
11 Q So that's Exhibit 5 you are looking at? 
12 A Right 
13 Q Anything else you discussed that you can 
14 remember? 
15 (Witness reviewed document.) 
16 A Yeah, that if there was an automatic 
17 renewal, it would only be a year. I think I may have 
18 mentioned that one. And also that we start the lease 
19 on the 1st of June of *91. 
20 Q Anything else? 
21 A That's all I recall at this time. 
22 Q Now, how did you leave that meeting? How 
23 did it conclude? 
24 A I told him that we would need to think about 
25 it, that we wanted the higher rate, but that they were 
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1 getting close. And I think Doug and I both felt like 
2 that we were real close to coming up with an 
3 agreement 
4 Q What did Doug tell you that led you to 
5 believe that? 
6 A He said that he could-that if we gave him 
7 the ten years, that we could probably work out all of 
8 the other things that we discussed, and that he would 
9 have to get back to me on the amount that he could 
10 go. In fact, I felt like we had pretty much the deal, 
11 except for that he was going to let me know what the 
12 new amount was. 
13 Q So then what happened? Doug left the 
14 meeting? 
15 A We left and several months passed, and we 
16 got back together again. 
17 Q How did that occur? 
18 A We both had a busy schedule, and I think I 
19 ended up calling him, and he came back to my office 
20 and we sat down and he presented me with Exhibit 4 
21 here. 
22 Q Did you stand him up at a meeting too once? 
23 A I did once, yes. We were both real busy and 
24 had an emergency that had come up and I wasn't there, 
25 Q But eventually you did get back together, 
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1 correct? 
2 A Yes. In fact, we did—we met several times. 
3 Q When was the first of the next meetings 
4 after June of *92? 
5 A That would actually probably be the meeting 
6 where this was—this document was presented 
7 (indicating.) 
8 Q Now, you are pointing to Exhibit 4? 
9 A Exhibit 4. And I recall that it was just 
10 before I sent the letter. 
11 Q Which is Exhibit 3? 
12 A Exhibit 3, uh-huh. 
13 Q So the next meeting after June of '92 would 
14 have been in approximately October of *92? 
15 A I would say it was a month or two ahead of 
16 that 
17 Q So approximately August of '92 you met? 
18 A Approximately. 
19 Q You met with Doug again in your office? 
20 A In my office, uh-huh. 
21 Q Tell me about that meeting. 
22 A He presented me with Exhibit 4 and we went 
23 over the points. There was some things that he didn't 
24 cross off that we did end up crossing off. At this 
25 time he crossed off the five-year period after the 
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ise expires, because they weren't willing to pay 
>re for that. 
Q Now, was that crossed off in the meeting 
elf? 
A That's what I recall, 
Q And what else? 
(Witness reviewed document. ) 
A We discussed the $7,800 a year for the first 
re-year term and $8,400 for the second five-year 
rm. 
Q And what were your discussions regarding 
3se amounts? 
A We agreed to that. We also agreed to the 
itomatic renewal for a year at a time after those 
rms. 
We agreed to start the lease on June 1st of 
1, and we agreed on a ten-year term on the lease. 
We also agreed to notify-or send notice if 
e were going to sell the property, but to not have j 
e option to purchase. 
(Witness reviewed document.) 
A And at that point we had a deal. That's 
hat I indicated to him and he indicated to me. 
Q So is any of the handwriting on Exhibit 4 
)ur handwriting? 
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Q And that would have been clear back in-
A Let's see, April or May of '92. 
Q -April or May of '92? 
A Or thereabouts. 
Q And that would have been the one at R.O.A.'s 
ffice? 
A Yes. In fact, that's when I recall getting 
iie blank lease is when I visited his office. 
Q And then in June of '92, he brought a lease 
illed out with the amount, and you had some 
iscussions about that particular one, correct? 
A Right. 
Q And so what lease was it that he had brought 
>ack to you that he had changed the terms of? 
A This particular lease here (indicating.) 
Q Exhibit? 
A It didn't-Exhibit 4. We had agreed to 
hese changes. 
Q Which changes? 
A The option to purchase. We had taken it 
Hit. We had discussed and agreed to the five-year 
erm being taken out. And he-when he brought the 
ease in, these weren't crossed off. 
Q In Exhibit 4? 
A In Exhibit 4. 
May 15, 1997 
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(Witness reviewed document.) 
A I don't recognize any of it as being mine. 
I believe it's all Doug's. 
Q Now, is there a reason that you did not sign 
this document at the time of your approximately August 
'92 meeting? 
A I had told him that I wanted their signature 
first They-in fact, every time he had brought a 
lease back, there were things that weren't crossed 
off-or weren't changed that we had agreed to. 
Q Well, as of August *92, you had only had one 
lease, correct, only one lease had been brought to 
you, correct? 
A Well, they had the original. 
Q Exhibit which one? 
A There was a blank lease that he gave me, 
which isn't this. 
Q Which isn't-
A It didn't have anything filled in. 
Q Which is not Exhibits 6 or 5 or 4, correct? 
A Right It was just blank. It had nothing 
on it 
Q When had he brought you that lease? 
A I believe that was the first meeting that we 
met 1 
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Q And these are items or issues that you say 
you agreed to? 
A We agreed to and he hadn't crossed off. So 
we sat there and I believe he crossed them off, but I 
pointed out what needed to be crossed off. 
Q So at that point you said you wanted 
Reagan's signature first? 
A Right. 
Q Because? 
A Because I didn't want him to change it after 
I had signed it. I had also asked if they had any 
lease on file and asked for copies of it which they 
never did give me for the lease that I felt was 
invalid. 
Q So you had asked for a copy of the 1975 
lease? 
A From the very beginning in each meeting I 
asked if they had anything that I needed a copy of. 
Q Were you aware that the one in your file was 
incomplete? 
A No, I felt like it had never been executed 
because we had not signed it. 
Q I guess then I'm a little confused as to why 
you were asking for a copy of the lease all the way 
through if you felt you had a copy in your file? 
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1 A Because they told me they had-they told 
2 me-in fact, from Bill Paxton-or Paxman on, 
3 they-be-Bill had told me that they realized this, 
4 that they didn't have a lease or that it wasn't 
5 valid. And Doug had told me that they had something, 
6 and I asked for a copy of it I never did receive 
7 that 
1 8 Q So you sent Doug away from the meeting with 
9 Exhibit 4? 
10 A To get it signed, uh-huh. 
II Q And you felt you needed Reagan's signature 
12 on there before it was a complete deal, correct? 
113 A I felt like we had a deal, and we had agreed 
114 to it and that we just needed it executed. 
15 Q But you didn't want to sign it until Reagan 
116 signed it? 
17 A Right, or I even said we could meet and both 
18 sign it together. 
19 Q What happened next? 
20 A I didn't hear back for a couple of months. 
21 So I sent this letter telling them that I thought they 
22 were just dragging it out, and that we had an 
23 agreement and we needed to get it resolved. 
24 Q The letter you are talking about is 
25 Exhibit 3? 
1 Page 70] 
1 A Exhibit 3. 
2 Q The amount that you had agreed to in 
3 Exhibit 4 was $7,800 a year. Is that what you told 
4 me? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q What does that translate into per month? 
7 A I believe it's $650, isn't it, starting June 
8 1st? 
9 Q Tell me about the handwriting on the side of 
10 Exhibit 4 where it says, " 10 year lease 600 first, 700 
11 per month for the next five years." 
12 A That was his first offer. This eight was a 
13 two when he brought it to us. 
14 Q The eight, where it says $7,800? 
15 A Right The first-in fact, it had $7,200 
16 here. As we were sitting there, I recall Doug writing 
17 this in here, across here as we first started talking 
18 (indicating.) And then he changed this to an eight 
19 here as we went through (indicating.) And I did agree 
20 to the $650 per month. 
21 Q For the first five years? 
22 A Right, and the $700, which is what he 
23 proposed on the second five-year term. So I was 
24 essentially asking $50 a month for the first five 
25 years more. 1 
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1 Q Fifty dollars a month more than what Doug 
2 had brought to the meeting in August? 
3 A When we first came. 
4 Q To the meeting in August of '92? 
5 A Right. 
6 Q Now in your letter of Exhibit 3, you 
7 indicate in the first paragraph, you say in the second 
8 sentence, "I indicated we would continue on a month to 
9 month basis with an increase in the monthly rent. We 
10 met and agreed on the following amounts. And then 
11 you state the $650 per month for five years and then 
12 $700 a month for five years, correct? 
13 A Correct. 
14 Q The meeting that you are referring to in the 
15 very first paragraph there is the August of '92 
16 meeting, approximately, August of 92 meeting, 
17 correct? 
18 (Witness reviewed document.) 
19 A Explain what you are asking again. 
20 Q You say, "We met and agreed on the following 
21 amounts," and then you say $650 per month and $700 
22 per month? 
23 A Right. 
24 Q So the meeting that you are referring to in 
25 your letter- | 
Page 721 
1 A Was this meeting. 
2 Q —was the August of '92 meeting, correct? 
3 A Right It was August, September time frame. 
4 Q And so I understand it, you have indicated 
5 that you came to a complete agreement with respect to 
6 Exhibit 4? 
7 A Right 
8 Q So what is it that you are referring to in 
9 your second paragraph of Exhibit 3 where you say that 
10 you have met and made several attempts over several 
11 months to work out other details of the agreement? 
12 A The main thing was to get it signed, that we 
13 had agreed to meet and sign together. And also he was 
14 supposed to get back to me, and he didn't There was 
15 really no other negotiation that we needed to go 
16 over. Everything was pretty much included there. I 
17 was more or less frustrated, frustrated that he hadn't 
18 come right back like we had talked. 
19 Q Where were these four phone conversations 
20 that you make reference to in Exhibit 3? When did 
21 those take place? 
22 (Witness reviewed document.) 
23 A I believe they were conversations where I 
24 had called and he was out or he told me that he 
25 was-he had a busy schedule and he wasn't available to | 
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. meet. And I felt like they were just dragging it on 
\ and on and on. 
\ Q When did those phone conversations take 
\ place? 
I A They were probably between our-all of our 
> meetings and after, at least two of them were after, 
1 trying to get the appointment for the lease to be 
I signed* 
) Q So they would have taken place between 
) August of *92 and October 29, *92 when you sent this 
L letter? 
I A At least two of those would have, yes. 
\ Q When would the other phone conversations 
I have taken place? 
$ A I believe the other two were trying to get 
S set up for this appointment (indicating.) 
7 Q Tell me about the two conversations that 
I took place between August of '92 and October 29 
) of '92. 
) A I recall we talked-talked about that we had 
I reached our agreement and that we needed to get the 
Z lease signed* 
3 Q Who initiated those phone conversations? 
I A I did, because they weren't-they hadn't 
5 gotten back to me* Or he may have called me back on 
Page 75 
1 A Yes, uh-huh. 
2 Q And on what were you basing that demand? 
3 A From the very first discussion with Bill 
4 Faxman and all the discussions with Doug Hall, I had 
5 indicated that we would continue on a month to month 
6 basis to receive the $80, and only under the terms 
7 that they would pay from the 1st of June of '91, and 
8 that the lease would start at that time. 
9 And they had agreed to that And it was 
0 actually put on the lease that you see here, on both 
1 leases* 
2 When they hadn't-we had had that agreement* 
3 and where they didn't bring it to sign, I felt that it 
4 was an agreement and that it needed to be finalized 
5 with the signature and that they needed to pay for it 
6 Q Now, you-
7 A Or we would have the sign removed. 
8 Q Why were you thinking it needed to be 
9 finalized with a signature? 
0 A We had an agreement; just the formality of 
1 the signature on it 
2 Q From where did the charge of one and a half 
3 percent interest per month come? 
A A I felt like that was a fair interest rate. 
15 Q That isn't anything that you agreed to with 
Page 74 
1 one. I don't recall. But I initiated to try and get 
2 together for the—to sign the lease. 
3 Q You make reference to a meeting where you 
4 say you got to Doug's office and you got there and the 
5 secretary indicated that Doug wasn't there and you 
6 would have to schedule another appointment. Do you 
7 see that? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q That's not the first time this had happened, 
10 correct? 
11 A It had happened twice in sequence, as I 
12 recall. It was before this meeting (indicating.) 
13 Q Before the August *92 meeting? 
14 A Right 
15 Q But each time prior to the one meeting where 
16 Doug stood you up that you made reference to in | 
17 Exhibit 3, each of those prior times where he had 
18 stood you up, he made an additional appointment, I 
19 correct? 
20 A Yes, he did. And after that happened, I 
21 missed an appointment too. And it wasn't on purpose j 
22 either. It was an emergency. 
23 Q Now, down in the next couple of paragraphs 
24 you make a demand for $10,340 worth of rent. Do you j 
25 see that? | 
Page 76 
1 Reagan? 
2 A No, but I believe they had it-no, I guess 
3 not. 
| 4 Q I'm sorry, what? 
! 5 A No, there wasn't anything that we had 
6 discussed with it. 
7 Q And it wasn't anything that you had agreed 
8 to in the Exhibit 4, correct? 
9 A No. 
io Q I got my double negative there again. 
11 There is nothing in Exhibit 4 that makes 
12 reference to a one and a half percent per month? 
13 A No. 
14 Q Is that-
15 A No, there is nothing. 
16 Q Thanks for clarifying that. 
17 So that's just something that you made up 
18 because you thought it was-
19 A Something I added if they were going to take 
20 time to pay it. Because I felt that it was owed and 
21 we had agreed to it all throughout this whole term, 
22 Q Because you say you had agreed to the rent 
23 but not the interest? 
24 A Right. 
25 Q During these lease negotiations, did you 
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1 Q But you are not the one who actually signs 
2 the deal, correct? 
3 A I have signed some. I am authorized to 
4 sign. I just typically have it signed by Elaine. 
5 Q Under what circumstances would you have 
6 Elaine sign rather than yourself? 
7 A The main circumstances would be that she is 
8 in the office, works at her desk. I work out 
9 inspecting the properties and working on the 
10 properties quite a bit. It's occasionally more 
11 convenient to have her sign it. 
12 Q So it's just a function of convenience? 
13 A Typically, yeah. 
14 Q With respect to the lease that we have 
15 talked about as being the one that you claim you came 
16 to an agreement with Reagan-
17 A Exhibit 4. 
18 Q What about Exhibit 4? Why wouldn't you sign 
19 that lease? 
20 A I probably would. There wouldn't be any 
21 reason I couldn't. I asked that it be signed before 
22 we-I asked that Reagan sign it before we would sign 
23 it. 
24 Q Now, did you have any conversations with 
25 Doug Hall about his ability to sign that lease? 
Page 10 
1 A I didn't I understood that he had the 
2 ability to sign it but— 
3 Q From what did that understanding come? 
4 A I was told by Bill Paxman that he was the 
5 manager there* In most negotiations, if they have to 
6 go back and get an approval, they make me aware of 
7 that He never told me that he had to get any 
8 approval whatsoever. 
9 Q So why is it that Doug didn't just sign it 
10 right there in August of '92 while you were sitting 
11 there together? 
12 A I don't know why he didn't other than the 
13 lease that I had in the file was signed by Bill 
14 Reagan, and I assumed that it may be standard for him 
15 to just take and formally have him sign it 
16 Q But you understood that Doug had the full 
17 authority to sign it in that August meeting? 
18 A It was real clear that he did, and he 
19 expressed that he did, that he was the one that made 
20 the decisions. 
21 Q Did he offer to sign it right then and there 
22 in August of *92? 
23 A I don't know that he did. He-weboth 
24 agreed we had a deal, and it may have been that he-
25 Q Don't speculate. Just tell me what the 
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1 conversations were. 
2 A I recall that he wanted to clean it up a 
3 little bit and then sign it or have it signed. 
4 Q What was he going to do to clean it up? We 
5 are talking about Exhibit 4 right now, correct? 
6 A Yeah, some of the things that were written 
7 on the sides and stuff, he wanted it to be a little 
8 clearer. 
9 Q What was it about the things on the sides he 
10 wanted to be more clear? 
11 A He mentioned that he wanted to have it 
12 cleaned up and more presentable, I guess is what he 
13 was referring to. He didn't say in particular, just 
14 that he wanted it to look better and cleaned up 
15 better. I assumed that the scribbling, he wanted to 
16 have it X'd out or whatever. 
17 Q How could he have done that right there in 
18 the meeting, X'd it out, if he had another copy of 
19 it? 
20 A I don't know that he did. I didn't see one. 
21 Q Now, let's go back to the Sportsman lease. 
22 A Okay. 
23 Q Does Garco have a lease with Sportsman with 
24 respect to the three signs that they put up? 
25 A Not for the signs. 
Page 1( 
1 Q Did Sportsman come to you and ask permission 
2 to put up the signs? 
3 A Yes, they did. 
4 Q Did you give them permission to put them up? 
5 A Yes, I did. 
6 Q And who put them up? Did Sportsman or did 
7 Garco? 
8 A Sportsman did. 
9 Q Is Garco receiving lease payments from 
10 Sportsman with respect to those signs? 
11 A Not for the signs. 
12 Q Now, are they receiving any kind of payment 
13 at all, any sort of-is Garco receiving any sort of 
14 financial remuneration from Sportsman for the signs? 
15 A Not for the signs. They are for the rent. 
16 Q But just of the space? 
17 A Right. 
18 Q And Garco had been receiving that rent 
19 before the signs ever went up? 
20 A Right. 
21 Q Have you had any discussions with them to 
22 tell them to take them down? 
23 A I haven't, 
24 Q So you don't know why they have been taken 
25 down, to the extent that they have been? 
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Now, who did do the design of it? 
I'm not sure who the engineer was. I can 
)Iy find out 
tod so a plan has now been drawn. Do you 
blueprint of the plans that have been drawn? 
By the engineer? 
And what you are telling me is that the 
nt for the lateral on Building No. 3 comes from 
hroom area to the west? 
[t would probably come out this way 
iting.) 
So it would come from the bathroom area to 
t, a short portion, and then it would come 
f—as I'm drawing this little squiggle, stop me 
rt going in the wrong—well, why don't you 
le squiggle. 
I'm not sure how the plan is to go. I just 
it goes from here to connect up to whatever is 
I'm not—there may be a way to connect it from 
le or they may have to go around. That, I'm 
•eof. We have plans to asphalt the entire 
his summer. 
including over the Reagan foundation? 
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1 A We would like to have it removed before we 
2 do that. 
3 Q Well, is there anything that's preventing 
4 you from just asphalting over, what is there? 
5 A The main reason to be to get it removed. 
6 Q Only because you want it removed? 
7 A Because it is in the way, if you do any 
8 construction or anything there. 
9 Q Now, what kind of construction is it in the 
10 way of? 
11 A If anything needs to be dug through there, ^ 
12 for any water lines or any other type orlines, or if 
13 that building is rebuilt, and the foundation is 
14 extended or anything. 
15 Q But you don't currently have any plans do 
16 any construction in that area; is that correct? 
17 A As far as remodeling of that or rebuilding 
18 of that, there aren't currently any plans. But that 
19 would be the first part that would be rebuilt, is the 
20 oldest part. 
21 Q Building No. 3 is the oldest part? 
22 A Right. 
23 Q How old is that building? 
24 A I'm not sure how old, but it is in need of 
25 repair. 
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liVhat repairs is it in need of? 
Tust general upkeep. The structure and 
hing is just old. 
Did you tell me how old the building was? 
[ don't know. 
5o the general upkeep is things like it 
painting? 
[t needs painting, 
[t needs a new roof? 
Probably, from time to time. 
Do you know when the last new roof was put 
[ don't. 
\nd there are no current plans right now to 
thing other than just normal maintenance and 
) to that particular building, correct? 
\ t this time. 
\t this time, correct? 
rhat's correct. 
\nd there are no plans to do any underground 
g at this time around and near Building No. 3, 
t? 
With the need of running the sewer lines, 
may be. 
3ut only the one sewer line, correct? j 
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1 A That's the only thing right now that I'm 
2 aware of. 
3 Q And you wouldn't be able to come straight 
4 out from the bathroom to the immediate north, because 
5 you would run into Building No. 2 , correct, with a 
6 lateral? 
7 A It's possible to do that. There may be a 
8 connection. The floor drains are at various points in] 
9 the shop. It may be easier to connect to a floor 
10 drain than join the two across that. 
n Q But you don't remember what the plans say? 
12 A I don't recall. 
13 Q And the blueprints are already all drawn, 
14 correct? 
15 A They are for this other part. I'm not sure 
16 on that part if they are. 
17 Q Do you have copies of those in your files at 
18 your office? 
19 A I'm sure I do. 
20 Q Can we get copies of those made available, 
21 please? 
22 MR. HANSEN: Are those U.P.C. documents? Or 
23 are they-
24 THE WITNESS: I would think they would be, 
25 yes,. 
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1 A That's something that I have decided to do 
I 2 on my property that I manage. And I'm not sure what 
3 Eldon has decided on his property. 
4 Q You had made an election to pursue putting 
J 5 up another sign on the property that's the subject of 
I 6 this lawsuit? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q And what had you done as of February '95 to 
9 pursue that option? 
110 A I have contacted other sign companies. 
11 Q What sign companies did you contact? 
12 A Young Electric, Electric Sign Systems. 
13 Q Who else? 
14 A And I believe I just went through the phone 
115 book and called. I don't recall the names of any of 
116 the others. 
117 Q And as of February *95, what had been the 
118 response of any of these other sign companies? 
119 A They expressed interest in the location. 
20 Q Had you set up appointments with any of 
21 them? 
22 A I have, yes. 
23 Q You had as of February'95? 
24 A Yes. 
125 Q And with whom had you made appointments? 
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1 Q And who did you meet with there? 
2 A Again, I don't recall the guy's name. It 
3 was a guy. 
4 Q Was anyone else from Garco there with you? 
5 A No, just me. 
6 Q At either of these meetings, I mean. 
7 A Just me. 
8 Q So it was just you and a representative of 
9 Young Electric in the one meeting and you and a 
10 representative of Electric Sign Systems in the other 
11 meeting? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q And tell me about your conversations with 
14 the Young Electric people, person. 
15 A They expressed interest in the property, 
16 said that it would be a real good location for them. 
17 And they would just—we just generally discussed the 
18 sign and the type of sign and size. 
19 Q Did you discuss rates, monthly lease rates? 
20 A We did. 
21 Q You did? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q Did Young Electric tell you what they would 
24 be willing to pay for that site? 
|25 A They told me they would get back to me with 
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1 A With Young Electric and Electric Sign 
2 Systems. Those were the two that I met with. 
3 Q And when did you meet with Young Electric? 
4 A I can't give you the exact date. 
5 Q Can you give me an approximate date? 
I 6 A It was-what was the date the sign was 
7 removed? 
8 Q It was before the sign was removed? 
9 A It was after the sign was removed. 
10 Q Your first appointment with Young Electric 
n was after the sign was removed? 
12 A Right, probably a month after. 
13 Q Amontnlater? 
14 A Uh-huh, yes, or approximately that. 
15 Q Who did you meet with at Young Electric? 
16 A I couldn't tell you the person's name. 
17 A It w a s - I met with a gentleman there. I 
is don't recall his name. 
19 Q Why did it take a month to get in to see 
20 him? 
21 A It took a month for me to get around to it 
22 with my schedule. 
p Q What about Electric Sign Systems? When did 
24 you meet with him them? 
25 A I met with them the same day. 
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1 an offer. 
2 Q Did they ever? 
3 A They didn't. 
4 Q Did you ever call them and ask them why they 
5 hadn't gotten back to you with an offer? 
6 A Yes, I did. 
7 Q What did they tell you? 
8 A They told me that Reagan had moved the sign 
9 to the north and blocked putting a sign in our 
110 location. 
n Q And when did you call YESCO back? 
12 A It was a week or two after our appointment, 
13 probably two weeks. 
14 Q Tell me about your conversations with 
15 Electric Sign Systems. 
16 \ They looked at the location and they said it 
17 Mould be a good location. They typically didn't do 
18 that kind of sign, but they would—they would be 
19 interested in it. 
20 Q Did you discuss lease rates? 
21 A We talked about it, but they didn't make an 
22 offer. They were going to get back to me also. 
23 Q And did they? 
24 A They checked with the licensing people on 
25 the signs and said the same thing. _ 
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Q Well, I mean did they get back to you with 
ly kind of an offer? 
A Not with an offer, no. 
Q You called them back? 
A He called me. 
Q When? 
A About a week later. 
Q He called you about a week later? 
A Yes, 
Q This is before you had your conversation 
ith YESCO-excuse me— with Young Electric? 
A Before the phone conversation with Young 
lectric 
Q When Young Electric had said that Reagan had 
loved the sign, you could no longer put one there? 
A Yes. 
Q When did Reagan move that sign on the north 
arcel? 
A I don't know the exact date. It was about 
le time that the sign was removed from our property. 
Q About a month after Exhibit 17, the February 
3, '95 letter? 
A When was the sign removed on that property? 
Q I'm hoping you can help me. 
THE WITNESS: Do you recall? 
May 15, 1997 
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1 MR. KINGSTON: I think the other 
2 correspondence would indicate the approximate date. 
3 Q (BY MS. VAN FRANK) When was it in relation 
4 to Reagan removing the sign from your property? 
5 A At the same time. 
6 Q So was it on the same day or within the same 
7 week? 
8 A The same time frame. 
9 Q How big is the time frame? 
10 A Within a month, maybe before or maybe 
11 after. I don't know. 
12 Q So they could have moved the sign on the 
13 northern parcel before they took the sign down on 
14 Garco's property, or they could have done it 
15 afterwards; you just don't remember? 
16 A I don't know. We would have to find the 
17 date. I'm sure that there is a record of when they 
18 applied for the license and everything. 
19 Q But you don't remember. It was just 
20 basically in the same time frame as when they took the 
21 sign down off Garco's property? 
22 A All I can tell you is when I-when Young 
23 Electric and the other sign company tried to put up a 
24 sign, it was already moved and blocked. 
25 Q You mean they tried to put up a sign? 
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A They tried to apply for a license for a 
ign. 
Q Did you have a signed lease agreement with 
iem, with either one of them? 
A No, I didn't. 
Q So what makes you think they tried, they 
pplied for the sign permit? 
A I'm not saying they applied. I said they 
yent through whatever was necessary to determine 
whether they could put a sign there. 
Q With respect to Exhibit 1, is this exhibit 
>ig enough for you to be able to mark on here where 
he adjacent sign had originally been and where it was 
Qovea to? 
A It's not, and I didn't pay close enough 
ittention on it. All I know is that-or what I have 
>een told is that it has to be 500 feet apart, and 
hat thev moved it 20 feet this direction 
indicating.) 
Q Twenty feet from the north to the south? 
A Right. 
Q Closer to your property? 
A Right. 
Q And is Exhibit 1-well, let me ask you 
his: Where is the sign now in terms of feet north 
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1 from your northern property line? 
2 A I don't know exactly. I would guess 
3 probably here (indicating.) 
4 Q You are pointing to the middle of the 
5 table. So the paper is not big enough to be able to 
6 put it on there? 
7 A Right. 
8 Q Have you got an approximation of number of 
9 feet? 
10 A If it has to be 500 feet apart and it's 20 
11 feet less, I would say 480 feet from where the sign 
12 is. 
13 Q The current or the— 
14 A Where the old sign was. 
15 Q The two little dots on Exhibit 1? 
16 A Right. 
17 Q Did you ever have any conversations with 
18 anyone at Reagan about why that sign was moved, the 
19 one to the north? 
20 A Yes, I did. 
21 Q With whom did you have that conversation? 
22 A Dewey— 
23 Q When did you-
24 A —and Doug. 
25 Q When did you have those conversations? 
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1 A With Dewey it was the meeting that Paul and 
2 I met with-the first part of '95 or the end of '94. 
3 He said it was to block us from doing business with 
4 anybody but Reagan. 
5 Q You and Paul and Dewey were the only ones in 
6 that meeting? 
7 A Correct 
8 Q And the sign had already been moved as of 
9 that point? 
10 A That's correct 
111 Q And that would have been in the meeting 
12 sometime in December of '94 or January *95? 
13 A Correct 
114 Q And you said you had similar conversations 
15 with Doug Hall? 
116 A We talked about it before it was ever done. 
17 And he indicated that that was how it would be done* 
18 Q When was that conversation? 
19 A It was-
20 (Witness reviewed document) 
21 A It was probably-I recall it was-
22 (Witness reviewed documents.) 
23 A It was first brought up shortly after I sent 
24 the first letter in October of '92. 
25 Q Which exhibit are you looking at? 
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1 being removed 
I 2 Q But prior to die time the signs were being 
I 3 removed, you had instructed Carl to tell Reagan to 
4 take the signs out of there, get them out as soon as 
J 5 possible, correct? 
I 6 A Correct And I explained the foundation to 
I 7 him also. 
8 Q To whom did you explain that? 
9 A Dewey and Doug Hall and the crew chief that 
10 was out there removing the sign, before he ever 
111 started. 
12 Q Let's start with your telling Dewey that. 
13 A Okay. 
14 Q When did you tell Dewey that? 
15 A I received a call that they were out there 
16 to remove the sign-or to take it out Actually I 
17 asked Carl to send a letter a month or two before they 
18 were going to remove the sign, 
19 Q Before they actually removed the sign? 
20 A That it explained how I needed it removed. 
21 Q So that would have been sometime in April or 
22 May of 1995? 
23 A Right I also discussed it with them and 
24 told them that that's how it had to be done. 
125 Q Did Carl send that letter, to your 
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1 A Exhibit 3. 
2 Q Doug Hall told you clear back in 1992? 
3 A That they would do that if we couldn't come 
I 4 to an agreement. 
5 Q And did he tell YOU why they would do that? 
6 A Because they didn't want us doing business 
7 with anybody but Reagan Sign. 
8 Q Did he tell you why? 
9 A They just wanted the business. That's what 
110 he said. 
11 (Exhibit No. 18 was marked for identification.) 
12 Q Handing you what has been marked as 
13 Exhibit 18 to your deposition and ask if you recognize 
14 that document? 
15 (Witness reviewed document.) 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q When did you first see that document? 
18 A Shortly after it was first received. 
19 Q Shortly after it was received by Carl? 
20 A By Carl, yeah. 
21 Q And had you instructed Carl to tell Dewey 
22 that you wanted to have Reagan remove its sign 
23 structure as soon as possible? 
24 A I had instructed Dewey and Bill and the sign 
25 crew that was out there at the time the signs were 
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1 knowledge? 
2 A I believe that he did. 
3 Q So prior to June of *95, you believe that 
4 Carl sent a letter to Dewey telling him how you 
5 anticipated the sign coming out? 
6 A And I had phone conversations with them. 
7 Q With who? 
8 A With Doug and with Dewey. 
9 Q And about how many conversations did you 
10 have with Dewey? 
11 A I had probably four. 
12 Q When did those conversations take place? 
13 A Two of them took place on the day that they 
14 were there to do the job, before they started. He 
15 refused to do it that way. 
16 Q How about the other two conversations? 
17 Let's try to go chronologically. The first two 
18 conversations were approximately when? 
19 A About just before I told Carl to send a 
20 letter to that effect, I had a phone conversation with 
21 either Dewey or Doug—I don't recall—and explained 
22 how that had to be handled. 
23 Q What did you tell them? 
24 A I a:-ked Carl to follow it up with a letter. 
25 Q What did you tell Dewey and/or Doug in that 
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conversation? 
A I told them that when they removed the 
foundation, that I wanted to make sure that they did 
it in a way that the building wasn't damaged and that 
they had to remove the foundation also. 
Q What was your concern about the building 
being damaged? 
A Haying it next to the foundation the way it 
was. 
Q How close to the foundation of the building 
is the foundation of the sign? 
A I don't recall. It's within probably three 
feet 
Q Is there a strip of asphalt between the 
xmcrete and the building? 
A Just barely. 
Q Approximately how big? 
A A f o o t 
Q So were you concerned that if the foundation 
ame out, it might undermine the foundation of the 
wilding? 
A If it was done wrong. 
Q What was done wrong? 
A If they took the foundation of the sign out 
yrong, they could damage the building. 
Page 163 
Q Now, have you told me everything about those 
Miversations? 
A That I recall at this time, yes. 
Q And then you had two conversations with them 
LC day the sign was cut down? 
A Correct 
Q Tell me about how those occurred. 
A I received a call from the on-site manager 
ating that the crew was there to take down the 
gn. I drove over to the location and talked to the 
*ew chief that was in charge of running the crew to 
ike down the sign. I asked him how they were going 
i take those out and expressed my concern. 
He told me that Dewey had told him to just 
it them off and not to worry about i t And I told 
m that that wasn't acceptable, and that they had to 
ke it out in a way that wouldn't damage the 
lilding, but that I wanted the foundation taken out 
so. 
He left and called Dewey. And he came right 
ick and started on taking the sign out 
I called Dewey, and he says, "Well, that's 
e way you told us to do itH And I says, "No, in no 
nversation have I ever given you permission to do it 
ly other way. It's not acceptable. It needs to be 
M a y 1 5 , 1 9 9 7 
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Q So it's not that it was done improperly; 
it's that you were concerned that it would be done 
improperly? j 
A It could be done improperly or it could be 
done right 
Q So you wanted to make sure that when they 
took it out they did it properly? 
A Correct 
Q And what did Dewey or Doug tell you in that 
phone conversation that you had with them in 
approximately April? 
A When I talked to Doug, he said he would tell 
the people at Reagan my concern. 
When I talked to Dewey he says, "No, we are 
not going to do it that way. We are going to cut it 
off and leave it" 
Q Dewey told you that in April of'95, 
approximately? 
A He told me that the day that they were 
cutting the sign. The conversation before that, he 
told me that they would see what they could do to take 
it out without damaging the building. 
Q So you think there were two conversations 
prior to the day they actually cut the sign down? 
A Right 
Page 164 
taken out" 
He says, "Well, we are going to cut it off 
and do it our way." I told him I would see him in 
court 
(Exhibit No. 19 was marked for identification.) 
Q I hand you what has been marked as 
Exhibit 19 and ask if you recognize that document? 
(Witness reviewed document.) 
A Yes, I do. 
Q That's Carl Kingston's signature on the 
bottom? 
A Yes. 
Q You received a copy of it shortly after Carl 
sent it to Dewey? 
A Yes. 
Q Carl indicates in here, in response to 
Dewey's letter dated June 12—that would be 
Exhibit 18, correct? 
A Correct 
Q It is my understanding—it is Carl's 
understanding-that Dewey phoned Carl after Dewey had 
dictated this letter. I'm assuming that's the June 12 
letter. Does that seem reasonable to you? Is that 
how you interpret that? 
A Explain where you are talking about i t 
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1 Q I'm reading the first paragraph of 
2 Exhibit 19. 
3 A Okay, 
4 Q Carl says, "In response to your 
5 letter"—that's Dewey's letter-correct? 
6 A Correct 
7 Q -"dated June 12, 1995"-that would be 
8 Exhibit 18, correct? 
9 A Correct 
10 Q —"it is my understanding"-that would be 
11 Carl's understanding, right? "It is my understanding 
12 that you"—Dewey—phoned Carl after Dewey had dictated 
13 the letter. 
14 So Dewey would have phoned Carl after he 
15 dictated Exhibit 18? Is that how you interpret that? 
16 A I assume that's correct 
17 Q —"when you were notified that Joe Kingston 
18 had requested that your employees cease their efforts 
19 of removing the sign structure at 3986 South adjacent 
20 to 1-15," at Garco property, correct? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q "My understanding is that you were going to 
23 going talk to Joe before resuming the dismantling 
24 process." 
25 Is that your understanding too? 
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1 A Yes, 
2 Q "I did talk to Joe after we spoke"-well, 
3 let's go back to what Carl has said in the first 
4 paragraph of Exhibit 19. 
5 It sounds like Dewey stopped after his 
6 conversation with you. Did he? 
7 A Stopped the removal? 
8 Q Yes. 
9 A It was the crew. When I went out and talked 
10 to the crew, I told them that I wanted them to explain 
11 how they were doing it before they did i t The crew 
12 stopped momentarily, for probably 20 minutes or so. 
13 In the meantime, I tried to call Reagan and 
14 see if they wanted to one more time to sign the lease 
15 and leave the sign up; if not, have them take it out 
16 And also I wanted to know how the foundation was going 
17 to be taken out before they startt i on it, because I 
18 didn't want it torn up and we needed to operate the 
19 business while they were doing i t 
20 Q So that was your conversation with Dewey 
21 when you were out at the property and the crew was out 
22 at the property taking the sign down? 
23 A Actually at that time it was my conversation 
24 between the crew chief there, and then the phone call 
25 that I called Dewey, yes. 
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1 Q So then the crew stopped while you were on 
2 the phone with Dewey, correct? 
3 A I actually wasn't able to get a hold of 
4 Dewey when the crew stopped. And by the time I had 
5 gotten a hold of him, they had already started again 
6 and were in the process of taking it down. 
7 Q That all took place in the same day within a 
8 few hours? 
9 A Within a half hour to an hour, yeah. 
10 Q So the crew never did, except for that half 
11 hour, stop the dismantling process? 
12 A Correct 
13 Q What is Carl talking about here when he 
14 says, "My understanding is you were going to talk to 
15 Joe before resuming the dismantling process"? 
16 A After I talked to the crew, I went and 
17 talked to Carl. And I asked him to call Dewey or 
18 contact Dewey, because I had had trouble contacting 
19 him and asked that they not take out the sign until 
20 either I knew how they were going to handle the 
21 foundation, or if they were interested in signing the 
22 lease at that time. 
23 Q And so then after that, then the crew did 
24 stop? 
25 A They talked to Dewey and Dewey said, "No, go 
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1 ahead, take it out." 
2 Q So the sign came down that same day? 
3 A Correct. 
4 Q One hundred percent? 
5 A Right. 
6 Q Do you know if Carl ever did talk to Dewey? 
7 A I believe he did later that day on the 
8 phone. 
9 Q Now, Carl mentions in Exhibit 19 that you 
10 had stated that you were concerned unless Reagan 
11 provided additional support—I'm reading about midway 
12 through the second paragraph— 
13 A Of which? 
14 Q Of Exhibit 19. 
15 A Okay. 
16 Q Do you see the second sentence? 
17 A Uh-huh. 
18 Q "He did mention"-that you, Joe, right? 
19 A Correct. 
20 Q nHe did mention that he was concerned that 
21 unless you"-that's Reagan, correct? 
22 A Okay. 
23 Q -"provide additional support for the ^  
24 building near the sign, the building foundation will 
25 be undermined when the sign foundation is removed/ 1 
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Do you see that? 
A Yes* 
Q Does that adequately express your concern? 
A If it's done wrong, it can be done without 
that much difficulty. But I just wanted to know that 
Dewey had people that were qualified to do the job. 
Q "I believe that you will agree that any 
removal activity you pursue must be done in such a way 
that the Garco property is not damaged." 
Do you see that sentence? 
A Yes. 
Q Did Dewey agree to that? 
A Whether he did or not, I told him that it 
was not acceptable to leave the foundation there. 
Q But your main concern with respect to them 
removing the foundation was that they had quality 
people do it? 
A Correct 
Q It's not hard to do? 
A It's not hard to do. 
Q What do you do? 
A Myself? 
Q What would one do in order to remove that 
foundation and not undermine the building foundation? 
A I don't know. But I'm sure that, in fact, 
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Garco sign up there and using those poles as a 
possibility, if it came to that 
I fully intended that Reagan would sign the 
lease and leave the sign there. I feel like it was a 
mistake for them not to, but-
Q Then you say, "This way, you would avoid the 
expense and time of removing the foundation and Garco 
may be able to use the structure for its own sign, 
should it chose to do so at a later time." 
Now, the own sign that you were talking 
about was what? 
A A Garco sign. 
Q At this time you were not contemplating 
doing business with YESCO-or excuse me—with Young 
Electric or— 
i A I had entertained the idea, but I hadn't 
r
 decided until it was removed. Because I wanted to 
; save the expense and hassle of having the sign taken 
1
 down and a new one put up. I fully believed that 
i Reagan would sign the lease on i t 
Q So what conversations followed this letter, 
t Exhibit 19, actually this letter of June 19, 1995 
\ which happens to be Exhibit 19? 
\ A I recall calling Dewey, telling him that 
> they had left the foundation in and that it wasn't 
T . T . r nTTNTFORD. CSR/RPR 
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1 what I was asking is that they have somebody tell me 
2 how they could do it without damaging i t 
3 Q And then Carl goes in his letter, he says, 
4 "One suggestion that Joe made was that Garco may 
5 agree to allow you to just remove the top part of the 
6 structure and leave the foundation and poles in 
7 place." Do you see that? i 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q That was the suggestion you made to Carl, 
10 correct? 
11 A It was. I also made that to the crew chief 
12 there and I believe Dewey, That's a possibility. 
13 Q And that way you would avoid the time and 
14 expense of removing the foundation-before we go that 
15 sentence, can you explain to me what you were 
16 envisioning? The top part of the structure, what are 
17 you talking about? Or what is Carl talking about? 
18 A I guess I don't understand your question. 
19 Q The sentence that talks about, "...Garco may 
[20 agree to allow you to just remove the top part of the 
J21 structure and leave the foundation and poles in 
22 place." 
23 Can you describe for me what it is you were 
24 talking about there, that suggestion? 
25 A I had entertained the idea of putting a 
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1 acceptable. It needed to be removed. And he said 
2 they weren't going to take it out and that's how it 
3 was going to be. 
4 Q So the only thing that Garco was concerned 
5 about was the fact that the foundation was still 
6 sitting there? 
7 A Say that again. 
8 Q The only concern about the way it would be 
! 9 removed is that the foundation is still there? That's 
10 the only concern that Garco has about the way the sign 
11 was removed, correct? 
12 A Correct 
13 Q So the only concern that Garco has about the 
14 way the sign was removed is because the foundation was 
15 still sitting there? 
16 A Correct 
17 (Exhibit No. 20 was marked for identification.) 
18 Q Do you recognize Exhibit 20? 
19 (Witness reviewed document.) 
20 A Yes, I recall. 
21 Q When did you first receive this letter? 
22 A It was shortly after Carl mailed i t 
23 Q To Dewey? 
24 A To Dewey. 
25 Q What was the construction activity that you 
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1 were contemplating at the site that Carl references in 
2 Exhibit 20? 
3 A I believe it was the asphalt that's going to 
4 be refinished. But the way, the process we have been 
5 looking into is recycling the existing where it's 
6 ground off the top and that would be in the way and 
7 also the sewer lines that I talked about 
8 Q I'm sorry, I didn't understand what you were 
9 talking about, recycling the existing. Can you 
10 explain that? 
11 A The process that I have been checking into 
12 on resurfacing the parking lot involves taking off the 
13 top where the asphalt off the top, grinding it up, 
14 mixing it with new asphalt and oil, and relaying it at 
15 a thicker height So the machines go through and dig 
16 up thai would run into the foundation also. 
17 Q How much thicker would the asphalt be? 
18 A I have been told that the normal is about 
19 two inches, two to three inches, and this would be 
20 three to four inches, is what the asphalt company has 
21 explained to me. 
22 Q So the asphalt that you were contemplating 
23 putting on the parking lot to renovate the parking lot 
24 would be three to four inches thicker than the way it 
25 is right now? 
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1 A It would be not thicker than the way it is 
2 now. It would be probably one inch, possibly an inch 
3 and a half thicker than what it is now. 
4 (Exhibit No. 21 was marked for identification.) 
5 Q Showing you what has been marked as 
6 Exhibit 21 to your deposition, and ask if you have 
7 seen this letter before? 
8 (Witness reviewed document.) 
9 A Yes, I have. 
10 Q And you received this from Carl when he 
11 copied it to you after he got it from Dewey? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q Now, in the last paragraph of that letter, 
14 Dewey is mentioning that there was a possibility of 
15 locating the outdoor advertising structure somewhere 
16 upon this location at a point to be determined in the 
17 future. 
18 Do you see that? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q Do you know what Dewey is talking about 
21 there? 
22 A He is still negotiating for a sign on our 
23 property. 
24 Q Were you willing to discuss negotiating a 
25 sign? ; 
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1 A All he needs to do is bring a lease and sign 
2 it and a check* 
3 Q So at this particular point in time, as of 
4 August 9, 1995, you would have been willing to allow 
5 Reagan to erect a sign on that property, correct? 
6 A At a fair price, ves. 
7 Q At the price set forth in Exhibit 4, 
8 correct? 
9 A Correct. 
10 Q And under the terms set forth in Exhibit 4, 
11 correct? 
12 A Correct. 
13 (Exhibit No. 22 was marked for identification.) 
14 Q Handing you what has been marked as 
15 Exhibit 22 to your deposition and ask if you recognize 
16 that document? 
17 A Yes, I do. 
18 Q And you received that shortly after Carl 
19 sent it to Dewey? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q That's Carl's signature? 
22 A Uh-huh. 
23 Q Yes? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q Now, Carl has referenced in Exhibit 22 in 
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1 the first couple of sentences to a meeting between you 
2 and Dewey. Do you see that? 
3 (Witness reviewed document.) 
4 A Yes, 
5 Q Do you recall that meeting? 
6 A I believe that's the meeting that I spoke 
7 about. 
8 Q Mr. Kingston, we have spoken about so many 
9 meetings now, I'm real confused as to which one that 
10 would have been. Refresh my memory here. 
11 A There was only two meetings with Dewey. 
12 Q That's regarding removal of the foundation? 
13 A Regarding negotiation of a new lease. The 
14 removal was discussed mostly over the phone. 
15 Q So y o u -
16 A That subject did come up in our meeting that 
17 we did restate our position that it needed to be 
18 removed and it wasn't acceptable the way it was. 
19 Q Where did you meet with Dewey in this 
20 meeting that's referenced in Exhibit 22? 
21 A If this was the meeting with Paul and I, it 
22 was in my office. If it was the one I wasn't present 
23 at, I'm not sure where they met. 
24 Q Well, this is an August of 1995 meeting. My 
25 recollection of your testimony is that the meeting 
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L with Paul and you took place at the end of *94 and the 
I beginning of *95. Correct? Is my recollection 
\ correct? 
I A I may have been mistaken on that date. It 
J was—I really only met with Dewey one time other than 
S our phone conversations which we have had several of 
7 really. 
3 Q So that meeting with Dewey could have taken 
) place in August of 1995? 
3 A It could have. 
1 Q And that's the meeting that you are talking 
2 about where Dewey told you that they had moved the 
3 sign deliberately to— 
* A Correct 
5 Q —to harm Garco? 
6 A To prevent us from doing business with 
7 anybody but Reagan. And then he made an offer of what 
8 he would pay for the sign. 
9 Q What was his offer? 
0 A It was, I believe, $4,000 a year. 
1 Q What was your response? 
2 A I went back to this (indicating.) 
3 Q Exhibit 4? 
4 A Right 
5 Q Mr. Carl Kingston goes on in his letter 
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1 marked Exhibit 22 and indicates that, "...the removal 
2 work was done deliberately in the cheapest way for 
3 you..." 
4 Is that something that you told Carl? 
5 A That's what the crew told me. And in 
6 looking at the work, that's the way I saw it. 
7 Q Now, tell me about what the crew told you. 
8 A They told me that they weren't going to go 
9 to the expense of digging it out. They were just 
10 going to cut it off below the ground and fill the hole 
n in with concrete.
 c 
12 Q When did they tell you that? 
13 A The day they were out there removing it. 
14 Q And you say in looking at the work you 
15 conclude that it was done in the cheapest way 
16 possible? 
17 A Correct. 
18 Q What is it about looking at the work that 
19 leads you to that conclusion? 
20 A There wasn't any expense to remove the 
21 foundation. I was told the foundation went down 18 
22 feet or thereabouts and that— 
23 Q Who told you that? 
24 A The crew that was on site there. 
25 Q And when it says that Reagan made certain 
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1 that the sign structure could never be used by anyone 
2 else, what is Carl referencing there? 
3 A In talking to the crew on the site there, I 
4 told them that if they left the poles up so that I 
5 could use the poles, not the whole sign, just the 
6 poles, that we could probably justify leaving the 
7 foundation and the poles in place. And the crew chief 
8 there told me there is no way that—in fact, I'm 
9 trying to think of his exact words. Dewey told us to 
0 take it out in a way that no one will ever be able to 
1 use any of i t 
.2 Q Now, do you know the name of that person 
.3 that you were talking to? 
4 A I don't recall the name, 
5 Q But he was the chief of the crew? 
[6 A He was the chief of the crew. That's the 
17 way he introduced himself to me. 
L8 (Exhibit No. 23 was marked for identification.) 
19 Q Handing you what has been marked as 
10 Exhibit 23 to your deposition and ask if you recognize 
>1 that letter? 
H (Witness reviewed document.) 
13 A Yes, I recall. 
>4 Q I'm sorry? 
15 A I do recall the letter. 
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1 Q And you received that shortly after Carl 
2 received it from Dewey? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q Now, the area that Dewey is referencing 
5 about putting up a new sign, can you mark that for me 
6 on Exhibit 1 with a blue pen? Maybe just put an X 
7 where he is talking about maybe putting one up. 
8 A He never did ever say exactly where he would 
9 put i t 
10 Q What were your discussions with him 
11 contemplating? 
12 A Our discussion was that when we met, he 
13 indicated they were still interested in putting a sign 
14 up. And I indicated that he needed to get the 
15 foundation out that was there. That we would possibly 
16 be interested in-or that we would be interested in a 
17 deal to have his sign up there, if he went back to 
18 this original agreement And he told us that he would 
19 get a proposal to us and returned an offer of about 
20 $4,000. He never did say exactly where it would be or 
21 any of the details. 
22 Q What were you understanding from his letter 
23 he was referring to as the southwest corner, 
24 approximately 30 feet south of the location where 
25 Reagan has completed removal of the old sign . 
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Outdoor Advertising, lnc~ 
1775 North 900 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
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i 
Pagel 
This agreement made and entered into by the undersigned lessor, (the "Lessor") and 
by Reagan Outdoor Advertising, (the "Lessee"). Both lessor and lessee acknowledge the 
receipt and sufficiency of good and valuable consideration and agree as follows: 
The lessor does hereby grant and convey to the lessee and its assigns and successors, the 
•Kclyivc right to use the following described property for the purpose of erecting and 
maintaining thereon outdoor advertising structures including such necessary devices, 
structures, connections, supports and appurtenances as may be desired by lessee for a 
years commencing on or before . / . day of 7 7 / / / ^
 f 1 9 / / . . 
gicsscc, upon the following described land, together with ingress and egress 
to and upon the same, located in the county 
term of A  
a4 npn'ar 
l State of Utah and more particularly described as follows: 
L**««« auty pltct oa or i iucb to tola Instrument. «uo*#qu«at I* «i«cuUon. a m«t«« tad bauaa* dMcrtptlaa •/ ta« IACAUOS. .
 4 
i 
Lessee shall pay lessor the amount of $. 
" (rn^uhl^%i^i^e4yT^seini annually); ltuwcvci, piiui u/iumtruitiuii and uuuiiiing^pemnts 
byncssec thu imtal shall uc r i te Dollars ~ 
annually^payable
 x / w ( 
1
 * ' $ - / * * • 
ilf <*- /XDrti^ +* /nch -rk basis cuU\ux If 
This lease shall continue on drfrstaroc^rFFm-and conditMHia for-a4&e SULLOIUJVU period; o^€fk ^< 
thereafter, this k&se-sftall -rnnftnnr in-full force on uW*am«--ier7Tn and •coftduioftAvfof-fl. S^crAtL 
-l&c succcvave period or peliuds, tm4c 
iiiiiciy-4*ys ufTfte^e^^of^aad^^crm. 
lessor delivorc to leasoc notice of termination withia f ,v£ • £V5 = 
It is further expressly agreed that lessee may terminate this lease by giving written 
notice and paying a penalty of one year's rent at any time within thirty days prior to the 
end of any twelve month period subsequent to the commencement date of this lease. I*ro-
nlciriuiiuci, U Hie said apaic'btLumis obstructed so as tu lessen the advertlsil] 
y of lessee's signs grcctegLfln ^aH prmn'u ij wi iirTTTTMirnjiivrnrTr-T^ 
-any sudi signs is prevented or iratricledj>fc£g£5f^^ 
r erection ormodjfjcja jj/? p -M-^cfrr^71' > t ^ J ^ ^ y ^
 zt mc^ptjoa^6Tlessee^^leTm!inttej 
r thg-jssa^&tic^rto rTvc Dollars-wtrite~"Ga4d condition fcxisS and in sucn event ltssof sliail 
efrJml preraut a.iy picpaid lcutal for the uucApLiid turn. Lessor agrees that no such 
obstruction insofar as the same is within lessor's control will be permitted or allowed. 
Lessor authorized lessee to trim and cue whatever trees, bushes, brush, as it deems necessary 
for unobstructed view of its advertising display. 
All advertising signs placed upon the described premises arc to remain the property of 
lessee and may be removed by lessee at any time. 4i4cssec ij ^tzJLLixmd by Uw, ui Kurern-
mrnf nr military order, or other causes b^YOadA^iitcls-j ^^ ^~** ' K 
Jessce may reduce- the lmial provided hereinby one-h 
aain in effeof JU luug as i^uiii mudlllUliTimiiuucs 
ipX^ogfTTTi i m i n ^ 7 
_^_JEffx>r warrants-'the title of said leasehold for the tcrm_hcrcin mentioned, -fa-thc cvmc 
.•^ "tnu lratr ic nor-fcnewerl nr rancelle^r-ks&gf agrees U*afr4*e-will^ noFf61^ a~~pera>d of £>e years 
( snh^murnt to the Hare al rrnmination, release said oremise lo any othrr i t i w i i i t j othtj > rq p ise* e advertiser ther 
> \tbt>4ci<ww for advg rming rnirpmrr. du .thL.ey.cut.lcssor ^A^e-tu>fcU"du,.piLiiLucA- dcscTtbed-nerein, 1« 
eude diuiiig.iiic-JcriirgC 
ritten/ nouceto-Reagan of 
if Reagan 
not sell the premises on oth 
have the same riybr as tn any tnhcMqi^nt nlU^ie* 
xpresaly-understood-ihat-ncithcr-the lessor'nor lessee is bound "oy any sdpula-
dons, representations, or agreements not printed or written in this lease. 
This agreement shall inure to the benefit of and shall be binding upon the heirs, per-
|sonal representatives, successors, and assigns of the parties hereto. 
Executed this . . day of . 19. 
LESSEE: REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING 
LESSOR: 
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fReagatO 
February 10, 1993 
CARL E. KINGSTON 
Attorney at Law 
3212 South State Street 
P.O. Box 15809 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Re: Outdoor Advertising Lease - 3986 South, 300 West 
Salt Lake City ^ Reagan Lease No. R223 
Dear Mr. Kingston: 
It is true that at this time no agreement for a new lease 
agreement has been reached. I have tried hard to negotiate 
a reasonable rental rate and to come up with other 
reasonable terms and conditions for a new lease. I am more 
than willing to continue to negotiate in an attempt to find 
a reasonable compromise agreement on these points. 
In the meantime the current lease remains in full force and 
effect. The sign structure and faces are the property of 
Reagan Outdoor and may not be removed by anyone without our 
permission. Neither you nor your client has that 
permission. 
Treble civil damages arid other penalties are available to 
Reagan under the provisions of section 27-12-13 6.9 of the 
Utah Code should your clients, their agents or assigns, 
attempt the removal of, or cause damage to, the sign. 
I am more than willing to meet with you, at your 
convenience, to discuss this matter and further attempts to 
seek a reasonable resolution of the situation. 
Very truly yours, 
Douglafe T. Hall 
Corporate Counsel 
DTH/nec 
cc: Dewey Reagan 
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June 12, 1995 
C a r l E. Kingston 
At to rney a t Law 
3 212 South S t a t e 
P.O. Box 15809 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Dear Carl: 
I am writing you this letter to follow up on the discussion we had 
last week. During the course of that conversation you informed me 
that you would like to have Reagan Outdoor Advertising remove its 
sign structure from your property located at 398 6 South adjacent to 
the Interstate as soon as possible. At that time I stated that we 
would begin removing the structure immediately and that is the 
manner in which we will proceed. 
Unless I hear from you within the next 5 working days, I will 
assume that you want us to remove the sign structure and we will 
begin to do so. In addition, in order to remove the foundation we 
will, need to tie up your parking lot for 3 to 4 days. Thank you 
for your time. 
Sincerely yours, 
Dewey A. Reagan 
DAR/de 
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Carl E. Kingston 
ATTORNEY AT WW 
3212 SOUTH STATE STREET 
P.O. BOX 15809 
SALT tAKE CITY, UTAH 84115 
TELEPHONE (801)486-1458 
FAX (801) 487-3971 
June 19, 1995 
Dewey A. Reagan 
1775 North 900 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Dear Mr. Reagan: 
In response to your letter dated June 12, 1995, it is my understanding that 
you phoned me after you had dictated this letter, when you were notified that 
Joe Kingston had requested that your employees cease their efforts of 
removing the sign structure at 3986 South adjacent to 1-15. My understanding 
is that you were going to talk to Joe before resuming the dismantling process. 
I tried to call you, but you were out, so I left a message on your voice mail. 
I did talk to Joe after wc spoke and he said he would be happy to discuss 
his concerns with you regarding the removal, but 1 have not spoken to him 
since and do not know if the two of you have made contact. He did mention 
that he was : concerned that unless you provide additional support for the 
building near the sign, the building foundation will be undermined when the 
sign foundation is removed. I believe that you will agree that any removal 
activity you pursue must be done in such a way that the Garco property is not 
damaged. One suggestion that Joe made was that Garco may agree to allow you 
to just remove the top part of the structure and leave the foundation and poles 
in place. This way, you would avoid the expense and time of removing the 
foundation "and Garco may be' able to use the structure for its own sign, should 
it chose to do so at a later time. 
In any event, as you requested a response to your letter within five 
days, please be advised that the sign removal must be done in such a way that 
the property is not damaged and the procedure must meet with Garco's 
approval. "Accordingly, if you have not yet spoken to Joe about this, please do 
so before proceeding. 
Very truly yours, 
Carl E. Kingston 
CEK/kj 
RECEIVED 
JUN 2 0 1995 
REAGAN OUTDOOR 
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August 9, 1995 
Carl E. Kingston 
Attorney at Law 
3212 South State Street 
P.O. Box 15809 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Dear Carl: 
I am writing this letter in response to your correspondence dated 
July 26, 199 5. Your requests in this letter are a complete 
departure from the manner in which you requested that we remove the 
sign on June 19, 1995. In your letter of June 19th you requested 
that Reagan Outdoor Advertising remove the sign located at 
approximately 398 6 South 3rd West in Salt Lake City, Utah in a 
manner which would not endanger the integrity of the near by 
building's foundation. You stated; "He (Joe) did mention that he 
was concerned that unless you provide additional support for the 
building near the sign, the building foundation will be undermined 
when the sign foundation is removed." In addition in that letter 
you also stated "one suggestion that Joe made wa:s that GARCO may 
agree to allow you to just remove the top part of the structure and 
leave the foundation and poles in place." 
As a result of these two statements contained within your June 19th 
correspondence, Reagan Outdoor Advertising removed the foundation 
of the sign in the manner you requested making absolutely certain 
that the foundation of the building was preserved and protected and 
that we removed only the part of the structure that was located 
above the ground. At this time, it is our firm's position that our 
work at this location is completed. 
4 
4 
In regards to another matter, that being the possibility of 
^ m locating an outdoor advertising structure somewhere upon this 
•I location at a point to be determined in the future, I would greatly 
appreciate you facilitating a meeting between myself and Joe, as we 
seem to have a hard time connecting. I look forward to 
PJ facilitating a mutually beneficial business relationship in the 
^ near future and await word from Joe. 
Sincerely yours, 
Dewey A. Reagan 
DAR/de 
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August 9, 19 9 5 
Carl E. Kingston 
Attorney at Law 
3 212 South State Street 
P.O. Box 15809 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Dear Carl: 
I am writing this letter in response to your correspondence dated 
July 26, 1995. Your requests in this letter are a complete 
departure from the manner in which you requested that we remove the 
sign on June 19, 1995. In your letter of June 19th you requested 
that Reagan Outdoor Advertising remove the sign located at 
approximately 3986 South 3rd West in Salt Lake City, Utah in a 
manner which would not endanger the integrity of the near by 
building's foundation. You stated; "He (Joe) did mention that he 
was concerned that unless you provide additional support for the 
building near the sign, the building foundation will be undermined 
when the sign foundation is removed." In addition in that letter 
you also stated "one suggestion that Joe made was that GARCO may 
agree to allow you to just remove the top part of the structure and 
leave the foundation and poles in place." 
As a result of these two statements contained within your June 19th 
correspondence, Reagan Outdoor Advertising removed the foundation 
of the sign in the manner you requested making absolutely certain 
that the foundation of the building was preserved and protected and 
that we removed only the part of the structure that was located 
above the ground. At this time, it is our firm's position that our 
work at this location is completed. 
In regards to another matter, that being the possibility of 
locating an outdoor advertising structure somewhere upon this 
location at a point to be determined in the future, I would greatly 
appreciate you facilitating a meeting between myself and Joe, as we 
seem to have a hard time connecting. I look forward to 
facilitating a mutually beneficial business relationship in the 
near future and await word from Joe. 
Sincerely yours, 
O 
Dewey A. Reagan 
DAR/de 
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September 11, 1995 
Carl E. Kingston 
Attorney at Law 
3 212 South State 
P.O* Box 15809 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Dear Carl: 
I am writing this letter in response to your correspondence dated 
August 30, 199 5. In that letter you state and I quote "that I met 
with Joe Kingston regarding our request that the sign foundation be 
removed from the 3 98 6 South 3 00 West location, and that I would get 
back to Joe regarding a proposal or a way to resolve the matter•" 
I must clarify that I did indeed meet with Joe, however, we did not 
discuss any further action with regards to the sign removal which 
Reagan has completed at that address. Our discussions only 
pertained to the possibility of Reagan building a new sign on that 
piece of property in the South West corner approximately 30' South 
of the location where Reagan has completed the removal of its old 
sign structure. 
In addition, as I have stated in my earlier correspondence, it is 
Reagan's position that we removed the sign in the manner that you 
requested, making absolutely certain that the integrity of the 
building foundation was preserved and that our work there has been 
completed. 
In regards to the possibility of our parties entering into a new 
lease agreement which, as I stated above was the only topic that 
Joe and I discussed, I will contact them in the very near future 
with a proposal the subject of which will be leasing the South West 
corner of your property in order to erect a new outdoor advertising 
structure. Should our parties be able to agree on a new ground 
lease, I would be willing to discuss possible further action at the 
old site. . It is my hope that we can consummate a lease agreement 
in that spot and thus facilitate a new business relationship 
between our two parties. 
Sincerely yours, 
Dewey^A. Reagan 
EXHIBIT 
DAR/de ™ 
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UV OFFICES OF 
'. MARK HANSEN, P.C. 
!4 NORTH 300 WEST, SUITE 200 
U_T LAKE CITY, UTAH 84103 
itEPHONE: (801) 533-2700 
cX: (801) 533-2736 
ADMITTED TO PRACTICE IN UTAH, 
ARIZONA, COLORADO AND NEVADA. 
NEVADA OFFICE: 
5675 S. VALLEY VIEW, #200 
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89118 
TELEPHONE: (702) 798-0125 
July 29, 1996 
NOTICE OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER 
William K. Reagan 
R.O.A. General, Inc. 
1775 North 900 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL 
Dear Mr. Reagan: 
I represent U.P.C, Inc. d/b/a Garco Industrial Park. For approximately one year R.O.A. 
General, Inc. d/b/a Reagan Outdoor Advertising has been continuously trespassing on U.P.C.'s 
property located at 3994 South 300 West, Murray, Utah. The trespass includes R.O.A.'s failure 
to remove its entire outdoor sign structure upon demand at the termination of R.O.A.'s lease, 
thereby remaining in possession of the premises after the expiration of the lease. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§78-36-3 et seq., U.P.C. hereby gives R.O.A. formal notice 
of unlawful detainer. U.P.C. demands that R.O.A. end its possession of the premises within five 
days after service of this notice, by removing P^.O.A.'s entire sign structure including the 
foundation and restoring the premises to their pre-lease condition. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10, if R.O.A. fails to surrender the premises by 
removing its sign structure within five days, U.P.C. shall file suit for, among other things, an 
order of restitution, plus judgment for the fair rental value of the premises occupied by R.O.A., 
plus three times damages, plus interest, costs and attorney fees as provided by contract or law. 
Govern yourself accordingly. 
Sincerely, 
"MarkH 
2351-L/OOl 
EXHIBIT 
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Third Judicial District 
*7? A U W 5 1997/N - / 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a ] 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ; 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ] 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ] 
Defendant. ) 
I AFFIDAVIT OF JOSEPH KINGSTON 
> IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 960906388 
) Judge William B. Bohling 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Joseph Kingston, being duly sworn, deposes and states I am the property manager for 
U.P.C., Inc. dba Garco Industrial Park, the plaintiff in this matter. I have read the following 
statements in this Affidavit and know them to be true of my personal knowledge. 
1. Based on my examination of the records, on February 22, 1990 U.P.C., Inc. 
purchased the Garco property in good faith and for a valuable consideration, and on March 2, 1990 
recorded its warranty deed. A true and correct copy of the recorded deed reflecting the transaction 
is attached as Exhibit 1. 
2. The Salt Lake County Recorder records show Reagan did not record its 1975 lease 
until December 14, 1992. A true and correct copy of the complete recorded 1975 lease is attached 
as Exhibit 2. 
m 
F. Mark Hansen, #5078 
624 North 300 West, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 533-2700 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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3. Although Exhibit 2 was purportedly signed on July 8, 1975, it was notarized by a 
seal that expired February 15, 1995. Because notary seals are renewed every four years, the 
recorded document did not exist even until some time after February 15, 1991, a full year after 
Garco bought the property. 
4. A true and correct copy of the portion of the Salt Lake County aerial plat map 
showing the respective locations of the Garco property, Reagan's signs to the south of the Garco 
property and on the Mollerup property, and Reagan's former signs on the Garco property and to 
the north of the Garco property, is attached as Exhibit 3. The photo is on a scale of 1" = 100'. 
As Exhibit 3 shows, Reagan owned and still owns a sign located about 510 feet south of Garco's 
southern boundary line and about 600 feet south of the former Garco sign location. Before Reagan 
put up its Mollerup sign, Reagan also owned a sign located about 550 feet north of the former Garco 
sign location and 640 feet north of Garco's southern boundary. The northern boundary of the 
Mollerup premises is slightly over 500 feet from Garco's southern property line. This makes it 
possible to erect two signs over 500 feet apart, one at Mollerup's northern boundary and the other 
at Garco's southern boundary. 
5. About three weeks before Reagan removed its sign from the Garco premises, before 
Reagan informed Garco it would remove its sign, and without giving any advance indication, 
Reagan erected yet another sign about 480 feet from Garco's south boundary line and about 390 feet 
from Reagan's still-existing Garco sign. I asked Dewey Reagan why Reagan had thus moved its 
sign. He replied that Reagan had done so for the specific purpose to prevent Garco from doing 
business with anyone but Reagan. 
6. I have met with James Mollerup, who has informed me that with respect to Reagan's 
placement of its sign on the Mollerup premises, he told Reagan where the sign had to be located as 
far as east-west placement (that is, respecting its distance from the freeway), but that it was Reagan, 
not Mollerup, who chose the sign's north-south placement. Reagan told Mr. Mollerup that Reagan 
rwvWl thr qian to he about 20 feet or so south of Mollerup's northern boundary. Mr. Mollerup 
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informed Reagan the sign would be more in the way there, but Reagan insisted, so Mollerup 
acquiesced in Reagan's location. Mr. Mollerup confirmed the sign could have been placed at 
Mollerup's the northern boundary rather than the location Reagan chose, and that such a placement 
would actually have been preferable to Mollerup, as it would interfere less with Mollerup's ability 
to use the area. Mr. Mollerup also informed me Reagan's lease with Mollerup was part of a 
settlement of a major dispute, and that Reagan insisted that the terms of the settlement and the lease 
itself be subject to a confidentiality agreement, and that he could therefore not produce those 
documents without a court order. 
7. I have also personally inspected the Mollerup sign placement and Mollerup's use of 
its property around the sign. It is readily apparent that Reagan's sign could easily have been placed 
at Mollerup's northern boundary; that Reagan's placement of the sign some 25 feet south of the 
boundary was more inconvenient to Mollerup than placing the sign at the boundary would have 
been; and that the difference between the two locations on the Mollerup premises would have no 
effect on Reagan's ability to sell advertising space on the sign. 
DATED this £ d day of August, 1997. 
tasepfi Kingston' 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _ ^ day of August, 1997. 
Residing at: if "'<"'•* o y r 
My Commission Expires: Notary Public 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify on August ^ i , 1997 a true and correct copy of the above was served by first-
class mail to: 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Leslie Van Frank 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. 
- 525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
2351p.016 
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Mail to: Grantee, P.O. Box 65644, bait Lake City, Utan oti« 
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00 
Recorded at Request of 
at M. Fee Paid *_ 
by Dtp. Book. Page Rcf.:_. 
Mail tax notice to_ .Add rest.. 
WARRANTY DEED 
J. RICHARD LAMONT a/k/a JAMES R. LAMONT a/k/a JAMES RICHARD LAMONT 
of Salt Lake City 
CONVEY and W A R R A N T 
.Countyof Salt Lake 
grantor 
to 
U.P .C . , INC., a Utah Corporation ^ 0 
A' 
, State of Utah, hereby 
^887645 
i-7 HARCH 90 10:35 At 
KATIE L . OIXON 
ftE(vf-?cR. SALI LAKE COUNTY. UTAH 
•lUAKOIAN TITLE 
*£*: l\' 0 DANCtRFIELD . OEF'U'Y 
of Salt Lake C i ty , County of Salt Lake, State of Utah 
Ten and no/100 and other good and valuable conslderatlons-
gTantee 
for the sum of 
— DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah: 
Beg1nr1nq d a point on the West line of Three Hundred West Street , said point 
being North 89°54,51" East 284.26 feet and Horth 0°08'30" West 755.9° feet from 
the South Quarter corner of Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, and said point of beginning Is also South 89°54'51M West 33.00 
feet and North 0°08,30M West 755.99 feet from the County Monument 1n Three Hundred 
West Street; and running thence West 235.36 feet ; thence South 70°32,42" West 
404.56 feet to the East right-of-way l ine of Interstate-15; thence North 4°56' 
West along said East l ine 317.90 feet; thence East 643.72 feet to the West l ine 
of Three Hundred West Street; thence South 0°08'30H East along said West l ine 
181.97 feet to the point of beginning. 
Subject to current general taxes, easements and restr ic t ions. 
WITNESS, the hand of aald grantor , thU 22nd 
February , A. D. 10 90 
Signed in tht Presence of 
day of 
). k\CHMT^OMsJ^/ei\}mtS R. LAMONT 
a/k/a JAMES RICHARD LAMONT 
STATE Or UTAH. 
County of Salt Lake J 
On the 22nd day of February , A. D. 1990 
pcrsonaU^^mpc*red before me J. RICHARO LAMONT a/k/a JAMES R. LAMONT a/k/a JAMES 
RiCHAnoTwwT 
tht ilgncr /; x)f tfw within initrument, who duly acknowledged to mo thut ht ixecuted th« 
.• ,v y r n .« 
<;*i t i atcp M t\ tlt/»h 
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1 "*-•"' REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, I N ^
 J
 ^  
SIGN LOCATION LEASE 
AGREEMENT made this &£&4xj £sjLcj2j/~ , 1 9 . 2 r i between 
Z21&&Z, hereinafter called the Lessor, and REAGAN OUTDOOR. ADVERTISING 
V -» V v ^ ^ ^ ^ ~ 
}<¥*L* 
.turn. 
hereinafter called the Lessee, 
1. That, for the consideration hereinafter mentioned, the Lessor does hereby grant to the Lessee, and its assigns and 
successors, the exclusive right to xxsc the following described property for the purpose of erecting painted, printed, or illumi-
nated advertising signs, including necessary structures, devices and connections, to-wit: on the ground, on buildiagi erected x-*/' 
or to be erected, or on roofs of any such buildings, upon the following described land, located in the county okzzt&^Jt-SZzz^-r 
.Stare of Utah, and more particularly described at follows, to-wit 
LOCATION 
^ ? e # y £ * t ^ ^ 
J^(^^A^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ <<a^£^^<^w^^ 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION: . 
2. The term of this lease shall commence on the ./faGSi^L— day of Js. 
and shall continue on the same terras for an initial period of ten years from the date oc placement of thVr sign structure for 
advertising purposes on the herein described premises; notwithstanding the foregoing, it is further understood and agreed that 
if the first structure is not placed within twelve months from execution of this agreement, that the first anniversary date shall 
be the commencement date of the lease and rent. + _ 
3. Lessee shall pay to die Lessor rental in die amount of \...{^Oj)^.QS:^tx year payable on a Q*Conddyf Quarterly; 
LFJTMIIII) basis. Prior to construction and during such times as no advertising copies are being displayed—orTthe demised 
premises by Lessee, the rent shall be at die rate of ten percent of the annual rental. 
4. Lessor grants to die Lessee privilege and option to continue this lease for a like period on the terms and condi-
tions herein set out; said renewal shall be deemed to haw been exercised for an additional period by die continuing in die 
possession of said premises and die payment of rent Lessor agrees at me term/nation of this lease for five yearsjipt to l< rent essor agrees at the tenmnal . y ^ > 
the demised premises to any outdoor advertiser odicr dian Lessee. ^ rfCfiC/Z&^f. d?c.-£-+</TCS4£•&;%%*A 
5. In die case die Federal, State, Municipal oc odier public authority shallenforce a^/ rule* or regulations or^axes 
which shall have the effect of restricting the location, construction, maintenance or operation of signs, JO as to diminish die 
value of said premises for advertising purposes, or in case die view of die premises shall become obstructed the Lessee may ter-
minate Uiis lease upon giving die Lessor diirty days written notice. 
6. It u understood diat in die event of die termination of diis lease under any of the provision herein set out, any 
rental which has been paid in advance by die Lessee shall be repaid by the Lessor. 
7. The Lessee is and shall remain die owner of all signs and improvements placed by Lessee on said property and 
has die right to remove or change the same at any time 
8. The Lessor represents diat he is die owner-tenant-agent of the premises above described and has the authority 
to execute diis Icase-
9. In the event the Lessor should default in any o( the covenants and agreements contained herein, Lessor agrees 
to pay all costs and expenses diat may arise from enforcing this agreement either by suit or otherwise, including reasonable 
attorney fees. 
10. Lessor agrees that he, his tenants, agents, employees, or odier persons acting in his behalf, shall not place or main-
tain any object on die premises or on any neighboring premise J which would in any way obstruct the view of Lessee's si*u 
structures. If such an obstruction occurs the Lessee has the option of requiring the Lessor to remove said obstruction, or the 
Lessee may itself remove die obstruction charging the cost of said removal to the Lessor, or die Lessee may reduce the rental 
herein paid to the sum of Five Dollars per year so loog as ruch obstruction continues. 
11. Lessor ik«H wHLcrrct, cause to beyrodcted^ otjxvnuIjp be erected any ugn which will extend above the parapet 
wail of Lessor's building^ ?2 £*^C4ZJ./^~Ct m ; <fr^'-
12. This Lease shall constitute die sole agreement of die parties relating to the lease of the above described premises. 
Netdier party will be bound by any statements, warranties, or promises, oral or written, unless such statements, warranties or 
promises are set forth specifically in diis Lease. 
13. This agrecement shall inure to tile benefit of, 
and assigns of the parties hereto. . ,.-y 
be binding upon their heirs, penonxl representatives, successon, 
ercto have let their hands die day and year first above written. 
Nam< 
City 
fc^UTDOOR AD 
-^©W'/j 
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EMBtTA 
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION 
Beginning at a point on the West line of Three Hundred West Street, said point 
being North 89°54'5r East 284.26 feet and North 0°08'30" West 755.9? feet from 
the South Quarter corner of Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, and said poTrfToTbeginning is also South 89°54'51" West 33.00 
feet and North 0°08'30" West 755.99 feet from the County Monument in'Three Hundred 
West Street; and running thence West 235.36 feet; thence South 70<,32'42" West 
404.56 feet to the East right-of-way line of Interstate-15; thence North 4°56' 
West along said East line 317.90 feet; thence East 643.72 feet to the West line 
of Three Hundred West Street; thence South 0°08,30" East along said West line 
181.97 feet to the point of beginning. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
On the ?«* day of <ftit- 19 7 5 
personal ly appeared before me CfcucAc R. GnvAo'* j CTaujis* (Z. Lau^tA. 
the s igner of t h i s foregoing instrument, who- duly acknowledged t o 
me tha t he executed the same. 
• i j Hilary PtiAl 
t / r a K & r a 1775 Nor* 900 Wttf | 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Sa l t Lake :ss 
On the fr"& day of CTol ^
 
19 7 5 
personally appeared before me (^/^Z£^ who, being 
by me duly sworn, did say that he is the ^(J)MOJ JpCo<2i)f 
of REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, that the foregoing instrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws, 
and said ^^AJJU^^AA) ^V/JtJ^ acknowledged to me that said 
cc^poc ai^Qn«G^ceGUtai.tJl£^ame. 
I y £ £ ^ k NotiryPublc \ 
I AJ^^^s. 8HfRt£YTi.OBGBlL I 
«24E«t4075 8oueh 1 
8artLakaCtylft5trS4107: 
My Convnissita Expirtt I 
February )5; 1fi& I •SA°a-HS322»_ I CD 
cn 
KJO 
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RCCOROCRi SALT LAKE COUHTYf UTAH 
REAGAH OUTOOOR ADVERTISING INC 
1775 H WO W S I C . 84114 
REC lYt RCKCCA «RAY • DCFUTY 
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•ormer Sisn North of Garco Property 
Mollerup Northern Boundary 
Present Location of Mollerup Sign 
Former Location of Garco Sign 
f^ :^:^ .: 
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. ' \ '••• . . ' 
Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2590) 
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913, 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SE< 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff 
R.O.A. General, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a ] 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ) 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ) 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ] 
Defendant. ) 
) REPLY MEMORANDUM 
) IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION FOR 
> SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. 960906388 
1 Judge William B. Bohling 
Defendant R.O.A. General, Inc. by and through its undersigned counsel, submits the 
following Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
STATEMENT OF ALLEGED DISPUTED FACTS 
Garco has gone to great efforts in an attempt to create factual disputes in response to 
Reagan's "Statement of Facts." Close analysis of Garco's 53-paragraph response, however, reveals 
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that Garco has raised primarily legal, not factual disputes, and that none of these disputes is material 
to a determination of whether Reagan is entitled to summary judgment.1 
1. Whether Reagan's Lease is Binding on Garco is a Legal Determination, not a 
Factual One. In paragraphs 2, 3, 12, 13, 16, 29, 30, 31, 34, and 35, Garco rambles on and on about 
an alleged "factual" dispute over whether Reagan's 1975 lease of the property was effective to allow 
Reagan to remain in possession of the premises after Garco purchased the property in 1990. This 
is not a factual dispute. Whether Reagan's lease was valid and binding on Garco is a legal 
conclusion. Garco's attempt to muddy the waters by raising multiple irrelevancies does not alter the 
legal effect of the 1975 lease. {See, Point I, infra). 
But even if Garco's legal conclusions regarding the effect of the 1975 lease on Garco 
were correct, the fact that the lease was undisputedly binding on Garco's predecessor makes the rest 
of Garco's arguments that rely on Garco's position fail: 
(a) Garco asserts that because the lease was not binding on Garco when Garco 
purchased the property in 1990, then Reagan had no right to leave the sign or the foundation after 
Garco purchased the property, and therefore was trespassing and in unlawful detainer thereafter 
(Garco Memo, pp. 12, 15-16, 17). But Garco collected rent from Reagan on a monthly basis after 
Garco bought the property, up until the time Reagan vacated the premises. Thus, Reagan could not 
possibly have been trespassing during that time period. Moreover, since Reagan had no duty to 
remove the foundation after the lease expired, regardless of the date of expiration, Reagan committed 
1
 Garco has admitted Reagan's Statements of FactNos. 1,4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 
17, 19, 21, 23, and 26. The remaining paragraphs that Garco either wholly disputes or disputes 
"in part" are addressed in this section. 
2 
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no trespass by leaving the foundation in place when it did vacate the premises. And since Reagan 
had no duty to remove the foundation and undisputedly returned possession of the premises to Garco 
prior to Garco's service of its Notice to Quit on July 29, 1996, then Reagan cannot have been in 
unlawful detainer. (See Points II and HI infra). 
(b) Garco contends that Reagan utilized improper means by threatening Garco 
with legal action should Garco take down the sign without Reagan's permission (Garco Memo, p. 
17). But had Garco followed up on its own threat to forcibly cut down the sign and remove it at 
Reagan's expense without Reagan's permission, Garco would have violated the provisions of U.C.A. 
§78-36-1, et seq., Utah's forcible entry and detainer statute. Thus, Reagan would have had the right 
to sue Garco, even if Reagan had been improperly in possession of the premises. 
(c) Finally, Garco avers that since the lease is not binding on Garco, the non-
compete provision of the lease cannot act as a bar to Garco's intentional interference claim. (Garco 
Memo, p. 18). Again, Reagan disagrees with Garco's analysis, but as Reagan explained in its initial 
memorandum, it doesn't matter whether the non-compete provision was still in effect. Even without 
the non-compete provision, Garco's own version of the facts still does not support a claim for 
intentional interference with economic relations. (See, Point IV, infra). 
2. Since Reagan was Entitled to Leave the Sign Foundation in Place on Expiration 
of the Lease, Garco's Asserted Disputes Regarding Damages and Reagan's Motivations for 
Leaving the Sign in Place Are Irrelevant. In paragraphs 24, 25, 40, 42, 44, 46, and 47, Garco 
asserts that its damages resulting from the foundation remaining in place are in dispute, and that 
Reagan's motives for leaving the sign in place are suspect. But since Reagan was entitled to leave 
the sign foundation in place at expiration of the lease (See Point II, infra), any dispute over these 
3 
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facts is immaterial to a determination that Garco has failed to state a cause of action against Reagan 
for leaving the foundation in place. If Reagan has no duty to Garco to remove the foundation, then 
Reagan's failure to remove the foundation is not actionable. 
3. The Remaining Miscellaneous So-Called "Factual Disputes" are 
Immaterial to a Determination that Reagan is Entitled to Summary Judgment. 
Garco asserts that Reagan's Statements of Fact Nos. 18 and 20 are disputed in that 
Reagan has characterized its conversations with Garco after August 1992 as "further negotiations." 
Garco states that its "position was consistent; Reagan was to comply with the lease terms the parties 
had agreed to in August of 1992 or remove its sign." (Garco Memo, p. 3, par. 18). Whether this 
constitutes "negotiations" appears to be an immaterial dispute over semantics. What is undisputed 
is that Reagan never signed a lease agreement incorporating the August 1992 terms on which Garco 
was insisting, that between November 1992 and January 1993, Reagan was unwilling to pay the 
amount of rent that Garco was asking (J.Kingston deposition, pp. 85-86), and that as of February 2, 
1993, "the parties had not been able to reach an agreement regarding the rental for [Reagan's] sign." 
(J. Kingston deposition, p. 89; Exhibit 17 to J.Kingston deposition). Moreover, after November 
1992, Garco repeatedly acknowledged that the negotiations were ongoing. See, e.g., Exhibit 12 
(2/26/93 - "in order to determine whether any further negotiations will be fruitful, please reduce to 
writing precisely what Reagan will pay. . . and any other specific terms. . ."); Exhibit 14 (5/4/93 -
". . . unless Reagan is willing to consider such terms, it does not appear that further negotiations will 
be productive." 5/4/93); Exhibit 17 (2/23/95 - ". . . we have no desire to start all over with 
negotiations that have already been unproductive for over two years."). By its own testimony and 
4 
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evidence, Garco knew during this time period that Reagan was unwilling to accept the lease terms 
that Garco had proposed and that Reagan was attempting to negotiate different terms. 
Next, Garco mischaracterizes Joe Kingston's deposition testimony in attempting to 
dispute Reagan's Statement of Fact No. 22. Reagan indicated in that Statement of Fact that as of 
February 1995, Garco had called other sign companies intending to have another sign put up by 
someone other than Reagan. Reagan's factual statement was based on the following testimony from 
Joe Kingston: 
Q. And what had you done as of February '95 to pursue that option [to have 
another sign company lease Garco's property]? 
A. I have [sic] contacted other sign companies. 
Q. What sign companies did you contact? 
A. Young Electric, Electric Sign Systems. 
(J.Kingston deposition, p. 149) (emphasis added). Thus, Garco's assertion in its opposing 
memorandum that it did not contact Young Electric Sign Company until after Reagan took down its 
sign in June 1995, is belied by Joe Kingston's own testimony. The point, however, is that Garco 
certainly believed as of February 23, 1995 that it had the right to contact other sign companies. 
Garco simply failed to follow up on those contacts until months later, and now blames Reagan for 
alleged damages resulting from Garco's own inaction. 
Finally, Garco attempts to dispute Reagan's Statements of Fact Nos. 27 and 28, which 
facts indicate that Reagan applied to UDOT on April 24, 1995 for a relocation permit and completed 
construction of its new sign on the Mollerup property on June 1, 1995. Garco offers no evidence to 
dispute these statements, but asserts only that Reagan could not have moved its sign, because 
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Reagan's signs on the Mollerup and the Garco properties were both standing for approximately three 
weeks. Garco misunderstands the statutory scheme involving outdoor advertising signs. 
U.Admin.Code Rule 933-2-4 requires all outdoor advertising signs to have a UDOT-approved 
permit. There is no dispute that Reagan had obtained such a permit for the Garco sign for the time 
period after 1975 when the sign was first erected. (A copy of that original permit is attached to the 
Supplemental Affidavit of Dewey Reagan submitted herewith as Exhibit "A"). Reagan applied to 
UDOT on April 21, 1995 to relocate that permit pursuant to U.Admin.Code Rule 933-2-5(1 )(c), 
which allows a sign permit to be relocated provided the actual change to the sign is completed within 
60 days from the date of approval of the request. On April 24, 1995, UDOT approved the relocation 
of Reagan's permit from Garco's property to Mollerup's property. (A copy of the R407 application 
and its approval is attached to the Supplemental Affidavit of Dewey Reagan as Exhibit "B"). 
Reagan then constructed a new sign on the Mollerup property and removed its sign from the Garco 
property, all within the 60 days allowed by UDOT's administrative rules. Thus, Reagan did, in fact, 
"move" its sign from Garco's property to Mollerup's property, and the fact that both signs were 
standing for approximately three weeks is meaningless. 
ARGUMENT 
I. REAGAN'S LEASE IS ENFORCEABLE AGAINST GARCO 
Garco asserts two issues contesting the enforceability of Reagan's lease against 
Garco. First, Garco insists that since the document was not recorded until after Garco bought the 
property, it is not binding on Garco. (Garco's Memo, p. 11). And second, Garco contends that the 
document "on its face" did not exist prior to February 14, 1991, a full year after Garco bought the 
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property. Id. Garco is flatly wrong on both counts and the disingenuity of this argument reveals the 
weakness of Garco's entire case. 
The law in the State of Utah for more than 100 years, as "hoary" as that law might 
be, is that possession of land, regardless of the state of record title, is notice to the world of the 
possessor's rights. 
An occupant's possession is actual notice of his title, and all persons with notice of 
such possession must at their peril take notice of his full title in the premises, no 
difference what the record shows. 
Toland v. Corey, 24 P. 190 (Utah 1890); see also, Neponset Land & Live-Stock Co. v. Dixon, 37 P. 
573 (Utah 1894) (occupancy is sufficient to put a purchaser on inquiry notice). This doctrine has 
been affirmed by the Utah appellate courts repeatedly, and at least as recently as the Utah Court of 
Appeals' decision in Stumph v. Church 740 P.2d 820 (Ut.Ct.App. 1987). 
In the instant case, there is no factual dispute over whether the Reagan's advertising 
sign was in place on Garco's property when Garco purchased it. Nor is there any dispute that when 
Garco bought the property, Garco's predecessor in interest gave Garco a written document that 
appeared to be a lease between Reagan and Garco's predecessor. (J.Kingston deposition, p. 42). 
While the copy given to Garco contained only Reagan's signature (Id. at 36), it contained all of the 
pre-printed provisions (including the non-compete covenant), a statement that the location was "3986 
South 1-15," a description of the rent that was to be paid, and many other of its material provisions. 
{Id. at 36-40). After Garco purchased the property, it collected rent from Reagan on a regular 
monthly basis until the sign was removed. {Id. at 45-46). Garco certainly had sufficient information 
at its disposal to be on inquiry notice of Reagan's lease of the property. 
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Garco apparently realizes that it had a duty of inquiry. On pp. 4-5 of its memo, Garco 
argues that it satisfied its duty of inquiry by talking to Reagan's agent, Dick Paxman, more than a 
year after Garco purchased the property. That claim is misguided. Based upon Garco's own 
testimony, Garco did not make its inquiry until a year after it purchased the property, although the 
sign was in place when Garco bought the property, and Garco had been collecting the rent all along. 
Neponset, supra and Toland, supra teach that one who is on inquiry notice is bound by everything 
that a full inquiry would reveal. A full inquiry by Garco of either its own predecessor or of Reagan 
would have revealed that the 1975 lease, with all of its terms and covenants, was still in full force 
and effect. Moreover, any alteration to the clear terms on the face of the lease document that was 
presumably made by Dick Paxman's alleged statement to Garco to the effect that the lease was no 
longer in full force and effect would be barred by the Statute of Frauds. See, e.g., SCMLand Co. 
V. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah App. 1986) (if contract to be modified must be in 
writing, then termination or rescission must also be in writing). The court can only imagine Garco's 
protestations if Reagan sought to enforce some hypothetical statement by Mr. Kingston to the effect 
that the rent had decreased, or the lease term had increased, or some other provision that would be 
unfavorable to Garco had taken effect. Similarly, Garco cannot turn this alleged statement of Mr. 
Paxman, i.e., a naked legal conclusion that is a nullity in the face of the document and the Statute 
of Frauds, into a purported admission by a party opponent. 
As for Garco's claim that the lease itself did not exist until after February 15, 1991, 
Garco has offered no law in support of that proposition. Garco notes that the lease was notarized by 
a seal that expired on February 15, 1995, and then makes the unsupported argument that since notary 
seals are renewed every four years, the document "did not exist" until after February 15, 1991. 
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Nothing in the notary statutes, however, prohibits a notary from affixing a jurat to a document that 
was acknowledged before him at a time when he held an earlier notary commission, which is what 
happened in this instance.2 Regardless, however, submitted herewith is the affidavit of Jack Gordon, 
Garco's predecessor in interest to the property, who attests to the fact that the lease was signed in 
1975 by him and by James Lamont, his partner, just as the lease states on its face. 
Garco's effort to invalidate Reagan's lease as against Garco's interest in the property 
is a silly and outrageous argument that must fail. That Garco has even advanced the argument shows 
how desperate and intellectually dishonest its position actually is. Reagan was in possession of the 
property pursuant to a then-currently existing and valid lease when Garco purchased its interests, 
Garco was on notice of Reagan's 1975 lease, and Garco is bound by its terms. 
II. GARCO HAS FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM 
FOR TRESPASS. 
Regardless, however, of whether Garco was bound by the terms of the 1975 lease 
after it purchased the property, there is no dispute that Garco's predecessor was bound and that 
Reagan lawfully entered into possession of the real property for the purpose of erecting and 
maintaining an advertising sign. Thus, Garco has still failed to state a claim for trespass. Garco 
rejects as "hoary" and "irrelevant" the legal authority that Reagan has offered to the effect that absent 
an express covenant, a tenant has no duty to remove items placed on the property during the tenancy 
when those items were placed there as a necessary part of the tenancy. Garco even misleads this 
2
 Given the Affidavit of Jack Gordon submitted herewith, the issue of the notary is 
wholly immaterial to whether the lease came into being in 1975. For the court's information, 
however, the lease was later notarized by Wm. K. Reagan, who had been a notary since before 
1975 when the lease was executed, and who was present when the lease was signed. The jurat 
was affixed so that document could be recorded. 
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court by attempting to distinguish the cases on the basis that the lessees in those cases did not retain 
ownership of the improvements. (Garco memo, p. 14) In fact, both of the lessees in those cases did 
retain ownership of the improvements. Sherman Co. v. United States of America, 258 F.2d 881 (9th 
Cir. 1958) (paragraph 8 of the lease stated, " . . . fixtures, additions, or structures so placed upon or 
attached to the said premises shall be and remain the property of the Government and may be 
removed therefrom by the Government. . ."); Duvanel v. Sinclair Refining Co., 227 P.2d 88, 89 
(Kan. 1951) (lessee entitled to remove all improvements at any time).3 While those cases admittedly 
do not involve a trespass issue, they do stand for the proposition that in the absence of an express 
covenant requiring a tenant to remove the improvements at the end of the lease, the law will not 
imply a duty on the lessee to do so. Even Garco admits that the definition of "trespass" requires the 
breach of a duty to remove the improvements. (Garco memo, p. 11). But without a legal duty to 
remove the improvements it made during the term of the lease, Reagan cannot be liable for trespass 
for leaving the foundation in the ground at the termination of the lease: 
One is subject to liability to another for trespass, irrespective of whether he thereby 
causes harm to any legally protected interest of the other, if he intentionally. . . (c) 
fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to remove" 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, §158(c) (emphasis added); (cited at Garco's Memo at p. 11). 
While Utah has not addressed the specific issue, courts around the nation have 
rejected efforts to establish a trespass action under circumstances in which real property is even more 
permanently changed by the actions of a prior party who had been lawfully in possession of the 
property at the time the change was wrought. Indeed, a large body of law has developed over who 
3
 Garco admits that when a lease authorizes a tenant to remove improvements, the tenant 
retains title to even seemingly permanent improvements. (Garco memo, p. 12). 
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has the ultimate responsibility to clean up hazardous wastes left on real property, an issue that has 
far greater impact on property than the inert sign foundation that Reagan did not remove from 
Garco's property at the termination of its lease. The courts have held that while the original actor 
may be liable under federal and/or state statutes for the clean-up, there can be no cause of action 
stated for common-law trespass, as the actor was legally entitled to be in possession of the property 
when the action was taken. For example, in Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 1A1 
F.Supp. 93 (D.Mass. 1990), Mobil Oil owned the real property and operated a gas station on it for 
many years. During this period, hazardous materials were released on the property. Mobil 
eventually sold the property without removing the hazardous materials, and a subsequent owner sued 
Mobil under various theories for damaging the property. Id. at 94. While the court refused to 
dismiss the plaintiffs claims based on remedial state statutes, Id. at 98, it did summarily dismiss the 
plaintiffs claims for trespass: 
Count III of the complaint asserts that Mobil's releases of oil and hazardous materials 
at the site constitute a trespass. A trespass, however, requires an unprivileged, 
intentional intrusion on land in the possession of another. New England Box Co. V. 
C&R Const. Co., 313 Mass. 696, 707,49N.E.2d 121 (1943); Restatement (Second) 
Torts §158. In this case, Mobil owned and was in possession of the property when 
it allegedly released the oil causing the contamination. Thus, Mobil's releases of oil 
were not unprivileged, and Mobil clearly was not intruding on land in the possession 
of another. Mobil's releases of oil on its own land, therefore, cannot constitute a 
trespass. 
Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F.Supp. at 99. A similar analysis, relying on 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, was utilized in Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., 355 Ms. 58; £52-A.2d 
180 (1994) to reject the trespass claims of a subsequent occupier of commercial property against a 
former lessee who had caused the property to become contaminated by toxic chemicals: 
11 
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Rosenblatt [plaintiff] relies upon §161 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
(1964) to support his position that Exxon [defendant] committed a trespass whenit 
allegedly caused the property to be contaminated during its occupancy and the 
contamination continued into Rosenblatt's occupancy of the land. Section 161 
provides that: "A trespass may be committed by the continued presence on the land 
of a structure, chattel, or other thing which the actor has tortiously placed there." 
Section 161 does not support Rosenblatt's position. It explicitly provides that 
a trespass involves the tortious placing of something on the land and implicitly 
provides that the affected land is the land of another. Section 158 further supports 
this interpretation. It states that "one is subject to liability to another for trespass.. 
. if he intentionally enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or a 
third person to do so, or remains on the land, or fails to remove from the land a thing 
which he is under a duty to remove." Exxon did not cause the contamination to 
occur during Rosenblatt's occupancy; the introduction of the contamination could 
only have occurred prior to its relinquishing possession of the land. Additionally, 
Exxon owed Rosenblatt no duty to remove the contamination. 
Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., 642 A.2d at 7^=79: Thus, if the actor who causes the contamination is 
lawfully in possession of the real property at the time the harm is introduced, there is no cause of 
action for trespass. See, also, e.g., Dartron Corp. v. Uniroyal Chemical Co., 893 F.Supp 730 
(N.D.Ohio 1995) (applying Ohio law). .-> ; 
As recognized in the above-cited cases, the common law does not create a duty to 
restore real property to its pre-existing condition on termination of a possesssory interest in land. 
The plaintiffs in these cases were able to prevail only on their claims for breach of & statutory duty. 
This concept was recognized in Bonds v. Sanchez-O'Brien Oil & Gas Co., 715 S.W.2d 444 (Ark. 
1986), cited by Garco in its memo at p. 15 (although the cite that Garco has given is incorrect). In 
that case, the court was deeply divided in its opinion that the judicial trend was toward recognizing 
an implied contractual duty to restore land at the end of a lease. The dissenting opinion, recognizing 
that other jurisdictions had enacted legislation to create the duty, noted that: 
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Other jurisdictions having no legislation covering the matter hold that there 
is no implied duty upon the mineral lessee to restore the surface. Warren Petroleum 
Corp. v. Monzingo, 304 S.W.2d 362 (Texas 1957); Amoco Production Co. v. Carter 
Farms, 703 P.2d 894 (N.M. 1985). 
I find no evidence whatever of the "changes in the viewpoint of courts." 
While I find some evidence of the legislative trend, I find the judicial one exists only 
in the hopes and dreams of the authors cited in the majority opinion. In my view we 
have no business making a blatant change in the law of mineral leases. Rather, I 
agree with the conclusion of the author of one article cited by the majority: 
The best solution to this problem seems to be the adoption of a 
statute, similar to the Kansas and Illinois statutes, requiring restoration of the 
premises upon completion of operations. 
L. Davis, Selected Problems Regarding Lessee's Rights and Obligations to the 
Surface Owner, 8 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst At 349 (1963). 
Bonds v. Sanchez-O'Brien Oil & Gas Co., 715 S.W.2d at 447. Even Garco recognizes that a 
remedial statute was required in Kansas to place a duty on the lessee to remove the improvements 
at the end of the lease. (Garco memo, p. 15). Utah has no remedial statute that imposes such a duty 
on a lessee. There is no implied duty in the contract by which Reagan leased the land. Reagan was 
in lawful possession of the land when it placed the foundation, and is not liable for trespass for 
leaving its foundation in place at the end of its lease term. 
III. GARCO HAS ALSO FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM 
FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER, 
Because Reagan had no contractual duty to remove the foundation at the termination 
of its lease, it cannot be liable for unlawful detainer. The unlawful detainer statute is designed to 
dispossess a tenant who "continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the property or any 
part of it, after expiration" of the lease. U.C.A. §78-36-3(1) (emphasis added). Here, Reagan 
vacated the property as of June 1995, and made no further claim to occupy the premises thereafter. 
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The unlawful detainer statute was not intended to alter the parties' contractual duties upon 
termination of a lease. It is a summary remedy that allows a landlord to quickly recover possession 
of the premises without resort to self-help. But the contractual covenants between the landlord and 
tenant are not thereby affected. See, e.g., P.H. Investment v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah 
1991) (warranty of habitability can be at issue in unlawful detainer action). With no contractual right 
to require Reagan to remove the foundation at the end of the lease term, Garco cannot bootstrap its 
way into such a right by relying on the unlawful detainer statute, and Garco has cited to no case law 
that would support this position. Possession is simply not an issue before this court. Garco has had 
possession of its property since June of 1995. The real issue here is whether Reagan had a 
contractual duty to remove the foundation at the end of its lease term. And as set forth above, there 
was no such duty. Garco having been placed into possession of the property in June of 1995, there 
simply is no claim for unlawful detainer. 
IV. GARCO HAS FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR 
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS. 
Contrary to Garco's analysis of the case, Leigh Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 
1982) does not support Garco's position that Reagan's defense of Garco's claim for intentional 
interference with economic relations is an affirmative one. (Garco memo, pp. 16-17). In order to 
recover for the tort, Garco must prove that Reagan acted for either an improper purpose or by 
improper means. Without proof of those elements, Garco's claim fails as a matter of law. Leigh 
Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d at 304. 
With respect to Garco's alleged proof of Reagan's "improper purpose," Garco alleges 
that Reagan erected its sign on the adjacent Mollerup property in a deliberate attempt to prevent 
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Garco from doing business with Reagan. (Garco memo, p. 18). Garco then misstates Leigh 
Furniture's holding regarding the improper purpose element, indicating that the Leigh Furniture 
court rejected the Restatement approach to this element. In fact, Leigh Furniture's holding on what 
constitutes an improper purpose is as follows: 
Because it requires that the improper purpose predominate, this 
alternative [i.e., improper purpose rather than improper means] takes the long 
view of the defendant's conduct, allowing objectionable short-run purposes 
to be eclipsed by legitimate long-range economic motivation. Otherwise, 
much competitive commercial activity, such as a businessman's efforts to 
forestall a competitor in order to further his own long-range economic 
interests, could become tortious. In the rough and tumble of the marketplace, 
competitors inevitably damage one another in the struggle for personal 
advantage. The law offers no remedy for those damages ~ even if intentional 
~ because they are an inevitable by-product of competition. 
Id. at 307 (emphasis added). Thus, Garco has the obligation of showing that Reagan's predominant 
purpose in moving the sign was to injure Garco. 
In making that determination, this court should note that in Leigh Furniture, the Utah 
Supreme Court found that there was substantial evidence that Leigh had deliberately set out to injure 
Isom's economic relations. Leigh Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d at 308. Leigh had confronted and 
questioned Isom's business practices during business hours in front of customers, and had driven 
away Isom's customers by repeated interruptions of Isom's sales activities. Id. at 306. But the 
Supreme Court went on to hold that: 
. . . that injury was not an end in itself. It was an intermediate step toward achieving 
the long-range financial goal of profitably reselling the building free of Isom's 
interest. Because that economic interest seems to have been controlling, we must 
conclude that the evidence in this case would not support a jury finding that the 
Corporation's predominant purpose was to injure or rain Isom 's business merely for 
the sake of injury alone. 
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Id. at 308 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court found, as a matter of law, that, having a legitimate and 
controlling long-range financial goal will not satisfy this element of the tort, even if one of the 
actor's purposes is to harm another's business. Id.4 
In reviewing the evidence that Garco has presented in support of its argument that 
Reagan's predominant purpose was to injure Garco, the court must (a) remember Leigh Furniture's 
holding that "a businessman's efforts to forestall a competitor in order to further his own long-range 
economic interests" is not actionable (Id. at 307), and (b) view the evidence that Garco has presented 
through the prism of Garco's substantive evidentiary burden. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All 
U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513 (1986). Here, in support of its assertion that Reagan acted with the 
predominant purpose to injure Garco, Garco has offered only Reagan's alleged statements to Garco 
that the sign was being moved because Reagan "didn't want Garco doing business with anyone but 
Reagan. . . " and then moved its sign such that Garco could not compete with Reagan. (Garco 
Memo, p. 18). Garco ignores the obvious the long-range financial goals that Reagan would 
accomplish by protecting its ability to compete with others along the 1-15 corridor, a goal that Garco 
itself has sought to enjoin by claiming that Reagan has engaged in acts of unfair competition. Leigh 
Furniture teaches that even if Reagan was deliberately attempting to injure Garco (which Reagan 
vehemently disputes), Reagan's legitimate long-range goal to protect its position in the outdoor 
4
 Garco misstates the Utah Supreme Court's holding on this point, incorrectly asserting 
that the Utah Supreme Court found Leigh liable for having an improper purpose even though it 
was partly motivated by its own economic interest. Garco Memo at p. 18. In fact, the Supreme 
Court found that Leigh was not liable under the improper purpose prong, even though Leigh had 
clearly intended to injure Isom's economic relations. Leigh Furniture v. horn, 657 P.2d at 308. 
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advertising market is simply not actionable. Thus, Garco is unable to establish any improper 
purpose on the part of Reagan. 
As for improper means, Garco offers a variety of actions that Reagan took that it 
suggests constitute improper means, none of which, contrary to Garco's assertions, was illegal or 
improper: 
a. Garco states that Reagan not only refused to remove its sign, but 
threatened Garco with legal action should Garco remove the sign. (Garco memo, p. 17). As set forth 
at Point I, infra, Reagan had no obligation to remove its sign until the lease expired in July 1995. 
Reagan removed its sign from Garco's property well before that date. But even if the lease had 
expired earlier, as Garco suggests, Garco had no right to simply remove the sign. The unlawful 
detainer statutes at U.C.A. §§78-36-1 et seq. would have prohibited Garco from utilizing self-help 
to regain possession of the property. Reagan clearly had the right to threaten legal action should 
Garco have removed the sign. Thus, Reagan's threat of legal action was not improper. 
b. Next, Garco argues that Reagan stayed in trespass and in unlawful 
detainer. (Garco memo, p. 17). As set forth above at Points I, II and III, the 1975 lease was still in 
effect until July 1995, Reagan has never been in trespass, having vacated the premises prior to that 
date, and the unlawful detainer statutes have never come into play. Even if the 1975 lease was 
somehow not effective after 1990 when Garco bought the property, Garco admits that Reagan 
occupied the property after August 1992 by either oral agreement or as a tenant at will (Garco's 
Statement of Fact No. 13). Thus, these facts do not state any improper means. 
c. Garco then asserts that Reagan violated U.C.A. §27-12-136.5 by 
erecting a sign within 500 feet of its still-existing Garco sign. (Garco memo, p. 17). This assertion 
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is patently ridiculous. The statute to which Garco has cited requires that 500 feet be maintained 
between outdoor advertising signs. Once an outdoor advertiser obtains an annual permit for a sign 
site pursuant to U.Admin.Code Rule 933-2-4, the advertiser is also allowed to apply to relocate that 
sign permit pursuant to U.Admin.Code Rule 933-2-5(l)(c). In accordance with the administrative 
rule, the advertiser can take up to 60 days to accomplish the relocation. That is exactly what 
happened in this case. Reagan had obtained its permit for the Garco sign in 1975, well before Garco 
ever came into the picture. Reagan's application to UDOT to relocate that permit to the Mollerup 
property was approved on April 24, 1995. Reagan then constructed a new sign on the Mollerup 
property and then removed its sign from the Garco property, all within the 60 days allowed by 
UDOT's administrative rules. Thus, Reagan followed the statutory scheme in moving the Garco 
sign to the Mollerup property. These facts do not establish improper means. 
Since Garco is unable to establish that Reagan acted with either an improper purpose 
or by improper means, Garco's claim for intentional interference with economic relations must be 
dismissed. 
V. GARCO HAS FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM 
FOR UNFAIR COMPETITION. 
Finally, Garco argues that the non-compete clause in the 1975 lease constitutes an 
unforceable and unfair method of competition in violation of various statutes. (Garco Memo, p. 19). 
Not understanding the interplay of the statutes governing outdoor advertisers, Garco argues that the 
non-compete clause does nothing more than restrict Garco's right to rent a "common billboard site." 
Id. As Garco itself admits, the statutory scheme governing outdoor advertising prohibits billboards 
from being placed within 500 feet of each other. As a result, there are no "common billboard sites" 
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along desirous traffic corridors. Since the signs can only be placed within 500 feet of each other, 
an outdoor advertiser does not locate single sites, but must work carefully if it wishes to develop 
many sites along busy traffic corridors. The statutory scheme dictates that the location of a single 
site can fix the placement of additional sites all along the corridor, a placement scheme with which 
all outdoor advertisers along that corridor must comply. Thus, once a site is developed, it becomes 
a valuable commodity. A loss of the site could require an outdoor advertiser, in order to maximize 
its use of a desirous corridor, to move not only the sign that is on the site, but also other signs, so as 
to be able to comply with the 500 foot spacing requirement. Given the investment that Reagan made 
in developing the Garco property as a sign site (at no cost outlay by Garco or its predecessor), 
Reagan had a vested interest in encouraging Garco (or its predecessor) to renew the lease at the 
expiration of its term. By including the non-compete provision in the 1975 lease, the landlord had 
an incentive to assist Reagan in protecting its valuable commodity. But if the landlord chose not to 
renew, as Garco did in this case, then Reagan would have a period of time within which to make up 
for the loss of the site and to develop whatever new sign sites were necessary to protect its business 
along the corridor. (Supplemental Affidavit of Dewey Reagan). Thus, the clause is not designed 
simply to limit and restrain trade and competition, but to give Reagan the opportunity to recoup its 
loss of a valuable and scarce commodity. When the non-competition restrictions imposed by a 
contract are reasonable as to time and area and reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interest 
of the covenantee, they are enforceable. See, e.g., Quadro Stations, Inc v. Gilley, 172 S.E.2d 237 
(N.C.App. 1970) (covenant restricting property from use in connection with sale or advertising of 
petroleum products for period of 25 years upheld); Vaughan v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 
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352 S.W.2d 562 (Ky. 1961) (covenant restricting landlord's adjoining premises from being utilized 
for advertising purposes for maximum period often years upheld). 
Thus, enforcement of the non-compete provision in 1975 lease would not constitute 
unfair competition, and Reagan is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this point as well. 
VI. GARCO HAS NOT SATISFIED RULE 56(f)'S REQUIREMENTS 
Finally, Garco asserts that it still needs to take discovery in order to meet Reagan's 
summary judgment challenge. Garco claims that it is "patiently waiting" for Reagan's responses to 
Plaintiffs Second Set of Interrogatories and Document Requests. (Garco memo, p. 20). In fact, 
Reagan served its responses more than two months prior to Garco's inaccurate claim. Attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" is a court date-stamped copy of the Certificate of Service dated June 2, 1997 
and filed with the Court on June 3, 1997. And as for Garco's assertion that it wishes to depose 
Reagan witnesses, Garco has not met the requirements of Rule 56(f). In order to obtain 
postponement of a determination of a motion for summary judgment, Rule 56(f) requires that the 
non-movant "articulate any material area of inquiry [he] intendfs] to pursue. . ." by way of the 
additional discovery and "explain how the continuance will aid in his opposition to summary 
judgment." Callioux v. Progresssive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah App. 1987). Garco has 
indicated that it wishes to depose several Reagan's employees as well as James Molierup. Except 
for Mr. Molierup, Garco has not articulated what facts it expects to glean from these witnesses. A 
simple assertion that the depositions are "expected to produce facts essential to justify [the] 
opposition" is insufficient. Id. at 841. And as for Mr. Molierup, Garco has indicated that it 
anticipates exploring statements that Mr. Molierup allegedly has made to Garco that are presumably 
inconsistent with those statements Mr. Molierup has made in his affidavit filed in support of 
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Reagan's motion for summary judgment. As the Callioux court indicated, however, "If the most that 
can be hoped for is a chance to discredit the affiants' statements or focus on demeanor, no question 
of material fact is presented." Id. Frankly, even if Mr. Mollerup made the statements to Garco that 
Mr. Kingston claims, those statements would be immaterial to Garco's right to recover. Reagan is 
entitled under Leigh Furniture, in the "rough and tumble of the marketplace," to advance its own 
economic interests at the expense of Garco's. Thus, it makes no difference why Reagan placed its 
sign on the Mollerup property, and Mr. Mollerup's testimony is wholly unnecessary. 
Having failed to meet Rule 56(f)'s requirements, Garco is not entitled to a stay of 
these proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting 
claims that are adequately based in fact to have those claims tried to a jury, but also for the rights 
of persons opposing such claims to demonstrate in the manner provided by the rule, prior to trial, 
that the claims have no factual basis. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). As 
Reagan has demonstrated, the evidence that Garco has presented in support of its claims is a nullity; 
it creates no causes of action at all in its favor against Reagan. For the reasons set forth in Reagan's 
original memorandum and in this reply memorandum, the Court should enter summary judgment 
in favor of Reagan and against Garco. 
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^ , DATED this _ ^ _ day of September, 1997. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Leslie Van Frank 
Attorneys for defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
mailed, U.S. First class, postage prepaid, on this £ T a a y of September, 1997, to the following: 
F. Mark Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
624 North 300 West, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
F:\LESLIE\SEPT97\ROAUPC.REP 
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w 
Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690) 
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff 
R.O.A. General, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a ; 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ; 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ] 
Defendant. ) 
) SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 
) OF DEWEY REAGAN 
) Civil No. 960906388 
i 
) Judge William B. Bohling 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DEWEY REAGAN, being first duly sworn, does depose and state as follows: 
1. This affidavit supplements my August 7, 1997 affidavit filed in this case. 
2. This affidavit is based upon my review of Reagan's lease file maintained with 
respect to the Reagan sign located on the real property that is the subject of this lawsuit ("Garco 
property"), and upon my experience in working in the outdoor advertising industry in obtaining and 
procuring sites for outdoor advertising signs. 
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3. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy, as maintained in 
Reagan's lease file, of the application and approval of the original state permit that Reagan received 
in 1975 to maintain an outdoor advertising sign on the Garco property. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy, as maintained in 
Reagan's lease file, of the application and approval by UDOT of Reagan's request to move the sign 
from the Garco property to adjacent property to the north. This type of application and permit is 
known in the industry as an "R407." 
5. The statutory scheme governing outdoor advertising prohibits billboards from 
being placed within 500 feet of each other. As a result, there are no "common billboard sites" along 
desirous traffic corridors. The 1-15 corridor along which the Garco property is located is an 
extremely desirous traffic corridor for the placement of outdoor advertising signs. 
6. Since outdoor advertising signs can only be placed within 500 feet of each 
other, an outdoor advertising company does not locate single sites, but must work carefully if it 
wishes to develop many sites along busy traffic corridors. The statutory scheme dictates that the 
location of a single site almost always fixes the placement of additional sites all along the corridor, 
a placement scheme with which all outdoor advertising companies along that corridor must comply. 
7. Once a site is developed along I-15 in Salt Lake County, it becomes a valuable 
commodity. The loss of such a site could require an outdoor advertising company, in order to obtain 
a replacement location and to maximize its use of a desirous corridor, to move not only the sign that 
is on the site, but also other signs, so as to be able to comply with the 500 foot spacing requirement. 
8. Reagan made a considerable investment in developing the Garco property as 
a sign site (at no cost outlay by Garco or its predecessor). Reagan had to first locate the site, 
negotiate with Garco's predecessor for a lease, obtain both state and municipal permits, and then 
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erect the sign. Thus, Reagan had a vested interest in encouraging Garco's predecessor (as well as 
any successor landowner) to renew the lease at the expiration of its term. By including the non-
compete provision in the 1975 lease, the landlord would have an incentive to assist Reagan in 
protecting its valuable commodity. But if the landlord chose not to renew, then Reagan would have 
a period of time within which to make up for the loss of the site and capital expenditures and to 
develop new sign sites to protect its business along the corridor. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
Dated this S ' day of September, 1997. 
Dewey R< 
6t 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me on this
 =£^_ day of September, 1997 
Notary Publo ] 
SHIRLEY M. ORG&L ) 
624 East 4075 8outh I 
Salt Lake Of t Utah 84107 ! 
My Commission Exptaaa • I 
February 1& lOtt J 
.State o r 1 " 
16. IOC 
I Utah NOTARY PU 
-J Q 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
mailed, U.S. First class, postage prepaid, on this ^ day of September, 1997, to the following: 
F. Mark Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
624 North 300 West, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
F:\LESLIE\SEPT97\REAGWM.AFF 
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yr -.;.'?•:•':.-''•.:• Pernit. originally issued to' Galaxy, Reissued to Reagan /rf,/*-
fecl^4'- UTAH} \ T E DEPARTMENT OF H~IGHWTT~—^ ^ <-, ^ 
SALT LAKE CITY-UTAH -3.^*7 s£ I 
DATE OF APPLICATION 
S , 
vi^ilS^^kki.^':^^. -.'.*. vx^^-j&^skitr^Ax^i "APPLICATION FOR P E R M I T ^ J ^ ^ ^ ^ ' - ^ j - - -..a,- > 
ROADSIDE ADVERTISING SIGN, DISPLAY, OR DEVICE 
Application is made in accordance with Section 7 of the "Utah Outdoor Advertisinx Act" lor permit to (cojisjrycj) (maintain) outdoor advertising sign, display, or device 
at location indicated below: This is a transfer oi ownership Yes ^N?) (Circle One) 
< 
- S . L -
X 
HE
K 
BOUNTY 
'. r : 
W
ID
T
H
 
" / / ' 
r ' 
ROUTE 
NUMBER 
TYPE FACING 
1 -Wood 
2 - Metal 
3-Ilium* 
4-Comb. 
J^. 
s /' 
FORM TYPE 
1 - Cut Out 
2 -Modular 
3 - Poster 
• - ' - - * ~ <-r' 
/ 
MILEPOST 
(to 100th of a 
••••. > M t l e ) .j/-
M£&5• 
NO. 
of 
Poles 
7 
A— 
SIDE OF 
ROAD " 
N,, S.. 
E^W„ 
. Pr 
TYPE OF 
POLES 
1 -Wood 
2 - Metal 
3 - Combination 
Z-
FEET 
from 
Mx 
SIGN 
CONDITION 
1 -Good 
2 - Average I 
3 - Poor 
/ 
ZONED 
1 -Com'l 
• 2 - Ind, 
1 3 - Other 
1 ~^ 
LAND 
1 - PVT. 
2 - PUB. 
/ 
WAS SIGN 
IN PLACE 
10-22-65 
(Y or N) 
5-9-67 
(Y orN) 
/ / 
. BUILDING **. 
PERMIT NUMBER' 
*?i£-' 
CONTRACTORS 
LICENSE 
NUMBER 
•''fT? P. ''• 
HIGHWAY 
BUSINESS 
LICENSE 
*>'?f 
TYPE OF SIGN 
1 -Single face ; 
2 - Back to back 
3-Vtype-
4-Other 
•<--.. I 
OUT OF STATE 
BOND 
1« Required 
2-Filed 
3 - SpU ConcU 
'~'S.'JZ\ 
I certify that I am the owner of the applied for sign and-that the owner or occupant of the land where the sign is or to be situated has consented in writing to the creation 
id or the maintenance of the sign thereon. That the sign is in full compliance with the Act and regulations promulgated thereunder. In the event the sign is sold, the 
ansfer of title shall be subject to any agreement or condition or regulation of the State of Utah. Proof of lease or consent is attached. 
Sign Owner: - • 1 -••" ^A ' L t ' - i m ; . r f , / - •£« • 
and Owner._i. 
ddress: " ' 
Address: ' • " 
ity & State: _ . Z i p . 
City & State:. 
By 
Zip-
Street Address of Sifn: •^" * 
THIS PERMIT IS NOT TRANSFERABLE! 
certify that I have personally inspected the proposed sign site and that I have verified the information contained in the application, and that the land lease OT consent
 ; 
i filed fn our office. Approval is recommended. Yes Q ' No Q . ;..• ':\'^<A^/X^J^^h^-^^^ 
ATED: ' ' S *? s~> •> v SlfiNFD: . - . ^ . / r - < > . > ^ " • * APPLICATION APPROVED - -Yes JB <No a - ^ ^ - ^ ' ^ l -
• • • • • • . . . * • ' - . • • . - DISTRICT PERMIT OFFICER J ~ . - _ _ r. - • ~ .--» .-i . '=:'' - ^ ' ^ i ? ^ ^ V - • ' : • : / : . ' ; 
^ ' . - : • • - D a t e d ' ; - - ?- ? ^ '^^)v>V^^^fear^ : 
? • / : • ; 
•.-twftev 
, ' • - . ' • • » • Diagram of sign locatjoo. 
Show measured distance from the sign to the nearest activity and the closest controlled sign and zoning. ' ' District Engineer..
 r 
ttf#£:;*;^ ,:---
.V-V;t"*i -; 
/ ^'; «V "r^ " ^ •/,?5-':>R<v/;-;V ""'-* 7'"'c 
* > * i" A 3 ? ' • A / ^ < c • , ' -> ' -**•••*•'I* ?'• Initial 
Ite: Road Accountlnfl, Administration, Data Processing 
M o w : D i s t r i c t 
i k ; A p p l i c a n t :-•••: '.-:\[ . ' • ' " ' . • . - ' : ^ ' -
• •.i£*.v:.f.'•{!;•>' ; $ ^ 5 ; . Receipt of J6.00 for permit *ckrv>w\<>dq^ '• l£?^J:?^y;-.Z;~^ 
- • • Check or Money Order *-" Cash ^ 
District Permit Officer »•- .". •^ T?-^ VP:' 
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•avlsed 12-73 
. U7 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATI^-
A P P L I C . I O N TO ALTER OR CHANGE A CON*, ...*ING 
"'"' OUTDOOR ADVERTISING SIGN OR STRUCTURE 
- / - c ™* 1 76>£> 
Date. HIM31 
Thauthe undesigned owner of the conforming outdoor advertising sign located on route milepost 30S.Z 
in > j y / / J^ie Crrtx 
(show the change of size, lighting, he 
county hereby applies for approval to alter or change said sign or structure by 
&ght, material, configuration, etc.) /rLfi\s-^ <js<<pY\ 
J*^ yu(t 7l*nJ%\ from the sign or structure as originally inventoried by the Utah Department of 
Transportation. . 
The original sign is (o / o l square feet and measures / y X ID 
The new altered sign or structure will be U 1 cK square feet and measures.. 
will be on ^ poles. 
_ feet and is on poles. 
. feet and 
IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED THAT: Altering or changing of the sign face, configuration or value and or of the structure 
has not commenced prior to the application. The changing of advertising copy is permitted without this application. That failure 
to comply with said regulation is a violation of the Transportation Commission of Utah's regulations. An inspection fee of S50. 
shall be charged if the sign or structure was changed as provided herein prior to or in the process of change at the time of the 
inspection and prior to clearance of Step No. 1, and the permittee shall also be subject to court action under Section 27-12-136. 
The approved changes listed herein must be completed within 60 days of the clearance date in Step No. 1 below or this clearan 
becomes void. The District Permit Officer must be notified when the change is completed in order to make the inspection provic 
in Step No. 2 below. 
gn Owner (/ Lqfya Owner Si  
Signature (y 
By: . IMn JL,JA 3OOUJ. 
Address 
117^71: / ^ / t ^ i ^ tHWL A>,jti1LL. Cut MUS 
\ddress Q / ' " ^ ip c i t V State Zip Code /W i   
TO BE COMPLETED BY DISTRICT PERMITS OFFICER 
Step No. 1 - Inspection Fee Required: Yes No (Circle One) Paid by Check >^—" Cash 
Cleared for Requested Change 
Signe 
District Permit O f f i c e r , ^ / ' Date 
Step No. 2 - I Certify That I have personally inspected and photographed the sign altering or change as completed. 
The change is as approved herein. 
Signed_ 
District Permit Officer Date 
State Inventory Number 
Current Permit Number 
DISTRIBUTION: 
White - Admin. 
Data Processing 
COMPLETED 
STEPS 
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- • • : ' C I 
F. Mark Hansen, #5078 
624 North 300 West, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 533-2700 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
<••• "'• " ! C " I . 
¥ 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
um 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a ; 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ) 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ] 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ) 
Defendant. ) 
) REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
) UNTIMELY AFFIDAVITS 
> AND IN RESPONSE TO MOTION 
> TO SUBMIT ADDITIONAL AFFIDAVITS 
I Civil No. 960906388 
l Judge William B. Bohling 
U.P.C., Inc. d/b/a Garco Industrial Park (Garco) respectfully submits this reply 
memorandum in support of its motion to strike the untimely affidavits filed by Reagan in support 
of Reagan's unmeritorious motion for summary judgment, and in response to Reagan's after-filed 
motion to submit additional affidavits. 
ARGUMENT 
Reagan's latest "Motion to Submit Additional Affidavits" should more_properly be styled, 
"Motion to Permit Trial by Affidavit," for that is what Reagan is trying to do. Garco's opposition 
to the affidavits is not so much because of the facts Reagan seeks to establish, but because the 
conclusions Reagan seeks to draw from those facts raise new issues for the first time, which the 
rules afford Garco no means directly to address. After its motion has been fully briefed, Reagan 
now asks the Court to treat its untimely Affidavits as though Reagan had withdrawn its original 
Motion for Summary Judgment and filed a new motion relying on new, additional affidavits. 
Presumably, Garco then would be permitted to file a new Memorandum in Opposition with new 
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affidavits to show the existence of additional disputed facts. Reagan would then claim the right to 
withdraw and refile a new Motion with new affidavits, with the process repeating itself ad nauseam. 
The rules simply do not contemplate the process Reagan suggests. 
Reagan wastes the time of this Court and of opposing counsel in falsely claiming Garco has 
taken positions it did not take, and then in proffering evidence and making arguments against those 
non-positions. For example, Reagan knows full well that to date Garco has not argued Jack Gordon 
and James Lamont did not execute a Reagan "Sign Location Lease." Reagan's argument on that 
point is worse than frivolous; it is a conscious attempt to mislead the court. Reagan's argument and 
newly proffered affidavit does not controvert the fact that the four page document Reagan finally 
recorded did not exist when Garco bought the property. What Garco did argue, and the undisputed 
facts show, was: 
• Reagan had recorded no document at the time Garco bought the property in February of 
1990, so Garco had no record notice of any lease. [Facts Nos. 29, 34] 
• When the previous owner turned the property files over, Garco examined the files and 
discovered there was no valid lease in the files. [Fact No. 30] 
• Garco spoke with an authorized agent of Reagan, who agreed there was no valid lease on 
the property. [Fact No. 31] 
• Garco began negotiating with Reagan for a lease, which Reagan would have had no reason 
to do if Reagan thought it had a lease enforceable against Garco, and the parties came to a 
full agreement as to the terms of a new lease that was different in several material respects 
from the document on which Reagan now seeks to rely. [Fact Nos. 32-33] 
• It was only after all the above events occurred that Reagan finally recorded the document 
Reagan now claims should be binding on Garco. The four-page document that Reagan did 
record included an attachment that clearly was not the "attached tax notice" referred to on 
the first page of the document, and a page containing two notary jurats Reagan now admits 
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did not exist when Garco bought the property, and were prepared in 1992 solely to facilitate 
Reagan's untimely recording of the document. [Fact Nos. 34, 35]. 
These facts show that there was no lease of record; that the previous owner surrendered no 
enforceable lease to Garco; that Reagan agreed there was no binding lease; and that Reagan 
negotiated a new lease. Those facts precludes summary judgment on the issue whether the 
document upon which Reagan relies is binding on Garco. 
The document attached to Mr. Gordon's affidavit, like the document Reagan recorded, also 
does not include the "attached tax notice" recited therein, and indeed includes no "Exhibit 'A'" at 
all, so it is obviously incomplete and is not a complete copy of the lease it purports to be. 
Therefore, Mr. Gordon's Affidavit creates rather than resolves a fact issue - whether the correct 
"Exhibit A," which Reagan even yet has not produced, describes the property on which Reagan 
erected its sign, or otherwise modifies the terms of the document. 
Reagan has made another false assertion, that "Both signators to the lease have testified that 
the lease was signed and in effect." On their face, none of Reagan's preferred affidavits include an 
assertion that the lease was in effect when Garco bought the property. Moreover, such an assertion 
would not be a a fact, but a legal conclusion that is at issue based on disputed facts. 
Reagan claims Dewey Reagan's supplemental affidavit was not filed sooner because it goes 
to issues not raised until Garco opposed Reagan's motion. Reagan ignores the facts that Garco's 
Third Claim For Relief alleges intentional interference; that one of the elements of the tort is 
interference by an improper means or for an improper purpose; and that Reagan has moved for 
summary judgment on that very claim including all of the tort's elements. It was Reagan who 
employed the improper means of knowingly and illegally maintaining two signs under a single 
permit within 500 feet of each other, so Reagan cannot claim surprise when that fact is brought to 
the Court's attention. 
Reagan argues Garco is ignorant of the permitting process, while at the same time, without 
bothering to quote the controlling rules (which fully support Garco's position), Reagan claims its Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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illegal conduct is authorized by the very law prohibiting that conduct. It is not Garco who fails to 
understand the law, but Reagan who does not care whether it violates the law. 
The Utah Administrative Code, R933-2-4(l), provides, "All controlled outdoor advertising 
signs legally in existence prior to the effective date of the 1967 Act, or that are legally created 
thereafter, must have a permit." That provision is straightforward; all signs, to be legal, must have 
a permit. R933-2-4 further provides: 
(3) ... Within 30 days from the date of issuance, the permit must be affixed to the 
completed sign for which the permit was issued ... 
(4) A permit affixed to a sign other than the sign for which it was issued is unlawful 
(5) Permits issued under Section 27-12-136.7 shall be permanently attached to 
the sign... 
(13) A permit issued under Section 27-12-136.7 is non transferable, and the 
permittee shall be liable for any violation of the law regarding the permitted sign. 
These provisions are equally straightforward. There can be only one sign to a permit, and 
one permit for a sign, which at all times must be attached to the sign for which it was issued. It is 
illegal to have a sign before a permit, or to have two signs with one permit, or to transfer a permit 
from one sign to another. And under R933-2-7(l)(a), any sign erected in a highway service zone 
may not be less than 500 feet from an existing controlled sign adjacent to an interstate highway. 
Reagan's claim its actions were a permissible "R-407" move of its sign are belied by the 
governing rules. R933-2-5(l)(c) provides, MA conforming sign may be reshaped or modified as to 
height or size, or relocated upon proper written request, Form R-407, provided the change is in 
compliance with the Act or these rules." The 60 day window on its face does not suspend other 
rules while a permittee makes the change, bot expressly requires the change to conform in all 
respects to all other rules. R933-2-5 clearly states relocating a sign even with UDOT approval is 
nevertheless illegal if done in such a way as to violate R933-2-4 and R933-2-7. 
Reagan did not have approval to move its sign permit from one sign to another sign; under 
R933-2-4(13), a permit is not transferable from one sign to another. Reagan sought UDOT 
approval only to relocate a sign, supposedly from Garco to the Mollerup property. Reagan then left 
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the Garco sign in place, erected a new sign within the 500 foot limit prohibited by R933-2-7, and 
maintained both signs while possessing only one permit for one sign, all in in violation of R933-2-4. 
"Relocate" under R933-2-5(l)(c) means to "move to a new location." Webster's Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1987). It does not mean "leave in place and duplicate at another location." 
Reagan still has not relocated its Garco sign; part of the sign Reagan claims it sought approval to 
move is still on Garco's property, over two years after Reagan's R-407 application expired. 
Dewey Reagan's new exhibits create more issues than they purport to resolve. Exhibit A, 
which Reagan claims is the application for the Garco sign, is an application for permit no. 2-0547 
located at what appears to be milepost 338.43. UDOT records (attached) show that permit was 
replaced by permit no. 2-0970 located at milepost 348.33 and has not been valid under the original 
permit number for over 24 years. Exhibit B, which Reagan claims is its application to relocate the 
Garco sign, is an application to relocate a sign permitted under permit no. 2-0966, another 
(nontransferable) permit entirely. [UDOT records, attached.] Moreover, Exhibit B provides that 
to obtain final approval of the R-407 application, "The District Permit Officer must be notified 
when the change is completed in order to make the inspection provided in Step No. 2 below." On 
its face, Exhibit 2 establishes UDOT, some 29 months (not 60 days) after Reagan applied, still has 
not given final approval of the change. It is reasonable to infer from Reagan's own evidence that 
Reagan's sign on the Mollerup property was illegally erected and is being illegally maintained. 
In preparing this response counsel spoke with UDOT, explaining the method by which 
Reagan erected its Mollerup sign and removed its Garco sign. UDOT stated that Reagan's method 
was in violation of law. Such a violation is clearly an "improper means," one of the elements of 
Garco's intentional interference claim. Inasmuch as this Court should defer to an agency's own 
interpretation of its rules, Reagan should be entitled to further discovery to obtain UDOT's 
interpretation of its rules, and other evidence in UDOT's possession, that Garco is confident will 
establish the illegality of Reagan's actions. 
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Reagan's remaining arguments based on the Supplemental Affidavit of Dewey Reagan are 
another conscious attempt to mislead the Court as to Garco's position. Garco has never claimed the 
1-15 corridor is not "a desirous corridor for outdoor advertisers." To the contrary, Garco is glad 
to see Reagan admit that fact, since Reagan's tortious conduct has stripped Garco of what Reagan 
now concedes is a valuable property right Garco previously had to erect a sign in that corridor, 
thereby permanently diminishing the value of Garco's premises. Reagan wastes everyone's time 
by making a specious issue of Garco's use of the term "common billboard sign." Garco was 
expressing the fact, supported by the new affidavit Reagan seeks to use, that any property along the 
freeway corridor on which a billboard might be erected would have about the same value to an 
advertiser. In general, there is nothing about one billboard location that makes it uniquely desirable 
to an advertiser over another location a stone's throw down the road. 
Arguments regarding Reagan's need for paragraphs 6 to 8 of Dewey Reagan's Supplemental 
Affidavit are equally specious. Whatever the value of a sign location, the "commodity" belongs to 
the landowner, not the lessee. When a Reagan sign location lease expires, Reagan has no "valuable 
commodity" left to protect. Reagan undoubtedly takes that fact into consideration when bargaining 
for a lease, so Reagan will realize the benefit of its bargain by the time the lease expires. The new 
affidavit is a flat admission Reagan slips a "noncompete" clause into its leases for the sole purpose 
of requiring the landlord even after the lease is up to thereafter deal with Reagan or no one; in other 
words, the clause is designed and intended solely to limit competition, making the clause facially 
void under Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1982). 
CONCLUSION 
The above points illustrate the dilemma courts inevitably face when considering whether to 
allow a moving party to submit additional affidavits after a motion for summary judgment has been 
briefed. Justice requires the opponent be allowed counter memoranda to address new issues. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Reagan's affidavits exemplify the point, by doing nothing to resolve issues of fact, but simply 
creating new fact issues, or raising new arguments, to which Garco had no prior opportunity to 
respond in its opposing memorandum. If the Court allows Reagan its new affidavits, Reagan must 
be allowed to fully respond. Otherwise, lest the process quickly degenerate to a "trial by affidavit," 
the Court should disallow further evidence by Reagan to support its motion. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of September, 1997. 
( 3ttofhey f^r^Pfctfntiff7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify on SeptembeE^ -^>, 1997 a true and correct copy of the above was served by first-
class mail to: 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Leslie Van Frank 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
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F. Mark Hansen, #5078 
404 East 4500 South, Suite B-34 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 266-2882 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
OiSTP.iCT COURT 
THIRD DISTRICT COUR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a ] 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ) 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ) 
Defendant. ) 
) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
) PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) (ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED) 
i Civil No. 960906388 
i Judge William B. Bohling 
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff U.P.C, Inc. d/b/a Garco 
Industrial Park (Garco) moves the Court for an order granting summary judgment dismissing the 
Counterclaim with prejudice, and on Defendant's liability on all Claims for Relief alleged in the 
Complaint. This motion is based on the grounds there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, 
and that Garco is entitled to judgment on those issues as a matter of law. This motion is supported 
by the current record, and the supporting memorandum and affidavit accompanying this motion. 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Garco requests 
oral argument on its motion, at the same time as any hearing on Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment. This request is based on the grounds this Motion involves substantially the same facts 
and legal issues as those raised by Defendant's motion. 
DATED this 17 day of November, 1997. 
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F. Mark Hansen, #5078 
404 East 4500 South, Suite B-34 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 266-2882 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
F|! F0 " 
•:? ! Q ' t 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
6 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ; 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ] 
Defendant. ) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
> PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
) PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 Civil No. 960906388 
1 Judge William B. Bohling 
Plaintiff U.P.C., Inc. d/b/a Garco Industrial Park (Garco) respectfully submits this 
memorandum of points and authorities in support of its motion for partial summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
Garco submits the following facts as undisputed for purposes of this motion only. 
1. According to Reagan, on July 8, 1975 Reagan as lessee and Jack R. Gordon and 
James L. Lamont1 as lessors, signed a Reagan form document entitled "Sign Location Lease" for 
property, describing a location in Salt Lake County of "3986 South 1-15, see attached tax notice for 
description hereby incorporated by reference, exhibit 'A'." 2 Reagan then erected an outdoor 
advertising sign on the property. No one recorded the lease or any notice thereof at any time before 
December of 1992. [09/04/97 Affidavit of Jack Gordon 13,4, Ex. A] 
1
 Mr. Gordon later quitclaimed the property to J. Richard (not L.) Lamont. Mr. 
Gordon apparently can't recall Mr. Lamont's name even under oath and with Reagan's help. 
2
 To this day, no such tax notice recited in the "Sign Location Lease" as being attached 
as Exhibit "A" has ever been produced. The exhibit's actual contents are unknown. 
ft ft n ' 
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2. On August 4, 1982 Jack R. Gordon deed his interest in the property to J. Richard 
Lamont, recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder's office on August 12, 1982. The deed 
describes the property later deeded to Garco. [Paul Kingston Aff 11fl, Ex. 1] 
3. In 1990 Paul Kingston acted as an agent for U.P.C. in negotiating for the purchase 
of Mr. Lamont's property. Then and now, the property was used as a source of income from rental 
of the property to other parties. Garco desired to purchase the property for the purpose of 
continuing rentals of the property, and to have an income source from rental of the property. 
Therefore, existing revenue-generating leases on the property would enhance the value of the 
property and its desirability to Garco, and Lamont had every incentive to disclose such leases to 
Garco. [Paul Kingston Aff 112] 
4. On February 2, 1990, Paul Kingston made the initial earnest money offer. On 
February 15, 1990 Mr. Lamont accepted the earnest money offer. [Paul Kingston Aff t f3, Ex. 2] 
5. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement provides: 
I. EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an 
existing lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer no later than fifteen (15) 
days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days 
prior to closing, a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting 
the property. Unless written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent 
within three (3) working days thereafter, Buyer shall take title subject to such leases. 
6. In fulfillment of his obligation under paragraph I of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement, Mr. Lamont provided a written disclosure, consisting of a sworn and notarized letter 
and four attached written lease agreements. The sworn letter states: 
I, Rick Lamont, seller do hereby warrant that all leases/rental agreements are 
on a month to month basis with the exceptions listed below and attached hereto. And 
that there are no other agreements written or oral which will be binding upon the 
buyer. 
shop #31 Steven E. Cross expires 12-01-90 
shop # 50 Steven E. Cross expires 12-01-90 
shop #33 Brigido Zamora expires 07-06-90 
shop #49 Gary Walter expires 12-01-91 
shop # 65 Chris Christensen expires 10-01-94 
[Paul Kingston Aff t f5, Ex. 3] 
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7. Mr. Lamont also provided a written list showing that 54 of the rental units, along 
with the sign, were generating rental income. Of those, according to Mr. Lamont, only 5 rental 
units, and not the sign, were subject to written leases. [Paul Kingston Aff t f6, Ex. 4] 
8. The rental list also showed Reagan's month-to-month rental had been $80.00 per 
month. Mr. Lamont verbally confirmed Reagan had no valid written lease, and was making 
payments pursuant to its month-to month lease. [Paul Kingston Aff 117, Ex. 4] 
9. Mr. Lamont also turned over his files on the Garco property. Paul Kingston 
examined those files and confirmed there was no signed lease with Reagan in those files. There was 
no sign lease document of any form signed either by Mr. Lamont, by Jack Gordon, or by Reagan. 
None of the pages of the document Reagan now offers as its purported lease, signed or unsigned, 
were in the file. [Paul Kingston Aff t f8] 
10. Paul Kingston had personal knowledge of other specific instances where Reagan was 
renting sign location space on a month to month basis without any written lease, and understood it 
was not uncommon for Reagan to do so. [Paul Kingston Aff t f9] 
11. On February 22, 1990 U.P.C., Inc. purchased the Garco property in good faith and 
for a valuable consideration. Mr. Lamont executed a warranty deed to U.P.C., Inc. setting forth 
the same legal description as the property quitclaimed to him by Mr. Gordon. On March 2, 1990 
Garco recorded its warranty deed, a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit 6. [Paul 
Kingston Aff t ^10, Ex. 6] As of that day, there was no recorded document giving notice that 
Reagan had any leasehold or other interest in the property. [Paul Kingston Aff t f 11] 
12. In May of 1991 Joe Kingston as agent for Garco met with Dick Paxman, Reagan's 
agent. Joe Kingston informed Paxman Garco and Reagan did not have a valid signed lease, and that 
Reagan needed to sign a lease at market rate or move its sign. Paxman did not controvert Joe 
Kingston's statement. [Joe Kingston depo. p. 47, 61] 
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13. By letter dated June 18, 1991 Garco gave Reagan written notice that Garco knew of 
o valid written lease for Reagan's sign, and that if Reagan had any interest in negotiating a lease 
; should contact Garco. [Crossley Aff 111, Ex. 1] 
14. Reagan did not respond to Garco's letter, either by claiming the existence of a written 
ease or otherwise controverting the letter, by expressing any interest in a written lease, or 
)therwise. Reagan simply ignored the letter. [Crossley Aff't \2~\ 
15. In or about June of 1992 Doug Hall, another agent for Reagan, came to Joe 
Cingston's office to discuss a written lease. Hall modified a Reagan standard form lease by, among 
)ther things, providing for a price of $7,200.00 per year, retroactive to June 1, 1991, making any 
*enewals on a year-to-year basis, and deleting Reagan's right of first refusal option. [Joe Kingston 
lepo p. 54-60; Ex. 5] 
16. In about August of 1992 Joe Kingston and Hall met again. During the course of their 
negotiations, Hall modified a Reagan standard form agreement in his own handwriting, by, among 
other things, inserting terms for a written lease at $7,800.00 per year the first five years, retroactive 
to June 1, 1991, and $8,400.00 per year the second five years. Hall also deleted Reagan's right of 
first refusal option and noncompete clause, and made any renewal on a month-to-month basis. Joe 
Kingston and Hall agreed the document would be signed by both parties when Hall got it "cleaned 
up." [Joe Kingston depo p. 64-72, 106-107, Ex. 4] 
17. Reagan did not record its 1975 lease until December 14, 1992, four months after the 
parties had negotiated for a written lease, and over two years after Garco recorded its deed. [Joe 
Kingston Aff't 1 2, Ex. 2] Although the document Reagan recorded was purportedly signed July 
8, 1975, it was notarized by a seal that expired February 15, 1995. [Joe Kingston Aff't 1 3, Ex. 
2] In addition, while paragraph 1 of the recorded document recites, "see attached tax notice for 
description hereby incorporated by reference, exhibit "A", Reagan's recorded exhibit "A" is not a 
tax notice. Therefore, the document in its recorded form did not exist until long after Garco bought 
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18. Laws regulating outdoor advertising signs prohibit the placement of signs in the area 
around Garco closer than 500 feet apart. The Utah Outdoor Advertising Act provides: 
§27-12-136.4(1) Outdoor advertising that is capable of being read or 
comprehended from any place on the main-traveled way of an interstate or primary 
system may not be erected or maintained, except: (d) signs located in a commercial 
or industrial zone .... 
§27-12-136.5(2)(a): Any sign allowed to be erected by reason of the exceptions set 
forth in Subsection 27-12-136-4(1) or in H-l zones shall not be closer than 500 feet 
to an existing off-premise sign adjacent to an interstate highway .... 
19. At all pertinent times Reagan owned and owns a sign located about 510 feet south 
of Garco's southern boundary line and about 600 feet south of the former Garco sign location. 
Before Reagan put up its Mollerup sign, Reagan also owned a sign located about 550 feet north of 
the former Garco sign location and 640 feet north of Garco's southern boundary. The northern 
boundary of the Mollerup premises is slightly over 500 feet from Garco's southern property line. 
This makes it possible to erect two signs over 500 feet apart, one at Mollerup's northern boundary 
and the other at Garco's southern boundary. [Joe Kingston Aff't f 4, Ex. 3] 
20. In October of 1992 Hall told Joe Kingston if Garco would not agree to modify the 
terms of the lease they negotiated in August, Reagan would remove its sign from Garco's premises, 
and erect another sign north of Garco within 500 feet of Garco's south property line, because 
Reagan didn't want Garco doing business with anyone but Reagan. [Joe Kingston depo. p. 157-58] 
21. After that time Garco repeatedly attempted to get Reagan to agree to a new lease but 
was unable to do so. [Reagan's Facts Nos. 14-21] 
22. By letter dated February 10, 1993 Reagan informed Garco that Reagan insisted the 
entire sign structure, despite being a fixture annexed to the property, was owned by Reagan: 
The sign structure and faces are the property of Reagan Outdoor and may not be 
removed by anyone without our permission. Neither you nor your client has that 
permission. 
Treble civil damages and other penalties are available to Reagan under the provisions 
of section 27-12-136.9 of the Utah Code should your clients, their agents or assigns, 
attempt the removal of, or cause damage to, the sign. 
[Joe Kingston depo. Ex. 11] 
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23. On February 23, 1995 Garco instructed Reagan to remove its sign before July 8, 
L995. [Joe Kingston depo Ex. 17] 
24. The sign foundation was an integral part of the sign structure. It was always Garco's 
intent, and until Reagan actually removed the sign, Reagan's outwardly expressed intent, to remove 
the entire structure including the sign foundation. By letter dated June 12, 1995 Reagan expressly 
agreed it would remove the entire structure including the foundation: 
I am writing you this letter to follow up on the discussion we had last week. During 
the course of that conversation you informed me that you would like to have Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising remove its sign structure from your property located at 3986 
South adjacent to the Interstate as soon as possible. At that time I stated that we 
would begin removing the structure immediately and that is the manner in which we 
will proceed. 
Unless I hear from you within the next 5 working days, I will assume that you want 
us to remove the sign structure and we will begin to do so. In addition, in order to 
remove the foundation we will need to tie up your parking lot for 3 to 4 days. Thank 
you for your time. 
[Joe Kingston depo p. 169, Ex. 18] 
i 
25. Unknown to Garco, on April 20, 1995 Reagan had already leased a sign location 
from Garco's neighbor to the north, Mollerup Moving and Storage. On April 24, 1995, also 
without notice to Garco, Reagan applied to UDOT to move to Mollerup the sign permitted by 
< 
UDOT Permit No. 2-0966. Permit No. 2-0966 was not for the Garco sign, which instead was 
permitted by UDOT Permit No. 2-0547. [Dewey Reagan Aff 114, 5; Supplemental Affidavit of 
Dewey Reagan ^3,4, Ex. A, B; UDOT "Numerical Log-Sign" sheets attached to Garco's Reply
 ( 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Untimely Affidavits] 
26. Reagan completed construction of a new sign on the Mollerup property about June 
1, 1995, about three weeks before Reagan began removing its Garco sign, and two weeks before 
Reagan confirmed with Garco it would remove the Garco sign. Reagan's Permit No. 2-0547 was 
still on the Garco sign when it was removed from the sign structure. Reagan did not attach Permit 
No. 2-0966, the permit for the sign Reagan had applied to move, to the Mollerup sign Instead, 
Garco later transferred Permit No. 2-0547 to the Mollerup sign, without having applied to do so, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
without UDOT's authorization, and in violation of UDOT regulation R933-2-4(13), which provides, 
"A permit issued under Section 27-12-136.7 is nontransferable, and the permittee shall be liable for 
any violation of the law regarding the permitted sign." 
27. Reagan erected its new sign about 480 feet from Garco's south boundary line and 
about 390 feet from Reagan's still-existing Garco sign. When Joe Kingston discovered the new 
sign, he asked Dewey Reagan why Reagan had done as it did. Reagan told Joe Kingston it was for 
the specific purpose to prevent Garco from doing business with anyone but Reagan. [Joe Kingston 
Aff 11 5, Ex. 3; Joe Kingston depo p. 155-158,177; Dewey Reagan Aff 1%] 
28. Garco was not overly concerned that removing the Garco sign foundation would 
injure its building foundation. Garco's only care was that Reagan use due care when removing the 
sign foundation to prevent damage to the building. Reagan could remove the foundation safely and 
easily, simply by having qualified people do the work. [Joe Kingston depo p. 161-162, 169] 
29. By letter dated June 19, 1997, Garco reminded Reagan not to damage the nearby 
building foundation when removing the sign, and warned Reagan it could leave the sign foundation 
only if it left the entire sign structure to Garco intact: 
He [Joe Kingston] did mention that he was concerned that unless you provide 
additional support for the building near the sign, the building foundation will be 
undermined when the sign foundation is removed. I believe that you will agree that 
any removal activity you pursue must be done is such a way that the Garco property 
is not damaged. One suggestion that Joe made was that Garco may agree to allow 
you to just remove the top part of the structure and leave the foundation and poles 
in place. This way, you would avoid the expense and time of removing the 
foundation and Garco may be able to use the structure for its own sign, should it 
chose [sic] to do so at a later time. 
[Joe Kingston depo. Ex. 19] 
30. Reagan finally began removing its sign no sooner on June 19, 1995. Reagan's Garco 
sign was still up and being used by Reagan until June 19, 1995, nearly three weeks after June 1, 
1995, when Reagan completed erection of its Mollerup sign. [Facts 27, 29] 
31. Before Reagan began work on the sign structure, Joe Kingston met with Hall, Dewey 
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ign foundation. Despite Reagan's June 12, 1995 letter expressly agreeing to remove the 
Dundation, Dewey Reagan instead instructed his crew to mutilate the sign structure, making it 
worthless and unusable to Garco, and leave parts of the sign structure on the property. Joe 
Kingston discovered what Reagan planned for the sign, drove to the sight and spoke to the crew 
:hief, telling him that Reagan had to take the entire sign including its foundation. The crew chief 
:alled Dewey, then returned and resumed dismembering the sign structure. Joe Kingston 
immediately called Dewey and told him, "In no conversation have I ever given you permission to 
io it any other way. It's not acceptable. It [the foundation] needs to be taken out." Dewey replied 
Reagan was going to cut off the sign anyway. [Joe Kingston depo. p. 159-164, Ex. 18, 19] 
32. After Reagan destroyed the Garco sign, Reagan, without UDOT approval, transferred 
to the Mollerup sign, not the Permit No. 2-0966 Reagan had applied to move, but the Permit No. 
2-057 from the Garco sign [Dewey Reagan Affidavits], which Reagan had not applied to move, and 
which under UDOT regulation R933-2-4(13) is nontransferable. [Fact No. 26] 
33. By letter dated August 9, 1995 Reagan informed Garco: 
In regards to another matter, that being the possibility of locating an outdoor 
advertising structure somewhere upon this location at a point to be determined in the 
future, I would greatly appreciate you facilitating a meeting between myself and Joe 
[Joe Kingston], as we seem to have a hard time connecting. I look forward to 
facilitating a mutually beneficial business relationship in the near future and await 
word from Joe. 
[Joe Kingston depo. Ex. 21] The only way Reagan and Garco could have "a mutually beneficial 
business relationship in the near future" would be for Reagan to erect a sign at Garco's southern 
boundary and move its Mollerup sign 20 feet or so north to Mollerup's northern boundary, so as 
not to violate the statutory 500 foot spacing limit. 
34. By letter dated September 11, 1995 Reagan again admitted Reagan's placement of 
the Mollerup sign was within Reagan's control, that Reagan choice its placement of the Mollerup 
sign to block Garco from dealing with anyone but Reagan, and that Reagan had left the demolished 
Garco sign on Garco's property to coerce Garco into a new lease: 
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In regards to the possibility of our parties entering into a new lease agreement which, 
as I stated above was the only topic that Joe and I discussed, I will contact them in 
the very near future with a proposal the subject of which will be leasing the South 
West corner of your property in order to erect a new outdoor advertising structure. 
Should our parties be able to agree on a new ground lease, I would be willing to 
discuss possible further action at the old site. It is my hope that we can consummate 
a lease agreement in that spot and thus facilitate a new business relationship between 
our two parties. 
[Joe Kingston depo Ex. 23] 
35. It is readily apparent from an inspection of the Mollerup property that Reagan's sign 
could easily have been placed at Mollerup's northern boundary; that Reagan's placement of the sign 
some 25 feet south of the boundary was more inconvenient to Mollerup than the boundary would 
have been; and that the difference between the two locations on the Mollerup premises would have 
no effect on Reagan's ability to sell advertising space on the sign. [Joe Kingston Aff't f7, Ex. 3] 
36. On July 29, 1996, Garco served Reagan with a Notice of Unlawful Detainer pursuant 
to U.C.A. et seq. [Complaint f 16; Amended Answer f7; Joe Kingston depo Ex. 27] 
37. Reagan still has not removed its sign foundation, and refuses to do so. 
38. Since Reagan dismantled its sign and mutilated its sign structure, Garco has never 
leased the premises, or any part thereof, to any outdoor advertiser, or to any person or entity for 
the purpose of erecting or displaying outdoor advertising. Except for Reagan, Garco has never 
negotiated with anyone for the lease of the premises for outdoor advertising. [Crossley Aff't f3] 
39. Garco is a landlord, and rents building space to its tenants. In 1995 Garco leased 
building space on the premises to Alan Jenkins pursuant to a month-to month verbal agreement. 
Their agreement did not include the lease of off-site outdoor advertising space. Jenkins is not in 
the outdoor advertising business. Jenkins occupied and continues to occupy building space he has 
leased. [Crossley Aff't f4] 
40. After he became a building tenant, Jenkins apparently caused a sign or signs to be 
placed on the premises. Jenkins did not lease the building side for that purpose, did not ask for a 
lease, did not ask Garco's permission to place any signs and did not have Garco's permission to do 
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so. Jenkins simply acted on his own, without Garco's knowledge. Garco never bargained for or 
received any consideration whatsoever for Jenkins having caused any signs to be placed. Jenkins 
has never paid nor offered to pay Garco for outdoor advertising space, or for the use, waste or 
defacement of the premises. [Crossley Aff t %5] 
41. Except for any signs Jenkins may have caused to be painted without Garco's 
knowledge or consent, neither Garco nor any other person or entity has erected, attempted to erect, 
or offered to erect any off-site outdoor advertising on the premises. [Crossley Aff't %] 
ARGUMENT 
I. REAGAN HAS NO VALID COUNTERCLAIM. 
A. REAGAN'S PURPORTED LEASE IS VOID AGAINST GARCO. 
Reagan's Counterclaim is premised on its purported " Sign Location Lease." That document, 
even if binding on its signatories, is void as against Garco. Utah Code Ann. §57-3-3 provides: 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith 
and for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
Garco had no record notice of the "Sign Location Lease." On February 22, 1990 Garco 
purchased the property in good faith and for a valuable consideration, and on March 2, 1990 
recorded its warranty deed. Reagan did not record its purported lease until December 14, 1992, 
over two years after Garco recorded its deed. The document Reagan ultimately recorded did not 
even exist in its recorded form until well after Garco bought the property.3 
3
 In its own motion Reagan purposely seeks to mislead and confuse the Court, by 
falsely claiming Garco contends the "Sign Location Lease" did not exist in any form until it was 
recorded. Even a cursory review shows Garco was simply stating the obvious, which Reagan itself 
admits - assuming page 1 of the recorded document existed in 1975, the four-page document in the 
f^rm in u/hir.h it was recorded did not exist until 1992. 
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Arguments regarding "inquiry notice" actually deal with a line of cases addressing "actual 
notice," one of the most recent of which is Diversified Equities v. American Savings & Loan Assn., 
739 P.2d 1133 (Utah App. 1987). There, the Court stated: 
Under our recording statute, a recorded conveyance is "void as against any 
subsequent purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration of the same real 
estate ... where his own conveyance shall be first duly recorded." Utah Code Ann. 
§57-3-3 (1986). However, under Utah Code Ann. 57-1-6 (1986), unrecorded 
documents affecting real property are enforceable as against persons with "actual 
notice." . . . 
As for the "actual notice" exception of Utah Code Ann. §57-1-6 (1986), the 
stipulated facts make clear Peck and Pentlute did not have actual knowledge of 
American's interest. However, the exception is also triggered if a party dealing with 
the land has information of facts which would put a prudent person upon an inquiry 
which, if pursued, would lead to actual knowledge as to the state of the title. 4 
Garco had no actual notice of the "Sign Location Lease" when it bought the property. As 
to any duty of inquiry, "All that is required of a party who is put upon inquiry is good faith and 
reasonable care in following up the inquiry; if due and diligent inquiry or investigation is made, and 
notwithstanding it, no knowledge of the outstanding interest is acquired, the purchaser will have 
fully discharged the duty to inquire and will not be charged with further notice." 77 Am Jur 2d 
Vendor and Purchaser §454. 
Garco used good faith and reasonable care in following up regarding the status of the sign. 
The property was being used to generate income from rental of the property to numerous tenants. 
Garco desired to purchase the property to continue generating income from those rentals. Existing 
leases on the property would enhance the value of the property to Garco, and Mr. Lamont had every 
incentive to disclose such leases to Garco to promote the sale. [Fact No. 2] Garco and Mr. Lamont 
entered into an Earnest Money Sales Agreement that legally obligated Mr. Lamont to disclose the 
status of all existing leases. [Fact No. 5] Mr. Lamont provided a written disclosure, including a 
sworn and notarized letter in which he stated in writing and under oath that except for five shop 
4
 Utah Code Ann. §57-1-6, including the statutory "actual notice" provision, was 
repealed in 1988, promptly after the Diversified opinion was published. Based on the act of Utah's 
legislature in response to appellate court opinions interpreting the statutory provision, it is 
questionable whether "inquiry" notice is good law in Utah. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
units, under four written leases, all leases affecting the property, including Reagan's tenancy, were 
on month to month oral rentals. [Fact No. 6] Mr. Lamont having not only the legal duty but an 
economic incentive to be truthful regarding the status of the property's tenants, Garco had no reason 
to suspect or inquire whether Mr. Lamont's sworn statement was fraudulent. Garco was entitled 
to rely on Mr. Lamont's duty of disclosure and his sworn written statement that Reagan had no 
written lease, but was only a month-to-month tenant. 
But Garco's inquiry did not stop there. Mr. Lamont also provided a rental list showing that 
54 of the rental units, along with the sign, were generating rental income. Of those, according to 
Mr. Lamont, only 5 rental units, and not Reagan's sign, were subject to written leases. [Fact No. 
7] He also turned over his files on the Garco property. The document Reagan now offers as its 
purported lease was not in the file.5 Indeed, there was no sign location lease in any form signed by 
Mr. Lamont, Mr. Gordon or Reagan. [Fact No. 9] Garco also had personal knowledge of other 
specific instances where Reagan was renting sign location space on a month to month basis without 
any written lease, and understood it was not uncommon for Reagan to do so. There was therefore 
no suspicious circumstance resulting from the lack of a written lease that would invoke a duty of 
further inquiry. [Fact No. 10] 
After buying the property, Reagan ignored at least one verbal and one written notice from 
Garco that Reagan had no written lease. [Facts Nos. 13-14] Even during the first several months 
while Garco was attempting to negotiate a written sign lease, Reagan did not produce a prior written 
lease or claim Garco was already bound by a written lease. Reagan's failure is significant, in that 
if Reagan failed to disclose any written lease in response to the parties' communications after the 
purchase, then any present claim that Reagan might have done differently before the purchase is at 
best a conclusory allegation and mere speculation. 
The document did not exist in its recorded form until shortly before it was recorded, 
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As did the buyer in Diversified, Garco actually inquired as to Reagan's status, and with 
sufficient diligence to meet any duty of inquiry it may have had. Because Garco's actual inquiry 
was reasonable and did not lead to the disclosure of any written lease, Garco acquired the property 
free and clear of Reagan's "Sign Location Lease." 
B. THE NONCOMPETE CLAUSE IS VOID. 
Utah law is clear: a covenant not to compete which is primarily designed to limit competition 
or restrain the right to engage in a common calling is simply not enforceable, Robbins v. Finlay, 
645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1982). Even if the "Sign Location Lease" was not void as against Garco, 
its noncompete clause is an adhesion contract designed primarily to limit competition with Reagan, 
and to restrain Garco's right to engage in the common calling of renting property it holds in fee. 
Such restrictions are void unless needed to protect the business for which the restriction was made; 
even then, no greater restraint is allowed than is reasonably necessary to secure such protection. 
St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital 811 P.2d 194, 198 (Utah 1991). 
Reagan had no legitimate business need whatever other than simply to restrain Reagan's 
competition, and to prevent Garco from renting its property to another company when Garco was 
unable to negotiate a fair lease with Reagan. 
Paragraphs 6 to 8 of the Supplemental Affidavit of Dewey Reagan are a flat admission 
Reagan slips a "noncompete" clause into its unenforceable adhesion contracts, for the sole purpose 
of requiring the landlord even after the lease is up to thereafter deal with Reagan or no one; in other 
words, the clause is designed and intended solely to limit competition and restrain a common 
calling, making the clause facially void under Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1982). 
Reagan's noncompete clause is also a contract in restraint of trade or commerce, and void 
as in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 and Utah Code Ann. §76-10-914(1). 
It is an attempt to monopolize, and void as in violation of 15 U.S.C. §2 and Utah Code Ann. §76-
10-914(2). It is an unfair method of competition in commerce or trade, and void as in violation of 
the Utah Unfair Practices Act, U.C.A. §§13-5-1 et seq. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Reagan's noncompete clause is designed not to induce advertisers to rent from Reagan, but 
to prevent others from leasing property from Garco when Reagan is unable to force another 
adhesion contract on Garco — that is, to limit and restrain trade and competition, and to monopolize 
the outdoor advertising business. It is void and unenforceable. 
C. GARCO HAS NOT BREACHED THE NONCOMPETE CLAUSE. 
Even if Reagan's noncompete clause was not void, Reagan's claim for breach of the clause 
is without merit. The undisputed facts show Garco has not entered any lease with any outdoor 
advertiser, and has not breached the clause. [Facts No. 38-41] Garco is entitled to judgment 
dismissing the Counterclaim as a matter of law. 
II. REAGAN IS LIABLE ON GARCO'S CLAIMS FOR RELIEF. 
A. REAGAN IS LIABLE FOR TRESPASS. 
For the sake of brevity and to avoid undue repetition, Garco incorporates here by reference 
part 11(A) of the Argument set forth at pages 11-15 of in Garco's August 21, 1997 Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Based on the points and authorities 
stated therein, and the undisputed facts, Reagan is liable for trespass as a matter of law. 
Reagan makes the claim that, in the guise of exercising a right to remove the sign structure, 
Reagan really had the right not to remove the structure, but instead to dismember and mutilate the 
sign structure, leaving at least part of the destroyed sign on Garco's property forever. Reagan is 
wrong. Restatement (Second), Property §12.2 (subparts 1-3 quoted in Garco's memo in opposition 
to Reagan's motion for summary judgment) goes on to state: 
(4) Except to the extent the parties to a lease validly agree otherwise, the tenant 
is entitled to remove permissible annexation he has made to the leased property ... 
if the leased property can be and is restored to its former condition after the removal 
and the removal and restoration are made within the time provided in §12.3. 
(5) In situations not described in subsection (4), except to the extent the parties 
to the lease validly agree otherwise, there is a breach of the tenant's obligation if he 
removes or attempts to remove annexations he has made to the leased property 
without the consent of the landlord ... 
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Reagan and Garco did not "agree otherwise." On the contrary, Reagan by its own admission 
expressly agreed in writing to remove its entire sign including the foundation. [Fact No. 25] The 
only alternative Garco would agree to was for Reagan to leave the sign structure intact, so Garco 
could use it at a later date. [Facts No. 29] At best, Reagan had a choice either to leave the entire 
annexed sign structure intact, or to remove the entire sign and restore the premises to their former 
condition. When Reagan instead ravaged the sign and left its despoiled remnants in place, it 
committed a knowing, wrongful and malicious trespass for which Garco is entitled to damages. 
There is no authority for Reagan's argument that a mere tenant, at the end of its tenancy, 
can lawfully mangle an annexed improvement making it worse than useless to the freeholder, then 
leave the remains of destroyed structure as a continuing encroachment on the property. If Reagan 
had done so while lawfully in possession, Reagan's conduct would constitute waste as a matter of 
law. Waste is an actionable tort, generally defined as any destruction, misuse, alteration, or neglect 
of premises, by one legally in possession, to the prejudice or the estate or other interest of another. 
Hansen v. Green River Corp., 748 P.2d 1102, 1106 (Utah App. 1988). Reagan's mutilation of the 
sign, in the face of its express agreement to remove the entire sign structure including the 
foundation, and Garco's direction to either leave or remove the entire sign structure, is a clear act 
of destruction, misuse or alteration of the premises, to the prejudice of Garco's fee estate. 
78 Am Jur 2d Waste §2 distinguishes between waste and trespass: 
Waste is distinguished from trespass in that the injurious or wasteful act is 
committed in the former case by one who is, and in the latter case by one who is not, 
in lawful possession of the premises involved or affected. Although acts injurious 
to the substance of an estate, committed by a stranger to the title, or by one who, 
although in possession of the premises, is not rightfully entitled to such possession 
are sometimes characterized as waste, they do not constitute waste in the technical 
legal sense of the term, but fall within the category of trespass and are governed by 
the principles applicable to that species of tort. 
The fact that Reagan was no longer a lawful tenant in possession when it committed what would 
otherwise be waste makes its act an actionable, continuing trespass for which Garco is entitled to 
ongoing damages as a matter of law. 
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B. REAGAN IS LIABLE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER. 
For the sake of brevity and to avoid undue repetition, Garco incorporates here by reference 
part 11(B) of the Argument set forth at pages 15-16 of in Garco's August 21, 1997 Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Based on the points and authorities 
stated therein, and the undisputed facts, Reagan is liable for unlawful detainer as a matter of law. 
III. REAGAN IS LIABLE FOR INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE, UNFAIR 
COMPETITION AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
For the sake of brevity and to avoid undue repetition, Garco incorporates here by reference 
part III of the Argument set forth at pages 16-20 of in Garco's August 21, 1997 Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Garco also incorporates by reference 
pages 4 and 5 of its Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Untimely 
Affidavits. Based on the points and authorities stated therein, and the undisputed facts, Reagan is 
liable for intentional interference, unfair competition and punitive damages as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, Garco is entitled to summary judgment against Reagan on the issue of 
liability for all of Garco's claims for relief as a matter of law. 
DATED this / / day of November, 1997. 
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THIRD DISTRIcf COtJRT ~ , 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a ; 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ] 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL KINGSTON 
1 Civil No. 960906388 
) Judge William B. Bohling 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Paul Kingston, being duly sworn, deposes and states the facts set forth in this Affidavit are 
true of my personal knowledge. I could and would truthfully testify to the same if called upon in 
a court of law. 
1. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of a quitclaim deed dated 
August 4, 1982 from Jack R. Gordon to J. Richard Lamont, recorded with the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's office on August 12, 1982 at Entry No. 3701784, Book 5402, Page 1549. The deed 
describes the property later deeded from Mr. Lamont to U.P.C. Inc. dba Garco. 
2. In 1990 I acted as an agent for U.P.C. in negotiating for the purchase of Mr. 
Lamont's property. Then and now, the property was used as a source of income from rental of the 
property to other parties. Garco desired to purchase the property for the purpose of continuing 
rentals of the property, and to have an income source from rental of the property. Therefore, 
existing revenue-generating leases on the property would enhance the value of the property and its 
desirability to Garco, and Lamont had every incentive to disclose such leases to Garco. 
ft 0 0 S I 
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3. When negotiations began U.P.C., Inc was in the process of being incorporated. On 
February 2, 1990, in my capacity as agent for the corporation that was being formed to own the 
property, I made the initial earnest money offer in my own name, as evidenced by paragraph 5, 
which provides, "Title shall vest in Buyer as follows: To be determined at closing." On February 
15, 1990 Mr. Lamont accepted the earnest money offer. A true and correct copy of the Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement executed by Mr. Lamont and myself is attached as Exhibit 2. 
4. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement provides: 
I. EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an 
existing lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer no later than fifteen (15) 
days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days 
prior to closing, a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting 
the property. Unless written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent 
within three (3) working days thereafter, Buyer shall take title subject to such leases. 
5. In fulfillment of his obligation under paragraph I of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement, Mr. Lamont provided the disclosure, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit 3, consisting of a sworn and notarized letter and four written lease agreements. The 
sworn letter states: 
I, Rick Lamont, seller do hereby warrant that all leases/rental agreements are 
on a month to month basis with the exceptions listed below and attached hereto. And 
that there are no other agreements written or oral which will be binding upon the 
buyer. 
shop #31 Steven E. Cross expires 12-01-90 
shop ft 50 Steven E. Cross expires 12-01-90 
shop it 33 Brigido Zamora expires 07-06-90 
shop #49 Gary Walter expires 12-01-91 
• shop # 65 Chris Christensen expires 10-01-94 
6. Mr. Lamont also provided me with the rental list attached hereto as Exhibit 4, 
showing that 54 of the rental units, along with the sign, were generating rental income. Of those, 
according to Mr. Lamont, only 5 rental units, and not the sign, were subject to written leases. 
7. The rental list showed Reagan's month-to-month rental was $80.00 per month. Mr. 
Lamont verbally confirmed Reagan had no valid written lease, and was making payments pursuant 
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8. Mr. Lamont also turned over his files on the Garco property. I examined those files 
and confirmed there was no signed lease with Reagan in those files. There was no sign lease 
document of any form signed either by Mr. Lamont, by Jack Gordon, or by Reagan. None of the 
pages of the document Reagan now offers as its purported lease, signed or unsigned, were in the 
file. 
9. Based on my personal knowledge in dealings with other properties, I knew of other 
specific instances where Reagan was renting sign location space on a month to month basis without 
any written lease, and understood it was not uncommon for Reagan to do so. 
10. On February 22, 1990 U.P.C., Inc. purchased the Garco property in good faith and 
for a valuable consideration. Mr. Lamont executed a warranty deed to U.P.C, Inc. setting forth 
the same legal description as the property quitclaimed to him by Mr. Gordon. On March 2, 1990 
Garco recorded its warranty deed, a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit 5. 
11. As of March 2, 1990 there was no recorded document giving notice that Reagan had 
any leasehold or other interest in the property. 
DATED this /£'^ day of November, 1997. 
Paul Kingston 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this J_^_ day of November, 1997. 
Residing at: <&'Z*i^S 
My Commission Expires: Notary Public 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify on November / / , 1997 a true and correct copy of the above was served by first— 
etess-matt to: 
fr nJ— ^U/(K/C^X^I 
2351P.025 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Leslie Van Frank 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Recorded at Request of., 
at . M. Fee Paid $. 
by . _ -
Mail ux notice to 
Dep. Book.... Page Rcf-: -
_. Addre«..^ll3..!b2CX^.(jO...SCCLJ. 
3701784 QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
JACK R. GORDON 
of Salt Lake City, 
QUIT-CLAIM to 
, County of Salt Lake 
J. RICHARD UMONT 
grantor 
, State of Utah, hereby 
of Salt Like City, County of Salt iAk*, State of Utah 
Ton and No/lOO 
and other good and valuable conaiderationo 
the following described tract of knd in 
State of Utah: 
Salt Lake 
grantee 
for the turn of 
-DOLLARS, 
Gronty, 
BEGINNING at a point on the We3t line of Three Hundred West Street, said 
point being North 89'54 ,51" Eaat 284.26 feet and North 0°08 ,30" Weat 755,99 
feet from the South quarter corner of Section 36, TownHhlp 1 South, Range 
1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and aaid point of beginning ia also 
South B995^5lu Weat 33,00 feat and North 0*08f30n Weat 755.99 feet from 
the County Monument in Three Hundred Weat Street; and running, thence Weac 
235.36 feet ; thanca South 70*32,42" Weat 404.57 feet tv, the East right-of 
way l ine of Interatatt-15; thenca North 4*56' Weat along Raid Eaat line 
317.90 feet ! thenca Eaat 643.72 f t t t to tha Weat line of Three Hundred 
Weac Street; thanct South 0i08l3UM Eaat tlong aaid West line 181.97 faat 
to the point of beginning. 
WITNESS the hand of laid grantor , thii 
KT 
Signed in th« prwenc* of 
STATE OF U T A H , y 1 
County of v ^ . ^ d A ^ f 
thoimnd nine hundredlod U- -<4{w/\J«£m>X*noni\ij «ppe»red before pve"\'..- •'.. . 
0 f U . V . - ; • • \ \ 
the- ilgner of the foregolnx initrunu/it, who duly tckno: Jed/rt: COTBC tint * he-. j/,Mecufea\tU 
,1 , /.'/•-• , NotiriTublic. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
EARr .^ST MONEY SALES AGr~EMENT 
Legend Yes (X) No (0) 
This is a legally binding contract. Read the entire document carefully before signing. 
IB 
REALTOR' 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
(Sections) 
NCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property: plumbing, 
air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies 
;. w indow and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage door 
md transmitter(s). fencing, trees and shrubs. - - - -
INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated. Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by 
>f any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income 
i or as to its production. Buyer accepts the property in "as i s " condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer desires 
tional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer. 
SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property.which 
or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances 
ature shall be brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances 
sound or in satisfactory working condit ion at closing. 
C O N D I T I O N OF W E L L . Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has. to the best of Sellers' knowledge, provided.an adequate supply of 
id continued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right. 
CONDIT ION OF SEPTIC T A N K . Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is. to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order and 
is no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards 
A C C E L E R A T I O N C L A U S E . No later than fifteen (15) days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days-prior to closing, 
tall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, deeds of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the 
of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise the interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the 
sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally approve the sale, then within three (3) days after notice of 
er or disapproval or on the date of closing, whichever is earlier. Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice 
• or Seller's agent. In such case, all earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It is understood and agreed that if provisions 
"Due on Sale' ' clause are set forth in Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become nuil and void. 
T ITLE INSPECTION. No later than fifteen (1 5) days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing. Buyer 
ve the opportunity to inspect either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion, or a preliminary title report on the subject property, 
hall have a period of three (3) days after receipt thereof to examine and accept. If Buyer does not accept. Buyer shall give written notice thereof to Seller 
r's agent, within the prescribed time period specifying objections to title. Thereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the 
| to which Buyer has objected If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option 
uyer. and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties 
T ITLE I N S U R A N C E . If title insurance is elected. Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a standard form ALTA 
if title insurance to be issued by such title insurance company as Seller shall designate. Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than 
rovided for in said standard form, and the encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable through 
)w agreement at closing, the earnest money shall, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement 
jreupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge 
EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases. Seller agrees to prov.de to Buyer no later than fifteen {1 5) days 
Her s acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to dosing, a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting 
rjerty. Unless written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent withm three (3) working days thereafter. Buyer shall take title subject to such 
If objection is not remedied withm the stated time, this Agreement shall be null and void 
C H A N G E S DURING T R A N S A C T I O N . During the pendency of this Agreement. Seller agrees that no changes -n any ex.stmg leases shall be made, nor 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Legend Yes(X) No(0) 
EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
E A R N E S T M O N E Y RECEIPT 
DATE: 
The undersigned Buyer. 
as EARNEST MONEY, the amount 
in the form of CAeC-kl & f?'7~9 
/ / &~, 
of ya<r_nfy/ //rf 1%r<.<n/1/'<- anM //cc 
L' £z Q'^ tf ' iA/hirh <:hall I 
— -p 
^hereby deposits with Brokerage 
Z " Dollars ($ tit^T/^/V) ^ ), 
VPS-/4.<rB 
whic sh l be deposited in accordance with applicable State Law 
Received by *~ u " r S-<^~ l i . ^ 
Phone Number / 
OFFER TO P U R C H A S E 
1. P R O P E R T Y DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST M O N E Y is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the property siiuated at i 
, / / O / O . in the City nf Sc'://- JLA/C&_ . County of 
.. Utah. 
subject to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or other easements or rights of wav, government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer 
in accordance with Section G. Said property is more particularly described as: 
.e,e 
& 
C H E C K APPUCABLE BOXES: 
D U N I M P R O V E D REAL P R O P E R T Y D Vacant Lot D Vacant Acreage D Other 
pa I M P R O V E D REAL P R O P E R T Y 12 Commercial D Residential D Condo D Other 
(a) Included items. Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property. 
The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title: 
(b) Excluded items. The following items are specifically excluded from this sale:. 
(c) C O N N E C T I O N S . UTILITIES A N D OTHER RIGHTS. Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price: 
pCpublic sewer QTconnected 
Dseptictank Dconnected 
Dother sanitary.system_ 
fcf public water {^connected 
Dprivate water Dconnected 
Dwell Dconnected D other 
D irrigation water /secondary system 
# of shares Company 
D T V antenna Dmaster antenna Dprewired 
)$ natural gas (^connected 
{^electricity ^connected 
D ingress & egress by private easement 
.$ dedicated road .Npaved 
Dcurb and gutter 
D other rights 
seJer prior to closing. D shall not be furnished. (d) Survey. A certified survey ffishall be furnished at the expense of 
(e) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physical 
condition, except: 
2. P U R C H A S E PRICE A N D FINANCING. The total purchase price for the property is_ 
Dollars ($ ^ ' / /"*• f)Q/Q JL ) which shall be paid as follows: 
$ £fy£C*PQ which represents the aforedescribed EARNEST M O N E Y DEPOSIT: 
$ ^ V t V OCVin/* representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing. 
$ representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed 
by buyer, which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
which include: Dprincipal; Dinterest; Dtaxes; Dinsurance: Dcondo fees; Dother 
representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be 
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
which include: Dprincipal; Dinterest; Dtaxes; Dinsurance; Dcondo fees; Dother. 
representing balance, if any, including proceeds from a new loan, to be paid as follows: 
s£//~; OCV oo 
Other 
TOTAL P U R C H A S E PRICE 
If Buyer is required to assume an underlying obl igat ion a n d / o r obtain outside f inancing. Buyer agrees to use best efforts to assume and /o r procure same and this 
offer is made subject to Buyer quali fying for and lending institution granting said assumption a n d / o r f inancing Buyer agrees to make application wi th in 
days after Sel ler 's acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underly ing obl igat ion a n d / o r obtain the new f inancing at an interest rate not to exceed % 
If Buyer does not qualify for the assumption a n d / o r f inancing within A y / , " ! days after Sel ler 's acceptance of this Agreement, this Agreement shall be voidable 
at the opt ion of the Buyer or Seller upon written nonce / 
Seller agrees to pay S . towards B u y c s total f inancing and c los ing costs inc luding bu : ited 10 loan diSCOu 
If this Agreement involves the assumption of an existing loan or obl igat ion on the property. Sect ion F shall apply 
Page t w o of a four page form Se l le r ' s Init ials ( Oat. Buyer s Init ials ( L - ) ( D a t e iTJ^C- i--
r/f 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
C O N O I T I O N A N D C O N V E Y A N C E O F T I T L E . Seller represents that Seller Qj ho lds title to the property m lee simple Q is purchasing the property under 
estate contract. Transfer of Seller s o w r r " h . p interest shall be made as set forth in Sect ion S. S>'ler agrees to furnish good and marketable title to the 
ty. subject to encumbrances and except noted herein, evidenced by G( a current policy of titl« jrance in the amount of purchase price Q an abstract 
brought current, with an attorney's opinio \See Sect ion H). 
INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G . Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subieci property prior to c los ing, 
shall take title subiect to any existing restrictive covenants, including condominium restrictions (CC & R's). Buyer D has CI has not reviewed any condo-
n CC & R's prior to signing this Agreement 
VESTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer as follows: J2JL V ( - fp / ' ; ^ in^ - - / n.i ^ir-jirf It 
SELLER WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C. the following items are also warranted: l^&/'(" ftf& /1S1 -fY*//(. 
^•-7.7/7/V ( I n r rrhr>:' .'j -. 7/» / / : )i r/Jft V y . / ^ / / / 
ions to the above and Section C shall be limited tome following: 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES . This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must 
sfied prior to closing: ofAyff iLnil Last. /t^,/-tU later r£ FzhMAty t£} t9W rr 7fi 4s/,r< a-N^S frceipf-fF*-
Hrnf/i&rW +,+1$ rtjfitft and(*.*/o*/ni£sr\enf +s }<Ui £ J-,r/4
 1
:/i^i,~oil/i^.Jfc.//1<p?C f 41sprye/Jy fake 
CrfU,< -Ppr/iAy r<°a4>>i /.dr^ctfr _ _/ 
C L O S I N G OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or before at a reasonable location to be designated by 
subject to Section Q. Upon demand. Buyer shall deposit with the Escrow Closing Office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance 
us Agreement. Prorations set forth in Section R. shall be made as of O date of possession Ofdate of closing Q other . • 
P O S S E S S I O N . Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on . unless extended by written agreement of parties. 
G E N E R A L PROVISIONS. Unless otherwise indicated above, the V_eneral Provision Sections on the reverse side hereof are incorporated into this 
nent by reference. 
. A G R E E M E N T T O P U R C H A S E A N D T I M E LIMIT FOR A C C E P T A N C E . Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller 
ave until_i*L _ . to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the.A§efH'_hall return the 
EST MCXbrfVkZi tfcx<^ver_ ^ - -V / ^ / - . s\ s\. iyer. 
ure of Buyer 
£afe-
7 Date Signature of Buyer Date 
C O N E 
:EPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
ECTION. Seller hereby REJECTS.the foregoing offer (Seller's Initials) 
JNTER OFFER. Seller hereby accepts the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and 
ents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have until (A.M. /P .M. ) . 19 to accept the terms 
;ified below. 
V / J L > (Aivyffvv 
Signature of Seller 
K O N E : 
er accepts the counter offer 
er accepts with modifications on attached a d d e n d u m 
. (AM-PM) Signature of Buyer 
Signature of Seller 
•MMISSION. The undersigned hereby agrees to pay i 
mission of -— • 
Signature of Buyer 
~MnEEtL 
_ as considerat ion for the efforts in procur ing a buyer 
(Brokerage) 
lure of Seller Date S ignature of Seller Oate 
D O C U M E N T RECEIPT 
3te Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bear ing all signatures. (One of the fol lowing alternatives must therefore 
npleted). 
Q l acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all s ignatures 
\TVRE OF SELLER S I G N A T U R E OF B U Y E R 
Oate Date 
Date 
O l personally caused a final copy of the fo regomg Agreement hearing at! signatures to be mailed on 
ed Mai l and return receipt attached hereto 10 '.he G Seller G B u v e : Sent by . 
1 9 by 
three of a four oaqe fori Se l le r ' s I n.t ials f ) ( t Date R u v . r s . M . u a l s f 0 / _ Oa.o feLUni 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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K. AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, pannership. trust, estate, or other entity, me person executing this Agreement on it 
behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller. 
L. COMPLETE AGREEMENT.— NO VERBAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties and supersedes and 
cancels any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties There are no verbal agreements which mod'f 
or affect this agreement. This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties. 
M. COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in writing and. if attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this 
Agreement not expressly modified or excluded therein 
N. DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer. Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated 
damages or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller. In the event of default by Seller, or if this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any 
express condition or contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit 
shall be returned to.Buyer. Both parties agree that, should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall 
pay all costs and expenses..including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law. whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise. In the event the principal broker holding the earnest 
money-deposit is required to file an interpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the-Buyer and Seller 
authorize the principal broker to draw from the earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action. The amount 
of deposit remaining after advancing those costs-shall be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law. The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting 
party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action. 
0. ABROGATION- Execution of a final real estate contract, if any, shall abrogate this Agreement. 
P. RISK OF LOSS. All ris* of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing. In the event there is loss or damage to the property 
between the date hereof and the date of dosing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God. and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed 
ten percent (10%) of the purchase price of the property. Buyer may. at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to repair or 
replace damaged property prior to closing, or declare this Agreement null and void. If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price 
and Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace and does actually repair and repiace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed. 
Q TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the" date provided herein due to interruption of transport, 
strikes, fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer, or feller, then the closing date shall 
be. extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but. in no event more than thirty (30) days beyond the closing "date provided herein. Thereafter, 
time is of the essence..Thjs.provisionjcelates only to the extension of closing date. "Closing" shall mean the date on which-all._necessary-instrumenis-are signed 
and delivered by all parties to the transaction. 
R. CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (1 /2) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise required by the lending institution Costs 
of providing title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller. Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer, 
rents, and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8. Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves 
shall be assigned to Buyer at closing. 
S. REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than 
those excepted herein. If this Agreement is tor sale or transfer of a Seller's mteres- under an existing rea! estate contract. Seller may transfer oy either (a) special 
warranty deed, containing Seller's assignment of sau! contrac m form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the 
said existing rea! estate contract therein. 
T. AGENCY DISCLOSURE. Selling Brokerage may have entered into an agreement to represent the Seller. 
U. BROKERAGE. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term Brokerage' shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office. 
V. DAYS. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term "days shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays 
PAGE FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM. THIS FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
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I, Rick Lamont, seller do hereby warrant that all leases/rental 
a^reoments are on a month to month basis with the exceptions listed 
below and attached hereto. And that there are no other agreements 
written or oial which will be binding upon the buyer, 
shop # 31 
shop # 50 
shop # 33 
shop # ^ 9 
shop # 65 
dat£d / 
State of Utah 
County of Salt Lake 
Steven E. Cross expires 12-01-90 
Steven E. Cross expires 12-01-90 
Brigido Zamora expires 07-06-90 
Gary Walters expires 12-01-91 
Chris Christensen expires 10-01-9** 
Rick Lamont, Seller 
c 
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_Address_ 
WARRANTY DEED 
J . RICHARD LAMONT a/k/a JAMES R. LAMONT a/k/a JAMES RICHARD LMOUT 
of S a l t Lake City 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
, County of Sa It Lake 
ZfhJiUjf 
U.P.C. , INC., a Utah Corporation 
A 4 
d 
, Suit of UikJ), c.trtoy 
4 8 8 7 6 4 5 
•jj nnkCf. 90 :0:3a Art 
K A T I E L . D IXON 
RECORDER, SALT LAKE COONTf. UTWi 
GUAROI/kH TITLE 
REC Br: 0 OAHGERFIELO , DEPUTY 
H.$ 
of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah 
Ten and no/100 and other good and valuable considerations-
grantee 
for the sum of 
- - - DOLLARS, 
County, 
1^ 
the following described tract of land in Sal t Lake 
State of Utah: 
Beginning at a point on the West line of Three Hundred West Street, said point 
being North 89°54,5r' East 284.26 feet and North 0°08'30" West 755.99 feet from 
the South Quarter corner of Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, and said point of beginning is also South 89°54'5r West 33.00 
feet and North 0°08'30n West 755.99 feet from the County Monument in Three Hundred 
West Street; and running thence West 235.36 feet; thence South 70°32,42" West 
404.56 feet to the East right-of-way line of Interstate-15; thence North 4°56\ 
West along said East line 317.90 feet; thence East 643.72 feet to the West line 
of Three hundred West Street; thence South 0o08,30" East along said West line 
181.97 feet to the point of beginning. 
Subject to current general taxes, easemerits and restr ict ions. 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor , this 22nd 
February , A. D.19 90 
Signed in the Presence of 
day of 
J. RICHARD LAM0NT a/k/a JAMES R. LAMONT 
a/k/a JAMES RICHARD LAMONT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of Sa11 Lake 
On the 22nd day of F e b r u a r y , A. D. 1990 
personaliy rAnpeared before mu J . RICHARD LAMONT a / k / d JAMES R. LAM0N' a / k / d JAMES 
RICHARO.^QvflQtfT 
the signer/, of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the 
. \y ^ ' . . . . . ' (~. • 
/..same. •>''•-. , ' - , • • • 
•'***& fa; xY;v 
• ^ • • 4 ^ / 
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F. Mark Hansen, #5078 
404 East 4500 South, Suite B-34 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 266-2882 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
FILFD 
' * ic r 
I 
97 NOV 11 PM 2- UU 
A*-f 
THIRD DISTRICT C O V K T M L 7 / 7 ^ i '•• 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATfi ORUTAH -
U.P.C.,INC. d/b/a 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ELAINE CROSSLEY 
Civil No. 960906388 
Judge William B. Bohling 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Elaine Crossley, being duly sworn, deposes and states the facts in this Affidavit are true of 
my personal knowledge. I could and would truthfully so testify if called upon in a court of law. 
1. I am an officer of U.P.C., Inc. d/b/a Garco Industrial Park. By letter dated June 18, 
1991, a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1, on behalf of Garco I informed 
Reagan there was no valid lease for Reagan's sign on Garco's property, and that if Reagan had any 
interest it should contact Garco to negotiate a lease. 
2. Reagan did not respond to my letter, either by producing a lease, by claiming the 
existence of a written lease, by expressing any interest to me in negotiating for a written lease, or 
otherwise. Reagan simply ignored my letter. 
3. Since Reagan dismantled its sign and mutilated its sign structure, Garco has never 
leased the premises, or any part thereof, to any outdoor advertiser, or to any person or entity for 
the purpose of erecting or displaying outdoor advertising. Except for Reagan, Garco has never 
negotiated with anyone for the lease of the premises for outdoor advertising. 
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4. Garco is a landlord, and rents building space to its tenants. In 1995 Garco leased 
building space on the premises to Alan Jenkins pursuant to a month-to month verbal agreement. 
Our agreement did not not include the lease of outdoor advertising space. To the best of my 
knowledge, Jenkins is not in the outdoor advertising business. Jenkins occupied and continues to 
Dccupy building space he has leased. 
5. I am informed that after he became a building tenant, Jenkins caused a sign or signs 
;o be painted on the premises. Jenkins did not lease the building side for that purpose, did not ask 
?or a lease, did not ask Garco's permission to paint any signs and did not have Garco's permission 
;o paint any signs. Jenkins simply acted on his own, without Garco's knowledge or consent. Garco 
lever bargained for or received any consideration whatsoever for Jenkins having caused any signs 
o be painted. Jenkins has never paid nor offered to pay Garco for outdoor advertising space, or 
br the use, waste or defacement of the premises. 
6. Except for any signs Jenkins may have caused to be painted without Garco's 
mowledge or consent, neither Garco nor any other person or entity has erected, attempted to erect, 
>r offered to erect any outdoor advertising on the premises. 
' DATED this / 7 day of November, 1997. 
Elaine Crossley 3 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this _/7_ day of November, 1997. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify on November f / , 1997 a true and correct copy of the above was served by first-
class mail to: 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Leslie Van Frank 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
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GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK 
3994 S. 300 W. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
(801) 466-3361 
June 18, 1991 
Mr. Reagan 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 
1775 North 900 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
Dear Mr. Reagan, 
We are the new owners of the property located at 3994 S. 300 W. After reviewing 
our records, there is not a valid lease in our file for the sign located at 3986 S. 1-15. 
It is our intention, as the new owners, to negotiate a lease for a sign. If you have 
any interest in this matter, please contact myself to make arrangements to negotiate a new 
lease. 
Please make a note that the amount of rent in the past is inadequate and would need 
to be increased substantially. 
If you have and questions, please contact our office at (801) 466-3361. 
Sincerely, 
E. Crossley 0 
Secretary 
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Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690) 
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaim 
Plaintiff R.O.A. General, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a " 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ; 
Plaintiff, •] 
VS. " '•", 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ; 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ] 
Defendant. ) 
) ORDER AND 
) JUDGMENT DISMISSING 
) PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
) Civil No. 960906388 
1 Judge William B. Bohling 
i 
The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the plaintiffs 
complaint having come on for hearing before the Hon. William B. Bohling on Monday, November 
24, 1997, the plaintiff being represented by its counsel, F. Mark Hansen, the defendant being 
represented by its counsel, Leslie Van Frank of and for COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C., 
the Court having reviewed the file, including the pleadings, affidavits, and references to deposition 
testimony, having heard the argument of counsel, and for good cause otherwise appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
F££D DISTRICT COUkT 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 2 9 1997 
SAL^i L>t;\c:UUOifliY 
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1. The Court finds that there are no material factual disputes with respect to 
whether there was a lease between defendant and plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest The undisputed 
evidence is that there was a lease between defendant and plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest. The face 
of the lease document itself does not require removal of the sign foundation of which plaintiff has 
complained. Nor does the face of the lease document require that the defendant restore the property 
to its former condition upon vacating the property. Therefore, as a matter of law, defendant did not 
and has not trespassed on plaintiffs property by leaving the sign foundation in place when defendant 
removed the sign face and poles from the plaintiffs property. Plaintiffs First Cause of Action is 
therefore dismissed with prejudice. 
2. The Court further finds that there are no material factual disputes as to 
whether defendant returned possession of the property to the plaintiff prior to plaintiffs service of 
a Notice to Quit. Defendant returned possession to plaintiff when defendant completed removal of 
the sign faces and sign structure from plaintiffs property no later than June 19, 1995. Plaintiffs 
Notice of Unlawful Detainer was served more than a year later, on July 29, 1996. As a matter of law, 
defendant is not liable for unlawful detainer of the property, having returned possession of the 
property to plaintiff more than a year prior to the plaintiffs Notice of Unlawful Detainer. Plaintiffs 
Second Cause of Action is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
3. The Court finds that there are factual issues with respect to whether the five-
year non-compete clause in the lease constitutes a reasonable period of time, and does not rule on 
the issue of whether the non-compete clause is enforceable. 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4. With respect to plaintiffs Third Cause of Action for intentional interference 
with economic relations, in order to prevail on its claim, plaintiff must prove that defendant's alleged 
acts were undertaken either (1) for a predominant improper purpose, or (2) by improper means, and 
that these acts caused injury to the plaintiff. It is undisputed that, because of the 500 foot spacing 
requirements of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, defendant's placement of the new sign on the 
neighboring property prevented plaintiff from leasing its property to any other outdoor advertiser. 
However, even if the Court implies as true that the plaintiff s purpose in locating the sign as it did 
on the nighboring property was to prevent plaintiff from erecting its own sign, there is no evidence 
that any injury to plaintiff occasioned by defendant's move of the sign to the neighboring property 
was an end in and of itself, designed to harm plaintiff merely for the sake of injury alone. Instead, 
the defendant's move of the sign to its present location constituted legitimate competitive activity, 
consistent with an effort by defendant to achieve the long-range economic goal of maximizing its 
profits from its outdoor advertising signs in the area by forestalling competitive activity on the 
plaintiffs property. Thus, there is no evidence of improper purpose. The Court also finds that there 
are no disputed facts material to a determination that defendant did not act by improper means. At 
the hearing, plaintiff abandoned its arguments that the lease negotiations and the defendant's threats 
of legal redress in the event plaintiff utilized self-help in removing the sign constituted improper 
means. With respect to the plaintiffs arguments that defendant utilized improper means in obtaining 
its permit to move the sign to the neighboring property, the Court notes that it is undisputed that after 
lengthy lease negotiations between plaintiff and defendant, on February 23, 1995, plaintiff advised 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
defendant that it had "elected to pursue other options" and demanded that defendant immediately 
remove the sign. Defendant contracted with the neighboring property owner on April 20, 1995, and 
applied to UDOT to move the sign shortly thereafter. There is no evidence that plaintiff took any 
substantial steps during that interim period to attempt to secure its own permit for a competing sign. 
Nor is there any evidence before the Court that the defendant's R-407 permit was improperly granted 
or that the defendant's two signs being erected at the same time for some three weeks caused any 
injury to plaintiff. Therefore, there is no evidence that defendant acted by improper means in 
moving its sign to the neighboring property or that the defendant's act in moving the sign was the 
cause of plaintiffs inability to procure its own permit. In the absence of evidence of improper 
purpose or improper means, and in the absence of any evidence that defendant's acts caused any 
injury to the plaintiff, plaintiffs Third Cause of Action must be and is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
5. Plaintiff has offered no evidence that defendant engaged in price 
discrimination or sold anything at less than cost. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 
the Unfair Practices Act. Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
6. Plaintiff having failed to prevail on any of its substantive causes of action, the 
Fifth Cause of Action for punitive damages is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
4 
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DATED this (0. day of November, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
£V Ulfi& 
Hon. William B. Bohling 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
F. Mark Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
-An. 
mailed, U.S. First class, postage prepaid, on this <£(= day of November, 1997, to the following 
F. Mark Hansen 
404 East 4500 South, Suite B-34 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
F:\LESLIE\NOV97\ROAUPC.ORD 
5 
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<JI\ I U l l Vf XL. ^ 
F. Mark Hansen, #5078 
404 East 4500 South, Suite B-34 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 266-2882 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ni£DnltrT 
• Toi.rT n o w * 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTA 
U.P.C, INC. d/b/a 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO REVISE ORDER 
AND JUDGMENT DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 960906388 
Judge William B. Bohling 
U.P.C., Inc. d/b/a Garco Industrial Park (Garco) moves the Court for an Order revising the 
Court's Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint. This Motion is supported by the 
accompanying Memorandum. 
DATED this^< ' day of January, 1998. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify on January c ^ f, 1998 a true and correct copy of the above was served by first-
class mail to: 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Leslie Van Frank 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
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F. Mark Hansen, #5078 
404 East 4500 South, Suite B-34 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 266-2882 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
FILED 
o i t m - T C013R" 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UT 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a ] 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ; 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ; 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ] 
Defendant. ) 
> MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION TO REVISE ORDER 
) AND JUDGMENT DISMISSING 
) PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
) Civil No. 960906388 
I Judge William B. Bohling 
U.P.C., Inc. d/b/a Garco Industrial Park (Garco) submits this Memorandum of points and 
authorities in support of its Motion to revise the Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but 
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination by the 
court that there is iio just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry 
of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other 
form of decision, however, designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims 
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action 
as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject 
to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and 
the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
The Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint does not adjudicate all pending 
claims, and includes no direction for the entry of final judgment as to any claims. Under Rule 54(b) 
the Order does not terminate the action as to any claims, and is subject to revision at any time. 
Garco respectfully requests the Court to revise the Order for the reasons set forth below. 
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1. PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF - TRESPASS. 
The Court's findings of fact on summary judgment respecting Garco's trespass claim — that 
there was a lease between Reagan and Garco's predecessor, and that the lease did not on its face 
require Reagan to remove its sign when the lease ended — do not lead to a conclusion that as a 
matter of law Reagan had a right, after any leasehold had ended, to cut its sign in two and occupy 
Garco's property in perpetuity with the wasted portion. 
First, Reagan's duties are defined by whatever lease Reagan had with Garco, not with 
Garco's predecessor. Garco incorporates here by reference its November 17, 1997 Memorandum 
in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, showing Reagan had no binding 
written lease with Garco. * Because under Rule 54(b) the Order adjudicates fewer than all the 
pending claims, and includes no determination and direction for the entry of final judgment as to 
fewer than all of the claims, the Order does not terminate the action as to Garco's claims and does 
not make moot Garco's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Court must rule on Garco's 
Motion before entry of any final order. The points and authorities raised there show it is Garco, 
not Reagan, who is entitled to summary judgment. At a minimum there are genuine issues of 
material fact precluding summary judgment in Reagan's favor. Construing the facts and reasonable 
inferences in Garco's favor as the Court must do on this motion, Reagan occupied the premises 
under an unwritten monthly tenancy and is not entitled to enforce any term of the written lease 
against Garco. 
Second, the facts show a lengthy dispute and negotiations between Garco and Reagan about 
the terms of any lease. When the parties were unable to resolve their dispute, Garco asked and 
Reagan expressly agreed to remove the sign foundation. [Joe Kingston depo Ex. 17, 18, attached] 
Reagan agreed in writing, signed by Dewey Reagan himself: 
1
 Garco's Motion requested a hearing pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(b), to be held the same time 
as any hearing on Reagan's motion. Although Garco's motion included facts, evidence and 
argument supporting summary judgment in favor of Garco rather than Reagan, the Court had not Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I am writing you this letter to follow up on the discussion we had last week. During 
the course of that conversation you informed my that you would like to have Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising remove its sign structure from your property located at 3986 
South adjacent to the Interstate as soon as possible. At that time I stated that we 
would begin removing the structure immediately and that is the manner in which we 
will proceed. 
Unless I hear from you within the next 5 working days, I will assume that you want 
us to remove the sign structure and we will begin to do so. In addition, in order to 
remove the foundation we will need to tie up your parking lot for 3 to 4 days. 
/s/ Dewey Reagan 
Whatever the original rental terms, Reagan's letter shows the parties thereafter modified 
their agreement, imposing on Reagan an express duty to remove its sign foundation. Reagan's 
ongoing breach of that duty is a trespass. 
Third, even if Reagan's lease document controlled, Reagan would still be in trespass. 
Reagan's argument is based on a faulty premise the lease contained no "implied covenant." That 
argument is contrary to Utah law. All leases include implied terms. One implied term is that a 
lease incorporates the applicable substantive law. Beehive Med. Electronics v. Industrial Comm'n, 
583 P.2d 53, 60 (Utah 1978): Washington Nat. Ins. V. Sherwood Assoc. 795 P.2d 665, 669 (Utah 
App. 1990). This includes the law in Garco's memoranda on the cross motions for summary 
judgment, for brevity's sake incorporated here by reference. That law is an implied term of the 
lease and obligated Reagan to remove its entire structure. 
Under controlling Utah law Reagan was also subject to a specific implied covenant and duty, 
directly on point, that a tenant may not commit waste: 
They do not contend that there is any express covenant therein that a seller, as 
tenant, will not cause waste or damage on the premises, but they urge that there is 
an implied covenant in any landlord-tenant relationship that the tenant will not 
commit such waste. With that we agree. 
Cluff v. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498, 499 (Utah 1976) (emphasis added). Reagan was under an 
affirmative duty, implied by law as part of its lease, not to commit waste or otherwise damage 
Garco's reversionary interest. Reagan breached that duty by cutting its sign in two and leaving the 
worse than worthless (to Garco) portion on the premises. 
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Even assuming it applies, Reagan's lease document must be construed as a whole, with the 
purpose to effectuate the parties' intention. Cecala v. Thorlev, 764 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah App. 
1988). Paragraph 6 provides, "Lessee is and shall remain the owner of all signs and improvements 
placed by Lessee on said property and has the right to remove or change the same at any time." 
Read literally and out of context, the provision would allow Reagan to leave its sign in place after 
the lease ended, and return even decades later to reclaim its property or even change the sign. But 
no reasonable lessee or lessor would contemplate the phrase "at any time" to mean literally "at any 
time" from now to eternity. No reasonable person would construe the document as a whole to allow 
a lessee to keep its personal property on the premises and to remove it, if at all, "at any time" in 
the indefinite future after the lease ended. It would be error so to construe the document. 
Instead, the provision must be construed in harmony with the document's other provisions, 
including provisions that (a) the lease was for a fixed, limited term; (b) only during the rental term, 
Reagan could erect signs including necessary structures (but not structures without signs); (c) during 
the rental term, but not after, Reagan would pay to occupy the premises; and (d) the document 
recognized the lessor's right to lease the identical premises to others at a future date. 
Any ambiguity in the document is construed against Reagan as its drafter. Holley v. 
Federal-American Partners, 507 P.2d 381, 383 (Utah 1973). Properly construed, paragraph 6 
applied only during the rental term, and allowed Reagan to remove or change its sign only during 
the rental term. Paragraph 6 is silent as to what happens after the rental term ends. The lease gave 
Reagan no express right to keep its personal property on the premises after the lease ends, and no 
such right should be implied. That is the only construction, taking the document as a whole, 
consistent with the parties' intent. 
The law implies in every lease a covenant and duty of good faith, which cannot be waived 
or disclaimed. Olympus Hills Center, LTD. v. Smith's Food, 889 P.2d 445, 450 & note 4 (Utah 
App. 1994). A party can breach that covenant even in exercise of an express right. "The question 
is whether, upon a motion for summary judgment ..., reasonable minds could differ as to whether 
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[the lessee] wrongfully exercised this power for a reason beyond the risks that [the lessor] assumed 
in its lease with [the lessee] or for a reason inconsistent with [the lessor's] 'justified expectations.'". 
Id. at 451. Construing the facts and reasonable inferences in Garco's favor, Reagan's actions were 
inconsistent with Garco's assumed risks and justified expectations. Reagan could not, in reliance 
on a right to remove the sign structure during the rental term, take part of the sign after the lease 
ended, make the remainder useless to Garco, and retain ownership of but leave the useless portion, 
thereby remaining in possession of the premises in perpetuity. Given the law cited in Garco's 
memoranda on cross-motions for summary judgment and the parties' expressed intentions as 
evidenced by the parties' correspondence, the implied covenant of good faith required Reagan either 
to remove its entire sign structure, as it had agreed in writing to do, or to abandon the structure to 
Garco in a useable condition. When Reagan instead cut its sign in two and left Garco with two 
useless (at least to Garco) huge chunks of concrete and steel, Reagan damaged Garco's reversionary 
interest in the premises, an outcome well beyond Garco's justified expectations. The resulting 
injury is an ongoing trespass. 
Under controlling Utah law, any lease subjected Reagan to implied covenants and duties not 
to commit waste or otherwise injure Garco's reversionary interest in the premises, and to exercise 
good faith in the removal or abandonment of its property when the lease ended. Reagan, having 
agreed and undertaken to remove the sign structure rather than abandon it to Garco, is under a 
continuing duty to do just that. Reagan's conduct breached those covenants and duties. Reagan's 
conduct is a trespass rather than waste, because Reagan's conduct occurred not during the rental 
term, but after any right Reagan had to the premises had already expired. The Court should 
reconsider its prior ruling, and hold Reagan liable on Garco's trespass claim. 
2. PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF - UNLAWFUL DETAINER. 
The finding of fact that "Defendant returned possession to plaintiff when defendant 
completed removal of the sign faces and sign structure from plaintiff's property" is not supported 
bv the evidence. Under the terms of Reagan's claimed lease, Reagan to this day remains the proud 
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owner of its sign foundation. For the reasons stated above, Reagan the is under a continuing duty 
to remove its entire sign structure including the foundation. 
It is a simple fact of physics that two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time. 
The sign foundation remains Reagan's personal property and is still at the same location on Garco's 
property as it has been since 1975. Aside from legal obstacles, before another advertiser could 
occupy the same location it would first have to remove Reagan's personal property from that 
location. Reagan, far from having "completed removal of the sign structure from Garco's 
property," has left a major portion of the structure in place on the premises, remains in possession 
of the same location on the premises it has occupied since 1975, and has not yet returned possession 
of that location to Garco. Garco having served the required statutory notice, Reagan is liable for 
unlawful detainer. 
3. PLAINTIFF'S THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF - INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE. 
A claim for intentional interference requires that the tortfeasor either used improper means 
or acted for a predominant improper purpose. The Court found Reagan moved its sign to maximize 
its profits in the area "by forestalling competitive activity on the plaintiffs property." Contrary to 
being "legitimate competitive activity," that is not only forbidden by both Utah and federal law, it 
is a crime. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2, provides: 
1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal ... 
2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty 
of a felony ... 
The prohibited acts, besides being felonies, subject a corporate violator to fines of up to $10 million 
per act. Similarly, the Utah Antitrust Act, Utah Code Ann. §76-10-914 provides: 
(1) Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy 
in restraint of trade or commerce is declared to be illegal. 
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, 
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize, any part of 
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Under U.C. A. §§76-10-918 and -919 the proscribed conduct subjects a corporate violator to civil 
penalties of up to $500,000 for each violation, in addition to an award of treble damages and 
attorney fees to injured persons, making such conduct very much illegal indeed. 
A party uses improper means "where the means used to interfere with a party's economic 
relations are contrary to law, such as violations of statutes, regulations, or recognized common-law 
rules.M Leigh Furniture v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293, 311 (Utah 1982). Reagan moved its sign in 
performing a contract with Mollerup. An agreement to do an act for the specific purpose of 
forestalling all competitive activity on Garco's property is by definition a contract, combination or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade. An act that intentionally eliminates competition in an area is by 
definition an act of monopoly. The conclusion "there is no evidence that defendant acted by 
improper means" is contrary to the Court's specific finding that Reagan acted to forestall 
competitive activity on Garco's property. The findings from which the Court concludes there was 
no improper purpose establish violations of the antitrust statutes and therefore show improper 
means. Reagan employed improper means as a matter of law by violating the antitrust statutes. At 
a minimum, Garco is entitled to a trial on the issue. 
The findings from which the Court concludes there was no improper purpose are based on 
disputed issues of fact precluding summary judgment. There was no evidence presented from which 
the Court could conclude as a matter of law that forestalling competitive activity on Garco's 
property was reasonably calculated to cause an increase in Reagan's profits. Even if that was a 
legitimate purpose, a party's intent, especially an undisclosed subjective intent, is almost always a 
question of fact precluding summary judgment. The self-serving affidavits of Reagan contradict 
those of Garco's witnesses, and raise issues of fact including the credibility of Reagan's witnesses 
that cannot be resolved by summary judgment. It is undisputed that at least one purpose of Reagan 
was to injure Garco. That needs only be a predominant purpose, not the exclusive or even the 
controlling purpose. Garco is entitled to a trial on the disputed facts as to whether injuring Garco 
was at least one predominant purpose. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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4. PLAINTIFFS FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF - UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT. 
In light of the evidence and findings having come to Garco's attention through Reagan's 
motion for summary judgment, Garco will likely either move to amend the Complaint to substitute 
an action against Reagan under Utah Code Ann. §76-10-919 for violations of the Utah Antitrust 
Act, or because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §15 over federal 
antitrust violations, will bring a separate federal action for violations of both the federal and state 
antitrust laws. 
5. PLAINTIFF'S FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF - PUNITIVE DAMAGES, 
As shown above, Garco is entitled to try its tort claims against Reagan, and is therefore 
likewise entitled to try its claim for punitive damages. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Rule 54(b), the Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint is not a final 
adjudication as to any of Garco's claims, and does not make moot Garco's own Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on those claims. The Court should revise its Order to accurately reflect the 
facts and controlling law as set forth above, and should rule on Garco's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and/or require a trial on Garco's claims before entering any final order on those claims. 
DO 
DATED this—^ / day of January, 1998. 
..Attorney for^Krintiff t 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify on J a n u a r y ^ / , 1998 a true and correct copy of the above was served by first-
class mail to: 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Leslie Van Frank 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
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Carl E. Kingston 
ATTORNEY AT W W 
3212 SOUTH STATE STREET 
P.O. BOX 15809 
SALT U K E CfTY, UTAH 84115 
TELEPHONE (801)486-1458 
FAX (801) 487-3971 
February 23, 1995 
Daniel A. Reagan 
1775 North 900 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Dear Mr. Reagan: 
I received your letter dated February 15, 1995 and passed it on to 
U.P.C. and also to Elden Kingston. We were disappointed in your letter, 
although not greatly surprised. We hoped that we would have some 
kind of an offer that we could deal with, but instead, you want to go 
back to "before square one." Since we have no desire to start all over 
with negotiations that have already been unproductive for over two 
years, my clients have elected to pursue other options with regard to 
both the 3986 South 1-15 property and the 3745 South State property. 
Accordingly, please accept this letter as official notification that 
your State Street sign constitutes a trespass and must be removed 
immediately. In addition, the sign must also be removed from the 3986 
South 1-15 property before July 8, 1995. We expressly reserve and any all 
claims for damages we may have against Reagan National Advertising, 
Inc., arising from trespass or otherwise. 
Very truly yours, 
Carl E. Kingston 
CEK/kj 
EXHIBIT 
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June 12, 1995 
Carl E. Kingston 
Attorney at Law 
3 212 South State 
P.O. Box 15809 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Dear Carl: 
I am writing you this letter to follow up on the discussion we had 
last week. During the course of that conversation you informed me 
that you would like to have Reagan Outdoor Advertising remove its 
sign structure from your property located at 3 98 6 South adjacent to 
the Interstate as soon as possible. At that time I stated that we 
would begin removing the structure immediately and that is the 
manner in which we will proceed. 
Unless I hear from you within the next 5 working days, I will 
assume that you want us to remove the sign structure and we will 
begin to do so. In addition, in order to remove the foundation we 
will, need to tie up your parking lot for 3 to 4 days. Thank you 
for your time. 
Sincerely yours, 
Dewey A. Reagan 
DAR/de 
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Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690) 
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No • 49. J3) ^ 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGA^* 
525 East First South, Fifth¥loor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaim 
PlaintiffR.O.A. General, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a : 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ) 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. dba ] 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ) 
Defendant. ] 
1 RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
) MOTION TO REVISE ORDER AND 
) JUDGMENT DISMISSING 
) PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
> Civil No. 960906388 
1 Judge William B. Bohling 
Defendant (ccReagan"), by and through its undersigned counsel, files the following Response 
to Plaintiffs ("Garco's") Motion to Revise Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint. 
L GARCO HAS FAILED TO IDENTIFY ANY CONVINCING REASON 
FOR THE COURT TO ALTER ITS PREVIOUS RULING. 
Garco has filed what it calls a ccMotion to Revise Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs 
Complaint." The substance of the motion, however, is not to revise the order and judgment, but 
instead, to reconsider and reverse the prior ruling that dismissed Garco's complaint against Reagan. 
A A f\ A 
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The motion should be treated as what it is, i.e., a motion to reconsider. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields 
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310, fa.2 (Utah App. 1994). 
While motions to reconsider are allowed under Rule 54(b) when a final judgment has not yet 
been entered, a litigant who hopes to change the court's mind should be prepared to demonstrate that 
at least one of the following factors is present: 
(1) the matter is presented in a 'different light' or under 'different circumstances;' (2) there 
has been a change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new evidence; (4) "manifest 
injustice" will result if the court does not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court needs to 
correct its own errors; or (6) an issue was inadequately briefed when first contemplated by 
the court. 
Trembly v. Mrs Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d at 1311, quoting State v. O Weill, 848 P.2d 694, 697, fa. 
2 (Utah App.) cert den., 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). Garco has not only failed to cite to this 
controlling law, it has also completely failed to demonstrate that any of the Trembly factors is present. 
As the record reflects, Reagan filed its motion for summary judgment on August 8, 1997. 
Garco filed its opposition to Reagan's motion on August 21, 1997 (hereinafter "Garco's 8/21/97 
Memo"). The hearing on Reagan's motion for summary judgment was held on November 24, 1997. 
Some six (6) days prior to the hearing, Garco filed its own cross-motion for summary judgment 
(hereinafter "Garco's 11/17/97 Memo"). While Reagan had not had time to brief Garco's cross-
motion at the time of the November 24th hearing, Garco's counsel nevertheless argued most if not 
all of the facts and the legal arguments that had been set forth in that cross-motion. The Court still 
granted Reagan's motion, despite Garco's last-minute presentation of additional facts and legal 
arguments in violation of Rules 56 and Rule 4-501. Thus, between Garco's original opposition to 
Reagan's motion and the cross-motion that Garco filed and argued at the November 24th hearing, 
2 
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the Court heard and ruled upon most if not all of the facts and legal arguments that Garco now seeks 
to have the Court reconsider by way of the present motion. Nothing that Garco has argued in its 
present motion presents any convincing reason to alter the Court's previous ruling. 
TRESPASS 
In its prior ruling, the Court noted that the undisputed facts revealed that Reagan and Garco's 
predecessor had a valid lease for the erection of and maintenance of an outdoor advertising sign on 
the Garco property. This fact was based not only on the affidavits that Reagan submitted, but also 
on Garco's admissions in its complaint, and Garco does not dispute this finding in its present motion. 
The Court also noted that the lease between Reagan and Garco's predecessor nowhere on its face 
required Reagan to remove the foundation at the end of the lease term, nor did it require that Reagan 
restore the premises to their pre-lease condition upon vacating the property. From these undisputed 
facts, the Court found as a matter of law that Reagan did not trespass on Garco's property by leaving 
the sign foundation in place. Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp,, 141 F.Supp. 93 
(D.Mass. 1990) (trespass requires an unprivileged, intentional intrusion on land in possession of 
another. When one is lawfully in possession when alleged harm is introduced, then there is no cause 
of action of trespass). 
In its present motion, Garco reiterates many of the same arguments that it made in opposing 
Reagan's motion for summary judgment on this issue. First, Garco argues that Reagan's duties 
cannot be defined by the lease Reagan had with Garco's predecessor. (Garco's 1/29/98 Memo, p. 
2). Garco argued essentially the same point on pages 11-13 of its 8/21/97 Memo. The Court has 
already rejected this argument, recognizing the legal principles set forth in Wellesley Hills, supra, and 
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the other cases to which Reagan cited in its previous briefs, i.e., that one cannot commit trespass 
when one is in lawful possession of the premises at the time the alleged harm is introduced. 
Second, Garco argues that the agreement between Reagan and Garco was modified by Dewey 
Reagan's letter that indicated that "in order to remove the foundation, [Reagan] will need to tie up 
your parking lot for 3 or 4 days." (Garco's 1/29/98 Memo, pps. 2-3). Garco made this same 
argument at p. 15 of its 11/17/97 Memo. Garco has never identified any consideration or benefit that 
it gave to Reagan in exchange for this alleged modification.1 Modification of a contract requires 
consideration, just as does the original contract. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 551 P.2d 
1288, 1290 (Or. 1976). Without additional consideration, there cannot be any modification of the 
original contract. Garco's argument was unconvincing at the time the Court granted Reagan's 
summary judgment motion, and still constitutes no reason for the Court to change its previous ruling. 
Third, Garco argues that even if the lease between Reagan and Garco's predecessor was 
controlling, the lease still contained "implied terms," including one not to commit waste and one to 
act in good faith. Once again, Garco made these same arguments (at least the one regarding waste) 
in its prior pleadings. (Garco's 11/17/97 Memo, p. 15). But as Reagan pointed out in its prior 
memoranda, unless there is an express covenant requiring a tenant to remove the improvements at 
the end of the lease, the law will simply not imply one. See, Sherman Co. v. United States of America, 
258 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1958) and Duvanel v. Sinclair Refining Co., 227 P.2d 88, 89 (Kan. 1951) 
1
 Any alleged settlement of the parties' negotiations over a new lease cannot constitute 
consideration for modification of the old lease. Garco gave nothing to Reagan — the lease was 
expiring on July 8, 1995, which is the date by which Garco insisted the sign be removed. Exhibit 
17 to J. Kingston depo). And Garco "expressly reservefd] any and all claims for damages." Id. 
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(both cited in Reagan's 9/5/ 97 Reply Memorandum). This would include any implied duty to remove 
the structures, regardless of how such duty is characterized: 
The nub of [the landlord]'s contention is that, under paragraph 8 [of the lease], the 
[tenant] was authorized to remove all of a particular fixture, addition, or structure, including 
the concrete foundations thereof but that it could not remove a part of any such fixture, 
addition, or structure, leaving portions which were unusuable and expensive to remove. [The 
landlord] poses the questioa* "if the [tenant] had removed the roof from each of the buildings, 
wouldn't the Court be justified in saying that it must pay for the removal of the remaining 
part?" Acknowledging that there was no express covenant to complete the removal of any 
structures, [the landlord] argues that such a covenant is to be implied. 
The lease in question gave the [tenant] the right to remove improvements at the 
expiration of the lease, but not the duty to do so.There is no express covenant requiring the 
[tenant] to restore the premises to the same condition as that existing at the beginning of the 
term. Under these circumstances, there is no implied covenant of the kind suggested by 
appellant. The [tenant] is not liable for damage occasioned by reason of partial removal of 
improvements, unless there was negligence in accomplishing such removal. 
Sherman Co. v. United States, 258 F.2d at 881 (C.J. Hamley concurring). 
The Sherman tenant had the right, during the existence of the lease, to add improvements, 
make alterations and so forth, which would remain the property of the tenant and could be removed 
at any time prior to expiration of the lease. Id. Reagan had the same right under the terms of its own 
lease, i.e., to erect the sign and then, as the owner thereof, to change or remove the sign at any time. 
(Garco's Memo, p. 4). Having been authorized by the lease to change or remove the sign, Reagan 
did not commit waste by cutting it down. See, e.g., Turman v. Safeway Stores, Inc.y 317 P.2d 302 
(Mont. 1957) (no waste committed where lease authorizes tenant's act). Thus, regardless of how 
Garco wishes to characterizes the duty it wishes Reagan had undertaken, Reagan had no such duty 
under the terms of the lease. The Court has properly ruled on this issue, and nothing that Garco has 
raised changes Reagan's duties. 
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UNLAWFUL DETAINER 
Garco stands steadfastly by its argument made in its 8/32/97 Memo at p. 16 that the existence 
of the sign foundation on Garco's property means that Reagan is in continuing possession of Garco's 
property. The Court has already rejected this argument, reflecting in its prior ruling the undisputed 
feet that Reagan removed its sign faces and structure from Garco's property no later than June 19, 
1995, more than a year prior to Garco's July 29, 1996 Notice of Unlawful Detainer. From those 
facts, and the Court's prior legal conclusion that Reagan had no duty to remove the foundation at the 
expiration of the lease, the Court properly found that Garco had failed to state a claim under the 
unlawful detainer statute. As Reagan pointed out in its prior pleadings, that statute is not even at 
issue in this case — the statute only provides a summaiy remedy so that a landlord can quickly recover 
possession without resorting to self-help, and it has no affect at all on the contractual covenants 
between the landlord and tenant. See, e.g., P.K Investment v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah 
1991) (warranty of habitability can be at issue in unlawful detainer action). 
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS: 
This tort requires evidence that Reagan's acts were taken (1) for a predominant improper 
purpose, or (2) by improper means. Leigh Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). Garco 
argues that Reagan acted both for an improper purpose and by improper means because any move 
of the sign to the Mollerup property to prevent Garco from competing with Reagan constitutes a 
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Utah Antitrust Act. Garco mentioned these statutes 
in prior pleadings (Garco's 8/21/97 Memo, p. 19, incorporated in Garco's 11/17/97 Memo at p. 16 
by reference) and has elaborated on them in this most recent motion. But nothing that Garco has said 
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should change the Court's mind. The purpose of the Sherman Antitrust Act (and the almost identical 
Utah Antitrust Act) is to '"rectify the injury to consumers caused by diminished competition Thus, 
the plaintiff must allege, not only an injury to himself, but an injury to the market as well." Car 
Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., IAS F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). The 
Seventh Circuit went on to note that: 
Tortious activities in the form, for example, of unfair competition do not contravene the 
antitrust laws unless accompanied by the requisite anticompetitive effect. Losing business to 
a competitor is an inevitable consequence of the economic system that the Sherman Act was 
designed to protect; some enterprises will prevail and others will not, but it is the function of 
§1 [of the Sherman Antitrust Act] to compensate the unfortunate only when their demise is 
accompanied by a generalized injury to the market. As the Supreme Court has aptly stated, 
the antitrust laws were designed to protect competition, not merely competitors. 
Id, at 1109 (emphasis added). Reagan's act in moving the sign, even if it was solely to prevent Garco 
from competing next door, simply does not constitute a violation of the antitrust statutes. 
UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES: 
Garco does not even attempt to present any new facts or evidence to urge the Court to 
reverse its ruling with respect to these issues, and argues only that for the same reasons Garco has 
previously set forth, the Court should reverse itself. As noted above, Garco has set forth no 
compelling reasons at all for the Court to reverse itself on any ground or on any of Garco's causes 
of action, including any alleged violation of the Unfair Practices Act and for punitive damages. 
7 
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H. CONSIDERATION OF GARCO'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IS BARRED BY THE COURT'S PRIOR RULING. 
Garco asserts that the Court's previous order dismissing Garco's Complaint is not a final 
adjudication as to any of Garco's claims, and that its own Motion for Summary Judgment has not 
been mooted by the Court's prior ruling. This is incorrect. Since the Court has already granted 
judgment against Garco dismissing the complaint in full, the issues raised in Garco's motion for 
summary judgment with respect to the complaint are barred by the law of the case doctrine. Salt 
Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 44-45 (Utah App. 1988). See, also, 
Osguthorpe v. Osbuthorpe, 872 P.2d 1057 (Utah App. 1994) (case is moot when the requested relief 
cannot affect the rights of the litigants.). Unless the Court sets aside the judgment it has already 
granted, thus reinstating Garco's claims, consideration of Garco's summary judgment motion would 
be a useless and meaningless act. 
The only motion before the Court is Garco's motion for reconsideration. Because Garco has 
failed to present any new material evidence or to present the case in a different light, the motion to 
reconsider should be denied. And the summary judgment motion with respect to the claims set forth 
in Garco's complaint should be considered only if the Court grants Garco's reconsideration motion. 
In that event, Reagan reserves the right to oppose the motion, not only by filing a memorandum in 
opposition thereto, but also filing a motion to strike the inadmissible statements set forth in the 
affidavits that Garco has filed in support thereof. 
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CONCLUSION 
Rule 54(b) does allow a court to "readjust prior rulings in complex cases as subsequent 
developments in the case might suggest.'5 Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d at 
44, fh. 5. As the Utah Court of Appeals has noted: 
There are good reasons for institutionalizing more leeway for reconsideration in the multiple-
party or multiple-claim case. When the entire case has been argued and decided, the judge 
has presumably heard all there is to hear and the parties have presumably offered all 
appropriate guidance. Once the judge has decided, the system assumes he or she has decided 
correctly and would decide the same way again. Reconsideration requests in that situation 
are frowned on. The occasional reversal on appeal is a price the system is pleased to bear in 
exchange for being free of the burden of reconsideration in the vast majority of cases where 
the correct result was reached and would be reached again on reconsideration, re-
reconsideration, and reconsideration of the re-reconsideration. 
Id. Recognizing that judges are free to change their mind until a decision is formally rendered, the 
James Constructors Court noted that: 
. . . the 'law of the case' doctrine is employed to avoid delay and to prevent injustice. "The 
purpose of [this] doctrine is that in the interest of economy of time and efficiency of 
procedure, it is desireable to avoid the delays and the difficulties involved in repetitious 
contentions and rulings upon the same propositions in the same case." Richardson v. Grand 
Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977). See Condor v. AX. Williams & Assocs., Inc., 
739 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). "Although a trial court is not inexorably bound by 
its own precedents, prior relevant rulings made in the same case are generally to be followed." 
People ex. rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 666 P.2d 550, 553 (Colo. 1983). 
The law of the case doctrine is particularly applicable, when in the case of summary 
judgment, a subsequent motion fails to present the case in a different light, such as when no 
new material evidence is introduced. Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d 
735, 736 (Utah 1984); Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d at 397; Hammer v. 
Gibbons & Reed Co., 29 Utah 2d 415, 510 P.2d 1104, 1105 (Utah 1973). 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d at 45 (emphasis added). Where, as in the case 
at bar, Garco has not presented any legal theories that have not already been considered and has 
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presented no material facts that were not before this Court at the time of the original judgment, the 
Court should refuse to reconsider its prior ruling and deny Garco's motion. 
DATED this H 1 ^ day of February, 1998. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Leslie Van Frank 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Counterclaim Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
mailed, U.S. First class, postage prepaid, on this fP^day of February, 1998, to the following: 
F. Mark Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3£&lfetaltfX]^^ 404 East 4500 South ' 
Salt Lake City, Utah**M»n 84107 
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F. Mark Hansen, #5078 
404 East 4500 South, Suite B-34 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 266-2882 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a ; 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ; 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ; 
Defendant. ) 
i REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) OF MOTION TO REVISE ORDER 
) AND JUDGMENT DISMISSING 
> PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
1 Civil No. 960906388 
) Judge William B. Bohling 
U.P.C., Inc. d/b/a Garco Industrial Park respectfully submits this Reply Memorandum in 
support of Plaintiffs Motion to Revise Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
"LAW OF THE CASE" AND THE RIGHT TO REVIEW OF NONFINAL DECISIONS. 
Rule 54(b) clearly allows a Court to revise all nonfinal decisions, including decisions 
granting summary judgment: 
We hold that pursuant to the provisions of rule 54(b), because the summary 
judgment was "subject to revision/1 a motion to reconsider is a reasonable means of 
requesting such a revision and is therefore permitted. 
Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993). 
One of the very cases Reagan relies on flatly contradicts Reagan's argument that review is 
barred by the "law of the case" doctrine. The doctrine does no such thing. See Trembly v. Mrs. 
Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah App. 1994): 
A fj t\ A a f; 
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Trembly's next contention of error is that the trial court heard Mrs. Field's 
motion in violation of the "law of the case" doctrine, which provides that "one 
district court judge cannot overrule another district court judge of equal authority." 
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 935, 946 (Utah 1987). This doctrine has "evolved to 
avoid the delays and difficulties that arise when one judge is presented with an issue 
identical to one which has already been passed upon by a coordinate judge in the 
same case." Id. at 947 (footnote omitted). Notwithstanding the law of the case 
doctrine, " 'a trial court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents.' " James 
Constructors, 761 P.2d at 45 (quotation omitted). "[T]he law of the case doctrine 
does not prohibit a judge from catching a mistake and fixing it." Gillmor v. Wright, 
850 P.2d 431, 439 (Utah 1993) (Orme, J., concurring). Moreover, a judge is free 
to change a ruling until a final decision is formally rendered. Utah R.Civ. P. 54(b); 
Ron Shepherd Ins. v .Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 652-54 (Utah 1994); McKee v. 
Williams, 741 P.2d 978, 981 (Utah App. 1987); cv. Richardson v. Grand Central 
Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977) ("[Generally preliminary or interim rulings 
do not rise to the dignity of res judicata or stare decisis."). 
The "law of the case" doctrine is not a rule of law. "As Justice Holmes once noted, the law-
of-the-case doctrine 'merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has 
been decided, not a limit to their power.' " Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 740 (Utah 1990) 
(quoting Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912). 
The Trembly court went on to state, notwithstanding the "law of the case" doctrine, that "It 
is within the sound discretion of the trial court to grant a motion under Rule 54(b)." Trembly, 864 
P.2d at' 1312. The court recognized Rule 54(b) "allows 'for the possibility of a judge changing his 
3r her mind'", Id. at 1311, and that "A court can consider several factors in determining the 
propriety of reconsidering a prior ruling. These may include, but are not limited to/' the factors 
Reagan argues are the only ones the court should consider. Jd. (emphasis added). As just stated, 
t is within a judge's discretion under Rule 54(b) even simply to change his mind. 
Nevertheless, not just one but several of the Trembly factors exist here. At the hearing on 
leagan's Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court stated it had not read and did not rely on either 
jarco's cross-motion for summary for summary judgment or the new evidence Garco had offered 
n support of its motion. Garco's motion and evidence presented the matters at issue in a different 
ight, were based on new evidence, and if given fair consideration would lead the Court to conclude 
t is necessary to revise its Order to correct errors and avoid injustice. 
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Rule 4-501(3)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration states that a party requesting 
a hearing on a dispositive motion shall be granted a hearing. When it filed its Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, Garco also requested oral argument on its motion, "at the same time as any 
hearing on Defendant's motion for summary judgment." However, the Court heard Reagan's 
Motion for Summary Judgment not only without hearing Garco's cross motion, before Garco's cross 
motion was fully briefed, but without even reading or considering the memorandum and affidavits 
filed in support of the motion. The affidavits in particular contained additional evidence directly 
relevant to the issues the Court ruled on in granting Reagan's motion. That evidence, once fully 
briefed, mandates granting the motion of Garco rather than Reagan, or at least creates fact issues 
precluding summary judgment in Reagan's favor. For the Court to rule on Reagan's motion without 
being fully advised as to the evidence and arguments on Garco's cross motion led to error in the 
Order. Since Garco's cross-motion puts Reagan's motion in a different light, and if afforded a full 
and fair hearing would result in issues being fully briefed which were inadequately briefed when 
considered in the light of Reagan's motion standing alone, the Court should revise its Order by 
setting the Order aside until Garco's motion is fully briefed and argued. 
I. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR TRESPASS. 
The Court's Order dismisses Garco's trespass claims based solely on the findings "there was 
a lease between defendant and plaintiffs predecessor-in interest" and that "the lease document itself 
does not require removal of the sign foundation" or "require that the defendant restore the property 
to its former condition upon vacating the property." Since those findings are legally insufficient to 
support the Court's conclusion, the Order should be revised to correct the error. 
Reagan's arguments all turn on what duty Reagan owed Garco. Reagan owed Garco duties 
arising from two separate and distinct sources: by contract arid by operation of law. In construing 
an express contract courts are indeed reluctant to imply a contractual term where none exists. 
However, it does not follow that a contractual relationship limits every duty to an express or implied Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
contractual duty. Reagan has repeatedly, and more or less successfully so far, attempted to confuse 
the issue by characterizing every duty that is not an express contractual duty as an implied 
contractual duty, and then asking the Court to apply contract law to circumvent duties that arise by 
operation of law rather than by contract. That approach leads to error. For example, every tenant 
is subject to a duty arising by operation of law, independent of any contractual duty, not to commit 
waste to his landlord's reversionary interest. Reagan was subject to that duty as a matter of law, 
separate and apart from any contract term. The Court should be careful to distinguish contract 
duties from duties arising by operation of law, and not allow the absence of a contract terms dealing 
with waste to negate Reagan's legal obligation not to commit waste. 
A. Reagan Rented From Garco As A Monthly Tenant. 
The issue is, what was the contract between Garco and Reagan? If the Lease Agreement 
Reagan relies on was not binding on Garco, it is irrelevant if the document was binding on Garco's 
predecessors, and its terms are also irrelevant. It would be error for the Court to find on summary 
judgment that Reagan's duties to Garco arise from a contract not binding on Garco. Reagan was 
renting from Garco, not under that lease document, but as a month-to-month tenant without any 
written lease agreement. There was sufficient additional evidence filed with Garco's cross-motion 
for summary judgment to support that finding. The Court should revise its Order accordingly. 
B. The Written Lease Agreement Was Unenforceable. 
Garco's Memorandum In Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (page 
14) raised, but did not analyze, the issue whether Reagan's written lease agreement was 
unenforceable as an adhesion contract. The "adhesion contract" issue is best analyzed in terms of 
unconscionability. A contract must be assessed under the differing factual circumstances of each 
case, Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985), which means 
the issue of unconscionability is normally a question of fact turning on the disputed circumstances 
of each case, precluding summary judgment: 
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Substantive unconscionability is indicated by "contract terms so one-sided as 
to suppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party," "an overall imbalance in the 
obligations and rights imposed by the bargain," excessive price, or significant cost-
price disparity. ... [T]he terms are to be evaluated "in the light of the general 
commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case." 
Id. at 1041-42 (citations omitted). There are sufficient facts to determine the Lease Agreement was 
substantively unconscionable. The Lease Agreement would give Reagan a ten year lease at a scant 
$50.00 per month, renewable at Reagan's sole option for ten more years at $80.00 per month. ft2-
4] For this nominal amount Reagan would have the exclusive right, not just to a 10 by 50 foot plot 
to erect one sign, but to use the entire property, consisting of some 3.3 acres, and including all of 
the lessor's land, buildings and roofs, to erect advertising signs, [^l] 
Reagan would remain the owner of all signs and improvements it places in the property and 
have the right to remove or change the same "at any time." [^ [7] Reagan unilaterally construes this 
term to give Reagan rights not "at any time" during the lease, but "at any time" for aye and always 
— in effect, as giving Reagan a perpetual easement on which it can leave its signs and retrieve them 
in the indefinite future, for which it pays nothing beyond the lease period. 
For five years after the end of the lease the lessee cannot rent any part of the premises to any 
other outdoor advertiser but Reagan, including the property fronting on 300 West, and the rest of 
the 3.2-plus acres Reagan never used, for which Reagan pays exactly nothing. [^ [4] This provision 
alone would make the Lease Agreement a contract in restraint of trade, and Reagan a violator of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1 and 2. 
Except for the payment of rent, Reagan would have no express contractual duties. If 
Reagan, at its sole discretion and for whatever reason, or no reason at all, chose to display no 
advertising copy, rent is reduced to 10% of the contract rental rate. [^3] If another tenant, even 
without the lessor's knowledge or consent, partially obstructed any Reagan structure (not just 
advertising copy), Reagan could unilaterally reduce its rental to less than 1% of the contract rate. 
[110] Reagan's exclusive control over whether it paid the contract rental would make Reagan's 
promise of payment, and hence the consideration it would give, illusory: Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
When there exists only the facade of a promise, i.e., a statement made in 
such vague or conditional terms that the person making it commits himself to 
nothing, the alleged "promise" is said to be "illusory". An illusory promise, neither 
binds the person making it, 1 Corbin on Contracts §145 (1963), nor functions as 
consideration for a return promise. 
Resource Management Co.. 706 P.2d at 1036. 
Reagan would have the unilateral right to recover its expenses and attorney fees in the event 
of a breach by the lessor. [1[9] The Lessor has no reciprocal right to recover its attorney fees in a 
suit for unpaid rent - fees which would almost certainly exceed any unpaid rent, in effect depriving 
the lessor of an effective remedy even if Reagan should breach its only express contractual duty. 
Taken as a whole, the terms of Reagan's form lease agreement are on their face so clearly one-sided 
as to require at least a trial whether the document is substantively unconscionable. 
Resource Management also states a contract is unenforceable if procedurally unconscionable: 
Indices of procedural unconscionability include "[t]he use of printed form or 
boilerplate contracts drawn skillfully by the party in the strongest economic 
position," generally offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, phrasing contractual terms 
"in language that is incomprehensible to a layman or that diverts] his attention from 
the problems raised by them or the rights given up through them," hiding key 
contractual provisions in a maze of fine print, or in an inconspicuous part of the 
document, minimizing key contractual provisions by deceptive sales practices, "lack 
of opportunity for meaningful negotiation," whether the aggrieved party was 
compelled to accept the terms, and "exploitation of the underprivileged, 
unsophisticated, uneducated and illiterate. 
Id. at 1042 (citations omitted). Several of these "indices of procedural unconscionability" exist 
here, including the fact the Lease Agreement is a printed form or boilerplate contract drawn 
skillfully by Reagan, offered (as Reagan's negotiating tactics prove) on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, 
and drafted so as to divert the lessor's attention from the extent of the rights the lessor gives up. 
Still, gross disparity in terms alone, even absent evidence of procedural unconscionability, can 
support a finding of unconscionability. W. at 1043. 
Based on the above, it would be error for the Court to grant summary judgment for Reagan 
without allowing a trial on whether the Lease Agreement is enforceable. 
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C- The Written Lease Agreement Did Not Permit Reagan's Actions. 
Even if the Lease Agreement was binding on Garco, Reagan had no legal right whatsoever 
to use the premises for any purpose other than the limited purpose expressly stated in the document. 
The Lease Agreement having been drafted by Reagan, any ambiguity must be construed against 
Reagan. The document allowed Reagan to use the property only "for the purpose of erecting 
painted, printed, or illuminated advertising signs." Reagan had no right to erect any other structure. 
Any right under paragraph 7 "to remove or change" a sign would be subject to this contractual 
limitation on Reagan's use of the property. Reagan could remove a sign, but could not leave a 
structure that was not an advertising sign. In other words, the "use" provision of the document 
allowed Reagan to remove a sign, but not thereby create a structure that was not a part of any sign. 
Cutting off its sign structure and leaving the foundation was the same in substance as erecting a 
structure that was not an advertising sign, and was a breach of Reagan's express duty under 
paragraph 1 of the Lease Agreement limiting its use of the premises. 
Although Reagan relies extensively on Sherman Co. v. United States, 258 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 
1958), that case is not even on point. Unlike Reagan's Lease Agreement, the lease in Sherman 
initially provided that the lessee would "restore the premises ..." The parties negotiated a substitute 
provision where the lessor expressly relieved "the [lessee] of any and all restoration responsibility 
..." Id. at 881. The Court relied on this provision in holding the lessor was not entitled to recover 
the cost of restoration. Reagan's purported lease contains no similar term, so Reagan had no similar 
right. And, unlike Turman v. Safeway Stores, 317 P.2d 302 (Mont. 1957), where the lease 
expressly gave the tenant the right to make changes to the landlord's building, Reagan's purported 
lease did not expressly authorize Reagan to dismember its sign rather than remove it. [ 
Any such "right," not being spelled out, would itself have to be implied. The Court 
should not imply such a right where, as here, the right would offend public policy. See Conclusion, 
infra\ Russ v. Woodside Homes. Inc., 905 P.2d 901, 907 (Itah App. 1995) ("When determining 
whether a contract provision offends public policy, we look to the provision's context, subject, and Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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D. Any Contractual Right Of Reagan To The Premises Had Expired Before Reagan 
Removed The Sign. 
Even accepting Reagan's theory, Reagan still committed a trespass. No later than 12:01 
a.m., July 9, 1995, Reagan had no right of possession and was already in trespass. Reagan was still 
in trespass on July 19, 1995 when it cut the sign off. 
The Lease Agreement, and Reagan's right of possession, expired on July 8, 1995. By its 
02/15/95 letter [Joe Kingston depo. Ex. 17] Garco told Reagan the sign had to be removed "before 
July 8, 1995." By 06/12/95 letter, nearly four weeks before the deadline [Joe Kingston depo Ex. 
18], Reagan cited an earlier conversation and agreed "At that time I stated that we would begin 
removing the structure immediately and that is the manner in which we will proceed." 
Assuming the Lease Agreement was valid, the correspondence reflects the parties' expressed 
intent to clarify a patent ambiguity in the original agreement. Paragraph 7 standing alone was 
ambiguous on two points: whether the right to remove a sign included a right to remove only parts 
of a sign structure piecemeal; and whether the right to remove "at any time" gave Reagan rights 
beyond the lease term. When a contract term is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
construction, the Court must construe the term in harmony with the parties' expressed intent. The 
exchange of correspondence clarifies that the parties mutually understood paragraph 7 to require 
removal of the entire sign structure, including the foundation, before the lease expired. 2 
When a tenant's right to remove improvements at the end of a lease is not exercised within 
a reasonable time, the right is forfeited. Where the parties agree on a reasonable time for removal 
the lessee does not have the right to remove improvements after the agreed time has lapsed. 49 Am 
Jur 2d. Landlord and Tenant §901. Accepting Reagan's theory, the lease terminated July 8, 1995; 
in February Garco demanded the sign be removed before July 8, 1995; and on June 12, 1995 
2
 Reagan's argument regarding "lack of consideration" misses the point. Garco's 
statement regarding "modification" of the parties' agreement was intended not to refer to a new 
agreement for new consideration, but rather to refer to the clarification of the ambiguity in the 
parties' agreement. However, even if there was a new agreement, given the then-pending dispute 
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Reagan agreed to remove the sign "immediately." When Reagan still had not removed the sign by 
July 19, 1995, Reagan had forfeited any contractual right to remove the sign. Reagan's rights and 
duties as of July 19, 1995 with respect to the sign were determined solely by common law as set 
forth in Garco's previous memoranda. Its failure to comply with that law was a trespass. 
E. Reagan Had A Duty Arising By Operation Of Law Not To Commit Waste. 
As stated before, in addition to duties arising by contract Reagan had other duties arising by 
operation of law. Under controlling Utah law Reagan was under a duty not to commit waste: 
[T]hey urge that there is an implied covenant in any landlord-tenant relationship that 
the tenant will not commit such waste. With that we agree. 
Cluffv. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498, 499 (Utah 1976) (emphasis added). 
The destruction, alteration, or removal of improvements by a tenant constitutes waste. 78 
Am Jur 2d Waste §18. One in possession under a temporary tenancy is liable for waste if injury 
results to the reversionary estate from his unreasonable use of the premises. Jd. §21. Reagan's act 
is actionable trespass under these standards: 
Waste is distinguished from trespass in that the injurious or wasteful act is 
committed in the former case by one who is, and in the latter case by one who is not, 
in lawful possession of the premises involved or affected. Although acts injurious 
to the substance of an estate, committed by a stranger to the title, or by one who, 
although in possession of the premises, is not rightfully entitled to such possession 
are sometimes characterized as waste, they do not constitute waste in the technical 
legal sense of the term, but fall within the category of trespass and are governed by 
the principles applicable to that species of tort. 
Id. §2. Reagan's act was a trespass rather than waste because at the time Reagan cut the sign off 
Reagan's possession of the premises was no longer rightful, but was itself already in trespass. 
[Point 1(D), supra.] The Court did not adequately consider the timing of Reagan's acts, or the 
undisputed fact that even under Reagan's theory of the case Reagan had already stayed in possession 
beyond the time it had to vacate. Under the law Reagan had already forfeited any contractual right 
to remove the sign, and was already in trespass, when it cut the sign down. Under these 
circumstances it would be error to rule as a matter of law that no trespass occurred. Garco asks the 
Court to revise its Order accordingly. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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F. PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRES HOLDING REAGAN TO A DUTY TO 
REMOVE ITS SIGN FOUNDATION, 
The Court should weigh the practical consequences of a decision that Reagan can with 
impunity demolish its sign structures and leave the waste on others' land. If Reagan succeeds here, 
Reagan will be able to do to all its landlords what it did to Garco. Reagan could dispose of its solid 
waste on others' property throughout the Wasatch Front, to the surprised and abject disappointment 
of landlords left to deal with Reagan's waste as best they can. Taken to its logical conclusion, 
Reagan's waste would impede new construction, and hinder repairs to existing structures throughout 
the area. Utilities would have to remove, go around or through Reagan's waste to lay water, 
sewage, gas and electric lines. Cities and counties would have to deal with Reagan's waste when 
constructing sidewalks and enlarging roads. Reagan's act would become a new species of court-
sanctioned environmental pollution, the cost being foisted on Reagan's victims. 
Reagan's conduct flies in the face of public policy concerns over environmental quality. The 
Environmental Quality Code, U.C.A. Title 19 and related regulations, control the disposal of 
"construction waste" including concrete and steel from demolition of structures (U.C.A. §19-6-
101(4)(a); R R315-301-2(16)). The environmental policy, under administrative rules, requires 
disposal of solid waste at designated facilities only, and makes the generator of waste responsible 
for its disposal. See R315-301-3 ("The ... operator ... of any premises ... shall be responsible for 
the ... disposal of all solid waste generated or accumulated by the ... operator "); R315-301-4 
("No person shall ... dispose of any solid waste in any place except at a facility which is in 
compliance with the requirements of these and other applicable rules."). Reagan generated solid 
waste and disposed of it on Garco's property. To relieve Reagan of the responsibility of disposal 
by letting Reagan leave its waste on Garco's property not only violates public policy by thwarting 
the reasonable expectations of contracting landlords, it violates the public policy of making waste 
generators responsible for the disposal of their own waste. The Court should revise its Order in 
accordance with public policy, to hold Reagan responsible for the disposal of its own wastes. D gitized by the Howard W. Hunt r Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law Sch ol, BYU. 
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II. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER. 
Based on the above analysis, Reagan was in possessory trespass beginning July 9, 1995 and, 
having left its sign foundation on the premises, remains in possession to this day. Garco gave the 
requisite Notice of Unlawful Detainer which Reagan ignored, making it liable. 
ffl. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE. 
A claim for intentional interference requires proof of improper means or improper purpose. 
Until Reagan's Motion for Summary Judgment, Garco understood Reagan had acted for the purpose 
to injure Garco, not necessarily to restrain trade with Reagan's competition. A party's intent is 
almost always a question of fact. It would be error for the Court to conclude there is no evidence 
of such a purpose on Reagan's part. The evidence is sufficient to create a triable issue whether 
Reagan's purpose to injure Garco was Reagan's predominant purpose, making summary judgment 
in Reagan's favor erroneous for that reason alone. 
"Improper means" include illegal means. Leigh Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 
1982). In ruling on Reagan's Motion for Summary Judgment the Court did not consider whether 
Reagan's conduct was an antitrust violation, because the point had not yet been raised. 3 Garco is 
not in the outdoor advertising business and is not Reagan's competitor, but, except for Reagan's 
acts, would be free to deal in the open marketplace with Reagan's competition. 4 
At the time the Court ruled on Reagan's Motion, the antitrust laws had been raised 
only as a challenge to the enforceability of the noncompete clause in Reagan's standard lease form, 
not as an "improper means" to support Garco's intentional interference claim. See Garco's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, page 19; Memorandum 
in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, page 13. 
4
 Garco's business is that of a landlord renting shop space to its tenants. Reagan, on 
the other hand, is in the outdoor advertising business. Its competitors include such companies as Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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On page 3 of its Order the Court, in reliance on Reagan's own evidence and arguments, 
found Reagan (in agreement with Mollerup) placed its sign on the Mollerup property for the express 
purpose of "forestalling competitive activity." Put another way, Reagan, with Mollerup's 
agreement, acted to restrain the trade of Reagan's competition, in an attempt to monopolize the 
market for offsite outdoor advertising on the U.S. Interstate freeway corridor. That is not legitimate 
competitive activity. That, in the words of Reagan's authorities, is an anticompetitive injury to the 
market. It is a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade. It is an attempt to 
monopolize the market. It is a violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S. C. §§1 and 2. 
The gravamen of an antitrust violation is an actual or attempted injury to the market caused 
by diminished competition. That, according to the Order, is exactly what Reagan was and is trying 
to do — forestall competitive activity. That Garco suffered a personal injury in addition to the 
actual or attempted injury to the market does not diminish that result. Such conduct not only 
subjects Reagan to civil penalties under 15 U.S.C. §15 for treble damages, it is a federal felony, and 
is surely both an "improper means" and an "improper purpose" for proving the tort of intentional 
interference. 
The Court's ruling shows the evidence is sufficient to support a finding Reagan violated the 
antitrust laws. Garco has this day filed an antitrust action against Reagan in U.S. District Court, 
which under 15 U.S.C. §§15(a) and 22 has exclusive jurisdiction. A copy of the Complaint is 
attached. Garco asks the Court to revise its Order, to find Reagan's antitrust violation constitutes 
improper means, or alternately stay a decision on improper means until the federal court rules on 
Garco's antitrust claim. 
Because there is sufficient evidence to create triable issues of fact both as to improper means 
and improper purpose, it would be error to grant Reagan summary judgment on those points. Garco 
asks the Court to revise its Order accordingly. 
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IV. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
Because Garco's claim for punitive damages rests on its trespass and intentional interference 
claims against Reagan, and there are triable issues of fact on those claims, the Court should also 
revise its Order to reserve Garco's punitive damages claim until trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Reagan's protestations to the contrary, Garco's cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
presented the case in a different light, presented new evidence, presented new legal issues and more 
fully briefed issues raised earlier. Although Garco had expressly requested oral argument on its 
cross-motion at the same time as argument on Reagan's motion, Garco's motion had not yet been 
fully briefed, and the Court by its own admission had not perused Garco's supporting memorandum 
or affidavits when it ruled on Reagan's motion. 
The Order represents a radical departure from existing property and landlord-tenant law. 
It contravenes the policy limiting environmental pollution and making the generators of waste 
responsible for its disposal. Any such shift in the law involves major public policy considerations 
that belong in the hands of the legislature, not the courts. If Reagan remains the owner of its signs 
and has the right to remove them, the law must also hold Reagan accountable when Reagan disposes 
of waste on the property of its landlords. 
For the reasons stated above, in the interest of justice and correct any errors in fact or law, 
Garco respectfully asks the Court to revise its Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint, 
to deny Reagan's Motion for Summary Judgment, and to give full consideration to Garco's cross-
motion. 
DATED this O day of March, 1998. 
yhS^A UJ}/'\ i /ySLyi-a*^ 
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F. Mark Hansen, #5078 
404 East 4500 South, Suite B-34 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 266-2882 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ; 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING; ; 
DEWEY REAGAN; ) 
WILLIAM REAGAN; ) 
DOUG HALL; ) 
DOES 1 THROUGH 10, ) 
Defendants. ) 
) COMPLAINT 
1 
Civil No. 
Judge 
Plaintiff U.P.C., Inc. d/b/a Garco Industrial Park (Garco) complains and alleges as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. This is an action under the antitrust statutes, 15 USC 1 et seq. 
2. Jurisdiction and venue are proper pursuant to 15 USC 15(a) and 22. 
3. Garco is a Utah corporation in good standing, located in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
4. R.O.A. General, Inc. d/b/a Reagan Outdoor Advertising (ROA) is a Utah corporation 
doing business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
5. Dewey Reagan (DR) is a director, officer or agent of Reagan. 
6. William Reagan (WR) is a director, officer or agent of Reagan. 
7. Doug Hall (Hall) is a director, officer or agent of Reagan. 
8. Does 1 through 10 are persons or entities whose identities are presently unknown. 
9. On information and belief, DR. WR, Hall and Does 1 through 10 authorized, 
ordered, or did the acts constituting the antitrust violations set forth below, were actively involved 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in the acts to achieve anticompetitive ends, and exerted their influence to shape the anticompetitive 
corporate intentions of ROA. Pursuant to 15 USC 24, DR. WR, Hall and Does 1 through 10 are 
personally liable. 
10. This Court has pendant jurisdiction over Garco's state claims. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
11; ROA is in the outdoor advertising sign business, including the rental of offsite 
outdoor advertising signs. According to ROA, on July 8, 1975 ROA leased a sign location space 
on property in Salt Lake County at 3986 South 1-15. ROA erected an outdoor advertising sign on 
the property and rented space to advertisers. 
12. Then and now, the property was used to generate income from rental of the property 
to others. In February of 1990 Garco purchased the property as a source of rental income. 
13. In mid-1991 Garco informed ROA it did not have a signed lease, and that ROA 
needed to sign a lease at fair market rate or move its sign. In about August of 1992 ROA by and 
through Hall negotiated a lease with Garco at a fair market rate and reduced it to writing. ROA was 
to retype the lease to make it presentable and then sign it, but failed to prepare the agreed-on final 
draft for signature. 
14. Statutes and regulations controlling outdoor advertising signs prohibit the placement 
of off-premises outdoor advertising signs along the U.S. Interstate freeway corridor, including the 
area around Garco, closer than 500 feet apart. 
15. In addition to its sign on Garco's property, ROA also owned a sign located over 500 
feet north of the Garco sign location and Garco's southern property line. In October of 1992 ROA 
by and through Hall told Garco that if Garco would not agree to modify the terms of the August 
lease to include a rental well below fair market rates, ROA would remove its sign from Garco's 
^remises and move its other sign to within 500 feet of Garco's southern property line. Hall stated 
ROA would do so because ROA did not want anyone else doing business with Garco. ROA 
ntf>nr\f>r\ tn r n m n p l Cixrm to r.nnfrarf with R p a a ; i n ;U nrirp^ anH nn t/>rmc Hirr:upH hv P O A o r fO 
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prevent any of ROA's competitors from dealing with Garco regardless of the prices and terms 
ROA's competitors might offer. 
16. After that time Garco repeatedly attempted to get ROA to sign a lease along the terms 
of the parties' August 1992 Agreement but was unable to do so. Throughout the time ROA 
occupied the property ROA paid rental at an amount set by ROA over Garco's objections, at a rate 
far below fair market rate, and refused to increase its payments to an amount approaching fair 
market rate. 
17. Mollerup Moving and Storage Company (Mollerup) is a Utah corporation, not named 
as a party to this action. James Mollerup (JM) is a director and officer of Mollerup, not named as 
a party to this action. Mollerup and JM are parties or conspirators with Defendants in their 
contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce as further alleged below. 
18. Mollerup owns property to the immediate north of Garco. The northern boundary 
line of the Mollerup premises is comfortably over 500 feet from Garco's southern boundary line. 
Absent the conspirators' agreement and acts in restraint of trade and commerce, it would be lawful 
to erect two offsite outdoor advertising signs over 500 feet apart, one near Mollerup's northern 
boundary line and the other near Garco's southern boundary line. 
19. On February 23, 1995, after years of unsuccessful efforts to negotiate a written 
agreement with ROA at fair market terms, Garco instructed ROA to remove its sign before July 8, 
1995. Garco anticipated ROA's competition would then be able to lease a sign location from Garco. 
By letter dated June 12, 1995 ROA finally agreed to remove the sign structure immediately. 
20. On April 20, 1995 ROA secretly contracted with Mollerup by and through JM to 
lease a sign location from Mollerup, and to erect a new sign just barely within 500 feet of Garco's 
southern boundary line. On April 24, 1995, without notice to Garco, ROA also applied to the Utah 
Department of Transportation to move to the Mollerup property a sign permitted by UDOT Permit 
No. 2-0966. (The Garco sign was under UDOT Permit No. 2-0547.) On or before July 1, 1995 
T ^ A .,_, ;f„ „;„„ fo r h p n r i r rh anr l P r P r t e r] a n p w Rwn o n {he M0 | |erUD orooertv, just barely 
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within 500 feet of Garco's southern boundary line. The precise location of the Mollerup sign was 
selected for the express purpose of manipulating the outdoor advertising laws to prevent any of 
ROA's competition from entering a lease with Garco, and to compel Garco to deal only with ROA 
on terms dictated by ROA, and not with ROA's competition. 
21. It is apparent from an inspection of the Mollerup property that ROA's sign could 
easily have been placed closer to Mollerup's northern boundary and outside the 500 foot limit; that 
ROA's placement of the Mollerup sign within the 500 foot limit was actually less convenient to 
Mollerup than a location outside the 500 foot limit would have been; and that locating the sign 
outside rather than inside the 500 foot limit would have no meaningful effect on ROA's ability to 
rent advertising space on the sign. 
22. When Garco saw the Mollerup sign, Garco asked DR why ROA had located its new 
sign as it did. DR told Garco it was for the specific purpose to prevent Garco from doing business 
with anyone but ROA. 
23. Any right ROA had to possession of the Garco property expired no later than July 
8, 1995. No later than that date ROA was in trespass. On July 19, 1995 ROA entered the Garco 
property, and against Garco's express instructions either to leave the sign in place or to remove the 
entire sign including the foundation and restore the premises, ROA cut the sign posts off at ground 
level and left the useless (at least to Garco) foundation of the sign in place. 
24. Garco contacted competitors of ROA about the possibility of leasing a sign location 
but was told the competitors could not obtain the necessary licenses because of the location ROA, 
with the agreement of Mollerup and the other conspirators, had chosen for its new sign. 
25. By letter dated August 9, 1995 ROA by and through DR then informed Garco: 
In regards to another matter, that being the possibility of locating an outdoor 
advertising structure somewhere upon this location at a point to be determined in the 
future, I would greatly appreciate you facilitating a meeting ... I look forward to 
, facilitating a mutually beneficial business relationship in the near future ... 
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The only way ROA and Garco could have "a mutually beneficial business relationship in the near 
future" would be for ROA to erect a sign near Garco's southern boundary line and move its 
Mollerup sign closer to Mollerup's northern boundary line, so as not to violate the statutory 500 
foot spacing limit. This would also allow ROA's competitors to compete with ROA to lease a sign 
location from Garco, a result within ROA's control that ROA refuses to make possible. 
26. In September of 1995 ROA further indicated facts showing ROA's placement of the 
Mollerup sign was within ROA's control, that Defendants chose the placement of the Mollerup sign 
to block ROA's competition from doing business with Garco, and that Defendants had acted to 
coerce Garco into a new lease on anticompetitive terms. ROA has since further demonstrated its 
intent that any new lease with Garco would be for a rental price well below fair market price. 
27. Garco and Reagan are parties in a state action, U.P.C., Inc. d/b/a Garco Industrial 
Park v. R.O. A. General, Inc. d/b/a Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Civil No. 960906388 (Utah 3rd. 
Dist. Ct.). On December 29, 1997 that court entered an Order which found, based on arguments 
made by Reagan, that Reagan had erected its new sign just within 500 feet of Garco's southern 
property line for the express purpose of "forestalling competitive activity on the plaintiffs 
property." Reagan is judicially estopped from denying that was its purpose. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
28. All preceding and following allegations are incorporated by reference. 
29. ROA's rental of outdoor advertising signs along the U.S. Interstate freeway corridor, 
and activities connected with such rentals, have the purpose and effect to engage in commerce 
among the several States. ROA's outdoor advertising signs were and are visible to travelers on 
U.S. Interstate 15 and were and are placed for the purpose of inducing those travelers to engage in 
commerce. The advertising includes advertising by persons or entities outside the state of Utah, 
for the sale in Utah of goods produced in other states, and directly affects interstate commerce. The 
advertising includes advertising of goods and services in interstate commerce, to encourage persons 
« .--. .i A , nnH cpruirPQ awl rherehv eneaee in interstate commerce. The advertising also 
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includes advertising of both interstate and intrastate goods and services, directed to persons 
traveling in Utah from other states, to encourage them to buy those goods and services and thereby 
engage in interstate commerce. 
30. The availability of sites for offsite outdoor advertising signs along the U.S. Interstate 
freeway corridors in Salt Lake County is restricted, fixed and limited. Such sites are valuable assets 
to the landowners. Acts that further restrict or eliminate access to otherwise available sites in the 
area decrease competition and are anticompetitive. 
31. 15 USC section 1 provides, "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 
32. Defendants, Mollerup and JM, and each of them (the conspirators), contracted and 
agreed to conspire, and did conspire, for the unlawful objective to reduce the availability of outdoor 
advertising locations, diminish competition and restrain trade, to the anticompetitive advantage of 
ROA and to the detriment of consumers and the free market. 
33. In furtherance of the agreement and conspiracy, the conspirators agreed to manipulate 
the outdoor advertising statutes not for the statutes1 intended purpose to control sign spacing, but 
to bar ROA's competition from even the possibility of competition with Reagan, whether or not the 
competitors had superior business acumen, or could offer consumers better pricing, service or other 
competitive incentives. 
34. In furtherance of the agreement and conspiracy, the conspirators agreed to erect 
ROA's Mollerup sign just under 500 feet from Garco's southern boundary, for the express purpose 
of preventing any of ROA's competition from even attempting to lease a sign location from Garco 
and thereby competing with ROA. 
35. The conspirators' agreement and acts in furtherance of the agreement tend to restrict 
competition and decrease output, not from any competitive ability of ROA such as more favorable 
pricing, quality of service or the like. The conspirators1 agreement and acts result in injury to the 
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market, including to lessees of outdoor advertising signs as a result of diminished competition along 
the U.S. Interstate freeway corridor. They have the purpose and effect to threaten the proper 
operation of the free market economy. If carried to their logical conclusion, the conspirators' 
agreement and acts would result in a monopoly in fact by ROA of outdoor advertising along the 
U.S. Interstate freeway corridor. The nature and effect of the conspirators' agreement and acts is 
plainly and necessarily anticompetitive, and is a per se violation of 15 USC 1. 
36. Before the conspirators' agreement and acts in furtherance of the agreement, Garco 
had a valuable asset in the form of real property available for the lease and erection of an outdoor 
advertising sign on freeway frontage. In addition to the general anticompetitive effect on the free 
market of the conspirators' contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce, 
Garco has suffered personal injury in the destruction of its asset. 
37. Pursuant to 15 USC 15, Garco is entitled to recover from Defendants, and each of 
them, threefold the damages sustained by Garco in an amount to be proved at trial, and the cost of 
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, plus interest from the date of filing this Compliant. 
38. Pursuant to 15 USC 26, Garco is entitled to a permanent injunction requiring ROA 
to relocate or position any other outdoor advertising signs in the general area of Garco's property, 
including ROA's sign to the immediate north of Garco's property, so as not to prevent ROA's 
competitors from competing with ROA for the lease of a sign location from Garco. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
39. All preceding and following allegations are incorporated by reference. 
40. 15 USC 2 provides, "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, 
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ..." 
41. The product and geographic market affected by the conspirators' agreement and acts 
is the rental and lease of offsite outdoor advertising space along the U.S. Interstate freeway corridor 
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42. The limited amount of frontage property along the U.S. Interstate freeway corridor 
in Salt Lake County, the limited number of landowners willing to lease sign location spaces, and 
the statutes regulating offsite outdoor advertising signs, constitute barriers to new entry or 
expansion into the market. ROA already owns a substantial majority of the offsite outdoor 
advertising signs in the market area. 
43. Because of ROA's substantial market share, the locations and spacing of ROA's 
existing signs, and the other practical and legal barriers to new entry or expansion in the market, 
ROA is in a unique position to manipulate the outdoor advertising sign statutes and its existing sign 
locations to achieve monopoly power in the market. ROA has the ability and intention to exercise 
its market power to restrict output, and has acted for that purpose and with that effect. There is a 
realistic probability ROA would be able to achieve monopoly power, if allowed to continue to act 
in furtherance of its scheme. 
44. Defendants have engaged in exclusionary and anticompetitive conduct, intended to 
stifle competition, to monopolize or attempt to monopolize the market. Their present intent, ability 
and attempt to use ROA to monopolize the market is not the consequence of superior product, 
pricing, business acumen or historical accident, but is a result of their purpose to manipulate the 
outdoor advertising sign statutes for their anticompetitive and monopolistic ends. 
45. Through ROA, Defendants have attempted to monopolize, or have combined or 
conspired to monopolize, part of the trade or commerce among the several States, and have thereby 
violated 15 USC 2. 
46. Defendants' acts as alleged above have injured Garco in its business and property. 
Pursuant to 15 USC 15, Garco is entitled to recover from Defendants, and each of them, threefold 
the damages sustained by Garco in an amount to be proved at trial, and the cost of suit, including 
a reasonable attorney's fee, plus interest from the date of filing this Compliant. 
47. Pursuant to 15 USC 26, Garco is entitled to a permanent injunction requiring ROA 
:o relocate or position any other outdoor advertising signs in the general area of Garco's property, 
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including ROA's sign to the immediate north of Garco's property, so as not to prevent ROA's 
competitors from contracting with Garco. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
48. All preceding and following allegations are incorporated by reference. 
49. Defendants' acts as alleged above are a violation of the Utah Antitrust Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §76-10-914(1), (2) and have injured Garco in its business and property. 
50. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-10-919(1), Garco is entitled to an award of damages 
and to permanent injunctive relief as alleged above. 
WHEREFORE, Garco prays for judgment against Defendants, and each of them, as 
follows: 
1. Three times Garco's actual damages, in an amount to be determined at trial; and 
2. Interest, costs and attorney fees as provided by law; and 
3. Permanent injunctive relief requiring ROA to relocate or position any other outdoor 
advertising signs in the general area of Garco's property, including ROA's sign to the immediate 
north of Garco's property, so as not to prevent ROA's competitors from contracting with Garco. 
4. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable 
DATED this ^ day of March, 1998. 
Plaintiffs address: 
3212 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
2352P.001 
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FILED 
Disraici COURT 
Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690) 
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaim 
Plaintiff R.O.A. General, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a ] 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ) 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
) STRIKE 
) Civil No. 960906388 
> Judge William B. Bohling 
Defendant ("Reagan"), by and through its undersigned counsel and pursuant to U.R.Civ.P. 
Rule 12(f), U.C.J.Admin. Rule 4-501, and the Court's inherent powers under State v. 
Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001 (Ut. App. 1993), hereby moves the Court for an order striking from 
the record the following matters set forth in plaintiffs (Garco's) Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Revise Order and Judgement Dismissing Complaint ("Reply Memo"): 
1. Point "B," on pages 4 through 6 of Garco's Reply Memo; 
2. Garco's incorrect statements on page 7 of Garco's Reply Memo regarding 
Sherman Co. v. United States, 258 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1958); 
98 MAR 18 PH 14-35 
TH»0 JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SklT LAKE COUNTY 
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3. Point UD," on page 8 of Garco's Reply Memo; 
4. Point UE," on page 9 of Garco's Reply Memo; 
5. Point "F," on page 10 of Garco's Reply Memo; 
6. Point "II," on page 11 of Garco's Reply Memo; 
7. Garco's request on page 12 of its Reply Memo for the Court to stay its 
decision in any way pending the outcome of federal court litigation that Garco filed at the time it 
filed its Reply Memo. 
This motion is made for the reason that each of these issues were raised for the first time in 
Garco's Reply Memo, in violation of U.C.J. Admin. Rule 4-501 and of Utah law as set forth in State 
v. Phathammavong, supra. This motion is supported by the Memorandum filed herewith. 
DATED this \* day of March, 1998. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
\ 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Leslie Van Frank 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Counterclaim Plaintiff 
? 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
mailed, U.S. First class, postage prepaid, on this p day of March, 1998, to the following: 
F. Mark Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
624 North 300 West, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
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Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690) 
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaim 
Plaintiff R.O.A. General, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a ; 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ] 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ] 
Defendant. ) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
) STRIKE 
) Civil No. 960906388 
i Judge William B. Bohling 
Defendant ("Reagan"), by and through its undersigned counsel, files the following 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Strike. 
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration allows only three memoranda to be 
filed in connection with a motion ~ a supporting memorandum, a memorandum in opposition, and 
a reply memorandum. It is incumbent upon a movant to include within its principal supporting 
memorandum all issues on which it believes it is entitled to prevail. State v. Phathammavong, 860 
P.2d 1001, 1003-04 (Ut. App. 1993), quoting White v. Kent Medical Or. Inc9 810 P.2d 4, 8 (Wash. 
IHIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
-0EPUW CLERK 
n i\ a A t\ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
App. 1991). In Phathammavong, the Utah Court of Appeals found that a movant's argument raised 
for the first time in a reply memorandum was not properly before the trial court. 
Allowing the moving party to raise new issues in its rebuttal materials is improper because 
the nonmoving party has no opportunity to respond. It is for this reason that, in the 
analogous area of appellate review, the rule is well settled that the court will not consider 
issues raised for the first time in a reply brief. 
State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d at 1003-04. As noted in Phathammavong U.S.Dist.Ct., D.Utah 
Rule 202(b)(2) limits reply memoranda to rebutting matters raised in the memorandum opposing the 
notion, as does Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. State v. Phathammavong, 860 
D
.2d at 1004. Additionally, as the Phathammavong court noted, Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 
1990) explains that "rebuttal evidence is restricted to 'explain, repel, counteract, or disprove facts 
;iven in evidence by the opposing party.'" State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d at 1004. Thus, it is 
rror for a court to consider issues raised for the first time in a reply memorandum. Id. 
In the case at bar, substantial portions of Garco's reply memorandum filed in support of its 
/lotion to Revise Order ("Reply Memo") consist of new argument raised for the first time: 
1. In Point "B," briefed at pages 4 through 6 of its Reply Memo, GarCo argues 
lat the written lease between Reagan and Garco is an unenforceable "adhesion contract." Garco 
dmits at p. 4 of its Reply that it has never before analyzed this issue. The issue was not raised or 
:gued in Garco's principal memorandum filed in support of its Motion to Revise Order. Under the 
rinciples of Phathammavong, Garco's Point "B" should be disregarded and stricken. 
2. Although Garco knew from the outset that this Court's original decision 
•anting summary judgment in favor of Reagan rested in large part on Sherman Co. v. United States, 
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258 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1958), Garco attempts for the first time in its Reply Memo to distinguish that 
case from the facts at bar. (Reply Memo, p. 7). Garco's reading of Sherman is wholly incorrect, in 
that the Sherman Court specifically noted that there would be no restoration responsibility even in 
the absence of a restoration covenant. Id. at 882. Nevertheless, Garco's assertion, raised for the 
first time in its Reply Memo, should be disregarded. 
3. Points "D" and "E" on pages 8 and 9 of Garco's Reply Memo consist of 
arguments that rely in whole on an assertion completely unsupported by the record that Garco has 
made for the first time that Reagan did not remove its sign from Garco's property until July 19,1995, 
after the lease expired. Prior to filing the Reply Memo, Garco admitted that the sign was removed 
in June 1995. {See, e.g., "Reagan's [sign] was still up and being used by Reagan until June 19, 1995. 
.." Memorandum in Support of Garco's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 7, pO (emphasis 
added)). Garco has never before asserted that the sign was still in place after that date, and certainly 
not after July 9, 1995, when the lease expired. The Phathammavong court squarely rejected a similar 
effort to alter key dates at the last moment - in that case, in a reply memorandum in support of a 
motion to dismiss, the defendant suggested a different key operative date than that which he had 
previously argued. The Phathammavong court held that the trial court was correct in disregarding 
this new assertion. Garco is similarly prohibited from asserting any new date in its Reply Memo. 
Garco's entire Points "D" and UE" rest on this asserted new date, and they should be disregarded and 
stricken. 
4. Garco's Point "F," made on page 10 of its Reply Memo, is an entirely new 
argument regarding public policy. To the extent it characterizes Reagan's foundation as Cvwaste," 
J 
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it raises factual issues that have never been supported by Garco or addressed by either of the parties 
at any time. Raised in Garco's Reply Memo for the first time, this point must be disregarded and 
stricken. 
5. To the extent that Point II on page 11 of Garco's Reply Memo relies on 
Garco's Points "B," "D," "E," and "F," that point must also be disregarded and stricken. 
6. Garco asks, for the first time in its Reply Memo (p. 12), that this Court stay 
its decision on whether Reagan acted by improper means until the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah rules on the antitrust claim that Garco filed in that court on the same day that it 
filed its Reply Memo. This request raises a whole host of new issues, including but not limited to 
whether Garco, who initially chose this state court forum in which to litigate its alleged dispute 
against Reagan, should be allowed to attempt to circumvent this Court's previous ruling (a ruling 
which Garco obviously does not like), by filing new allegations based on the same conduct in a 
different forum. Garco's grasping attempt to prolong this litigation while it pursues its outrageous 
and meritless claims in federal court, must be stricken. 
It is totally unfair for Garco to attempt to place matters before this Court in its Reply Memo 
to which Reagan is not allowed to respond. Therefore, the Court should not consider those portions 
of Garco's Reply Memo that violate the spirit as well as the letter of the rules governing this matter. 
An order should be entered striking from the record Garco's request for the Court to stay its decision 
in any way pending the outcome of the federal court litigation, Garco's incorrect statements 
regarding Sherman, and Points "B," "D," "E," "F," and "II" of Garco's Reply Memo. 
4 
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DATED this [5 day of March, 1998. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C, 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Leslie Van Frank 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Counterclaim Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
mailed, U.S. First class, postage prepaid, on this (o day of March, 1998, to the following: 
F. Mark Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
624 North 300 West, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103—— 
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F. Mark Hansen, #5078 
404 East 4500 South, Suite B-34 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 266-2882 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 'Sr-t^ • v 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a ] 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ] 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ; 
Defendant. 
i PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
> Civil No. 960906388 
1 Judge William B. Bohling 
Plaintiff U.P.C, Inc. d/b/a Garco Industrial Park responds to Defendant's Motion to Strike 
certain matters in Garco's Motion to Revise Order and Judgment Dismissing Complaint as follows: 
ARGUMENT 
1. Point 1(B) - The Written Lease Agreement Was Unenforceable. 
Reagan admits it is appropriate to include in a reply memorandum arguments "rebutting 
matters raised in the memorandum opposing the motion." [Memo in support of Motion to Strike, 
p. 2] On pages 2-3 of Reagan's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Revise Order, Reagan argued the 
Court was adequately informed and had effectively ruled on the arguments raised in Garco's cross-
motion: 
While Reagan had not had time to brief Garco's cross-motion at the time of the 
November 24th hearing, Garco's counsel nevertheless argued most if not all of the 
facts and the legal arguments that had been set forth in that cross-motion. ... fflhe 
Court heard and ruled upon most if not all of the facts and legal arguments that 
Garco now seeks to have the Court reconsider. 
Garco is entitled to rebut that argument in its reply memorandum. One of the arguments 
raised in Garco's cross-motion for summary judgment, that was not adequately argued and ruled 
r i | 
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on, was that the Lease Agreement was unenforceable, among other reasons because it was an 
adhesion contract. [Garco's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 
13] Reagan having argued in its opposing memorandum that "most if not all the facts and the legal 
arguments" had been argued and ruled on, Garco was entitled to make any arguments the facts and 
law allow tending to rebut Reagan's argument. In light of Reagan's argument it was proper for 
Garco to point out legal arguments that had not been argued and ruled on. Garco's Point 1(B) is 
proper rebuttal of Reagan's argument, and should not be stricken. 
2. Garco's Argument On The Import of Sherman Co. v. United States. 
Reagan's argument regarding the Sherman case reduces to the proposition that Rule 4-
501(l)(c) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration requires a movant to anticipate all cases a 
non-movant might rely on, and distinguish those cases in its opening memorandum, as a prerequisite 
to making the same rebuttal arguments in its reply memorandum. Even to state the proposition 
proves its fallacy. Garco correctly did not rely on Sherman in its opening memorandum because 
the case is not on point. When Reagan attempted to argue the Sherman holding should apply to a 
different set of facts that the facts upon which it was decided, it was proper for Garco to rebut 
Reagan's argument by distinguishing Sherman on its facts. Reagan may differ with Garco's reading 
3f the case, but Garco's rebuttal argument was appropriate. 
} . Point 1(D) - Reagan Had No Contractual Right To Remove the Sign As It Did. 
J. Point 1(E) - Reagan's Duty Not To Commit Waste. 
Reagan's argument, that these two points "rely in whole on an assertion ... that Reagan did 
lot remove its sign from Garco's property until July 19, 1995," is incorrect. l At page 4 of its 
>pposing memorandum Reagan's argued its June 12, 1995 letter was an alleged contract 
nodification lacking consideration. Garco was entitled to rebut that argument by pointing out that 
1
 Reagan correctly points out the date according to the evidence proferred on summary 
idgment was June 19, not July 19. Garco apologizes for any confusion. Since Reagan contended 
une 19, 1995 was the date, Garco accepted that date as undisputed for purposes of summary 
idgment only. Garco is still determining the actual date the sign was cut off.. 
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the letter was not a contract "modification" as such, but rather clarified an ambiguity in the parties' 
agreement, to memorialize the parties' mutual intent both as to how the sign would be removed 
(i.e., according to Reagan itself, that Reagan would remove the entire structure including the 
foundation) and when it would be removed (i.e., according to Reagan, "immediately"). Garco's 
Points 1(D) and (E) show Reagan acted in abrogation of the parties' mutual intent both as to the 
method and timing of its sign removal, and that there are triable questions of fact as to when 
Reagan's right to remove the sign expired. 
5. Point 1(F) - Public Policy Considerations. 
Under Rule 54(b), it is within the Court's sound discretion to revise any non-final order at 
any time, for any reason, either on motion or sua sponte. On page 2 of its opposing memorandum, 
Reagan incorrectly argued Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884P.2d 1306,1311 (Utah App. 1994) 
bars the Court from revising its Order unless one of 6 specific factors was present, including "(1) 
that the matter is presented in a 'different light' or under 'different circumstances;' ... or (6) an 
issue was inadequately briefed when first contemplated by the court." Reagan then argued none of 
those factors were present. Garco is entitled to make any arguments the facts and law allow that 
tend to rebut Reagan's argument. 
The public policy arguments form a good part of the legal basis for the arguments regarding 
waste and good faith Garco expressly made earlier. The public policy arguments are sound, and 
show (rebutting Reagan's argument to the contrary) that at least two of the Trembly factors are 
present. The public policy arguments indeed present the matter in a "different light", and while 
implicitly raised in the argument against allowing waste, were inadequately briefed, and certainly 
not fully considered, when first contemplated by the court. The Court can and should weigh the 
public policy considerations when resolving whether to revise its Order. 
6. Point II - Reagan's Unlawful Detainer. 
Garco stands by its position on its unlawful detainer claim. 
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7. Federal Court Jurisdiction Over Garco's Antitrust Claims against Reagan. 
Garco agrees with Reagan in one respect. Garco's antitrust claims indeed "raises a whole 
host of new issues," issues that preclude summary judgment on Garco's intentional interference 
claim. Garco raised the effect of those claims in points 1(3) and (4) of its opening memorandum. 
Garco could not have brought its Sherman Act claims in its original Complaint. It did not then have 
sufficient evidence of Reagan's monopolistic intent, could not then allege a federal claim and could 
not choose a federal forum. It was not until Reagan made its arguments on summary judgment, and 
the Court held based on those arguments that Reagan acted for the express purpose of "forestalling 
competitive activity", that Garco had the proof it needed to make those claims. Since 15 U.S.C. 
§§15 and 22 give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction, Garco could not choose a state forum for 
those claims. An antitrust violation would certainly be an "improper means" to support an 
intentional interference claim, so it would not be proper for the Court now to conclude that there 
is no genuine issue of fact and that Reagan did not employ improper means as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Reagan's main gripe appears to be its final point, that it supposedly "is not allowed to 
respond." Reagan's position is not well taken. Reagan has had all the opportunity to respond the 
Rules allow. Given the Court's broad discretion under Rule 54(b) (for that is, after all, what is at 
issue here), the Court should give due consideration to all available information and issues when 
deciding whether to revise its Order. In the interest of being fully informed, and for the reasons 
stated above, the Court should deny Reagan's Motion to Strike. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of March, 1998. 
/?"^.£ *ji ' 
-Attorney for Plaintiff ~T 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify on March ^ _ _ ' 1998 a true and correct copy of the above was served by first-
class mail to: 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Leslie Van Frank 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
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Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690) 
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaim 
Plaintiff R.O.A. General, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a ; 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ; 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) REPLY MEMORANDUM 
) IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
) MOTION TO STRIKE 
> Civil No. 960906388 
i Judge William B. Bohling 
Defendant ("Reagan"), by and through its undersigned counsel, files the following Reply 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Strike. 
1. Point "B " - Garco is, in fact, entitled in its Reply Memo to raise matters that might 
rebut Reagan's position that this Court has already heard and ruled upon the arguments that Garco 
originally raised in its principal memorandum supporting its Motion to Reconsider ("Principal 
Memo"). However, this does not give Garco carte blanche to raise legal arguments that it wished 
it had raised in the Principal Memo - legal arguments that have never yet been presented to the 
Court, including Garco's brand new argument that the Lease is somehow unenforceable. That new 
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3AL7 L 
. j 
B Y _ _ ^ ; _ Hr, 
0L7WY cl.erir 
ft ft ft r; n o 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
argument is not rebuttal of anything that Reagan had pointed out in its opposition to the Motion to 
Reconsider, but is a brand new argument that Garco thought of at the last minute and raised for the 
first time in its Reply Memo. As such, the argument made at Point "B" of the Reply Memo cannot 
be considered in connection with Garco's Motion to Reconsider and it should be stricken in 
accordance with State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001 (Ut.App. 1993). 
2. Garco's Incorrect Distinction of Sherman Co. v. United States - Since this Court 
relied at least in part on the body of law represented by Sherman in granting Reagan's motion for 
summary judgment, it stands to reason that in asking the Court to reconsider its decision, Garco 
should have anticipated that Reagan would be raising that law in its opposition to Garco's Motion 
to Reconsider, and that Garco would have addressed that law in its Principal Memo. Rather than 
quibble with Garco, however, on what, it could or should have anticipated Reagan would raise, 
Reagan withdraws its Motion to Strike Garco's attempt to distinguish Sherman, recognizing that the 
Court can read the case for itself to determine that Garco's reading is inaccurate. 
3. Points "D" and "E" - Garco's attempt: to encourage this Court to reconsider its prior 
ruling is becoming increasingly brash. In resisting Reagan's Motion to Strike, Garco claims that it 
was Reagan, and not Garco, who had originally argued that Reagan's June 12, 1995 letter to Garco 
was a contract modification. (Garco's Response to Motion to Strike, pp. 2-3). Garco then states that 
Points a D" and "E" were raised to show that "the letter was not a contract 'modification' as such, 
but rather clarified an ambiguity in the parties' agreement. . ." (Id. at p. 3). The record specifically 
contradicts Garco's statements. At pages 3 and 4 of its Principal Memo filed in support of its 
Motion to Reconsider, Garco specifically claimed that the parties had "modified their [lease] 
2 
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agreement" by way of correspondence, and that Reagan thereafter had "an express duty to remove 
its sign foundation." Reagan pointed in its opposition to the Motion to Reconsider out that there was 
no consideration for that alleged modification. Garco then changed its approach, claiming in its 
Reply Memo for the first time that there was an ambiguity in the original agreement, and asserting 
that (instead of a modification), the correspondence reflected the parties' mutual understanding that 
the sign needed to be removed before the lease expired. Reply Memo, p. 8. The point of Garco's 
argument was Garco's assertion that Reagan did not remove its sign foundation until after the lease 
expired on July 8th, and that Reagan thereby supposedly lost its contractual right to remove the sign. 
Reply Memo, p. 9. Point "E" similarly rests in Garco's assertion, made for the first time in the Reply 
Memo, that Reagan "forfeited any contractual right to remove the sign and was already in trespass 
when it cut the sign down." Garco Memo, p. 9. Both of these arguments fail as a matter of law if 
Reagan removed its sign before the lease expired, a fact that Garco had admitted at the time of 
summary judgment. Garco never asserted at any time until its Reply Memo that the sign did not 
come down before July 8th when the lease expired. Points "D" and "E", which rely wholly on this 
newly-asserted date, must be disregarded in accordance with the principles of Phathammavong. 
4. Point "F" - Here again, Garco has taken Reagan's arguments regarding Rule 54(b) 
as carte blanche to raise anything and everything it can think of in order to convince this Court that 
it should reverse its prior grant of summary judgment in Reagan's favor. Trembley v. Mrs. Fields 
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 (Ut.App. 1994) indicates that a litigant hoping to change a Court's mind 
should be prepared to show that at least one the Trembly factors is present. None of those factors 
were present in Garco's Principal Memo filed in support of the Motion to Reconsider. In apparent 
3 
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( 
recognition of that deficit, and to bolster its claim that the Court should reconsider its prior grant of 
summary judgment, Garco presented its new public policy argument in its Reply Memo. Notably, 
Garco presented no evidence at all to support this argument. The argument is simply a last-ditch 
attempt by Garco to have this Court reverse a ruling that Garco does not like. Not having been raised 
in Garco's Principal Memo, the argument must be disregarded in the Reply Memo. 
5. Point II - As Reagan pointed out in its opening memorandum in support of its Motion 
to Strike, to the extent that Point II of Garco's Reply Memo relies on Garco's Points "B," "D," "E," 
and "F," that point must also be disregarded and stricken. 
6. Request for Court to Stay Ruling until Federal Antitrust Claims are Determined - In 
responding to Reagan's point that Garco was the one who initially chose this state court forum in 
which to have its claims determined, Garco asserts that it could not have brought its Sherman Act 
claims against Reagan because did not have sufficient evidence regarding Reagan's intent until the 
time of summary judgment. This is not true. The allegations of Garco's antitrust complaint against 
Reagan regarding Reagan's intent are as follows: 
(a) In October 1992, Hall told Garco that unless Garco agreed to Reagan's terms 
for a new lease, Reagan would remove its sign and place it such that Garco 
could not do business with anyone else. (Federal Complaint, ^(15). 
(b) Dewey Reagan told Garco essentially the same thing. (Federal Complaint, 
122). 
(c) In September 1995, Reagan further indicated to Garco that Reagan's 
placement of the sign was within Reagan's control, that Reagan chose the 
4 
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placement of the sign to block Reagan's competition from doing business 
with Garco, and that Reagan had acted to coerce Garco into a new lease on 
anticompetitive terms. (Federal Complaint, [^26). 
These alleged facts were fully known to Garco prior to its 1996 filing of the complaint that 
is at issue in this case. They were also known to Garco at the time of Reagan's summary judgment 
motion. To raise antitrust allegations for the first time in a Reply Memo in an effort to have this 
Court reverse its decision granting summary judgment for Reagan and then stay its decision pending 
the outcome of federal court antitrust litigation is completely inexcusable. 
The only additional assertion that Garco has made in its antitrust complaint that it may not 
have known when it filed this lawsuit is that this Court found, based on Reagan's arguments at 
summary judgment, that Reagan had acted for the express purpose of "forestalling competitive 
activity." (Federal Complaint, 1J27).1 This assertion, however, is completely untrue. Garco has 
taken that phrase completely out of context. What this Court ordered was that even if Garco's 
allegations regarding Reagan's purpose in moving the sign were to be taken as true, there would 
be no liability for intentional interference with Garco's prospective economic relations, for such a 
purpose (even if it were to be taken as true) constitutes legitimate competitive activity, "consistent 
with an effort by defendant to achieve the long-range economic goal of maximizing its profits from 
1
 The phrase "forestalling competitive activity" comes directly from the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Leigh Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 307 (1982), where the Supreme Court 
noted that competitive commercial activity "such as a businessman's efforts to forestall a 
competitor in order to further his own long-range economic interests," did not constitute tortious 
conduct. "The law offers no remedy for those damages -- even if intentional - because they are 
an inevitable by-product of competition." Id. 
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its outdoor advertising signs in the area by forestalling competitive activity on the plaintiffs 
property." Court's 12/16/97 Order. At the time of Reagan's summary judgment motion, the facts 
regarding Reagan's purpose in moving the sign were hotly disputed ~ the Court only assumed for 
purposes of Reagan's motion that Garco's allegations were true. Garco's mischaracterization of this 
Court's Order to the Federal District Court for the District of Utah (as well as to this Courtt) is 
sanctionable — and certainly does not establish any basis for this Court to reverse its prior ruling or 
to stay any decision on whether or not Reagan acted by improper means. Garco chose the forum, 
and to the extent Garco requests in its Reply Memo that this Court stay any ruling while Garco 
attempts to convince the federal court that there is some actionable claim in Reagan's conduct, 
Garco's request must be stricken in accordance with Phathammavong. 
WHEREFORE, Reagan respectfully requests that this Court enter an order striking from the 
record Garco's request for the Court to stay its decision in any way pending the outcome of the 
federal court litigation, as well as Points "B," UD," "E," "F," and "II" of Garco's Reply Memo. 
DATED this 3 ^ d a y of March, 1998. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Leslie Van Frank 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Counterclaim Plaintiff 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
mailed, U.S. First class, postage prepaid, on this 3° day of March, 1998, to the following: 
F. Mark Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
624 North 300 West, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY - STATE OF UTAH 
MINUTE ENTRY DECISION 
U.P.C., Inc. D/b/a : 
Garco Industrial Park : Case No.960906388 
Plaintiff, 
-vs- : JUDGE: WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
R.O.A General, Inc. d/b/a: 
Reagan Outdoor Advertis : Date: April 8, 1998 
Defendants : 
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Revise Order and 
Judment Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint, submitted on 
plaintiff's March 23, 1998 notice, and defendant's Motion to 
Strike, submitted on defendant's March 30, 1998 notice. Having 
reviewed the parties memorandum, being fully advised, and good 
cause appearing, the Court rules as follows: 
1) Plaintiff's motion to revise is denied. Motions to 
reconsider are not favored. None of plaintiff's arguments 
persuade the Court that its original ruling was not proper. On 
the contrary, plaintiff's arguments essentially rehash arguments 
already fully considered. 
2) Defendant's motion to Strike is granted, as limited in 
defendant's reply memorandum. The Court believes State 
vs.Phathammavong,8 60 P.2d 1001,(1993), sets forth the principles 
of law governing plaintiff's reply memorandum. It is persuaded 
the many points in plaintiff's reply memorandum not previously 
raised are properly stricken as defendant urges. 
A (i I) % 1 
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3) Defendant is requested to prepare an Order consistent 
with the Court's ruling. 
Dated this 8 day of April, 1998 
By the Court 
/y u°2>/^ 
Judge William B. Bohling 
WBB/mtr 
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Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690) 
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaim 
Plaintiff R.O.A. General, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a ; 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ; 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) ORDER 
) Civil No. 960906388 
) Judge William B. Bohling 
The Plaintiffs Motion to Revise Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint and 
the Defendant's Motion to Strike, both having come before the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501, 
U.CJ.Admin., the Court having reviewed the pleadings and the file and for good cause otherwise 
appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Strike Points "B," "D," "E," "F," and "II" of Garco's 
Reply Memo is granted. 
FILED OGfflCWn 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 0 1 1998 
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2. Plaintiffs Motion to Revise Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs 
Complaint is denied. 
DATED this ( _ day of April; 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
fl UjW 
William B. Bohling 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
'7vLt?rfA l
: Mark Hansen 
attorney forPlaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
is*" 
lailed, U.S. First class, postage prepaid, on this ^ day of April, 1998, to the following: 
F. Mark Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
404 East 4500 South, Suite B-34 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
d.ESL!BAl>R98'ROAUPC.ORD 
? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Tab 24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690) 
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff 
FILED D6STKICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 0 1 1996 
SAO' U OOtoTY 
iksxjtv Clartc 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a ] 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ', 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ] 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ) 
Defendant. ) 
) ORDER DISMISSING 
) COUNTERCLAIM, 
) WITHOUT PREJUDICE 
I Civil No. 960906388 
1 Judge William B. Bohling 
The parties' Stipulated Motion for Dismissal of Counterclaim, Without Prejudice, having 
come before the Court, and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant's Counterclaim is hereby dismissed, without prejudice. 
DATED this _ \ day of-AprtfjK998. 
BY THE COURT: 
William B. Bohling 
District Court Judge 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
/ LR-MarkHs 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant 
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F. Mark Hansen, #5078 
404 East 4500 South, Suite B-34 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 266-2882 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
no 
FILED 
S8j\JH-\ PH12: 30 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
iX&'i^JRiCT coir>r 
U.P.C., INC. d/b/a ] 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ; 
vs. ] 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ; 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ; 
Defendant and Appellee. ) 
i NOTICE OF APPEAL 
> Civil No. 960906388 
) Judge William B. Bohling 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff and Appellant, U.P.C., Inc. d/b/a Garco Industrial 
Park, through the above-named counsel, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final order of the 
Honorable William B. Bohling entered in this matter on May 1, 1998. The appeal is taken from 
the entire order. 
/ DATED this day of June, 1998. 
mail to: 
I certify on June / 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
, 1998 a true and correct copy of the above was served by first-class 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Leslie Van Frank 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
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